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ABSTRACT
THE PATH TO SUPERSUBSTANTIVALISM
MAY 2016
JOSHUA D. MOULTON
B.A., REED COLLEGE
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Phillip Bricker
This dissertation is divided into two parts. In the first part I defend substantival-
ism. I do this by offering, in chapter 1, a counterpart-theoretic defense of substantival-
ism from Leibniz’ shift arguments. Then, in chapter 2, I defend substantivalism from
the hole argument and argue, against the consensus, that the question of haecceitism
is irrelevant to substantivalism in the context of general relativity.
In the second part of the dissertation I defend supersubstantivalism. I do this by
offering, in chapter 3, an argument against dualistic substantivalism. The argument
appeals to plausible principles of modal plenitude to show that the dualist is commit-
ted to a range of problematic possibilities. Then, in chapter 4, I consider a range of
supersubstantivalist positions. I conclude by arguing for a version of supersubstanti-
valism I call compresence supersubstantivalism.
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PREFACE
Our world is made either mostly or completely of material things – material ob-
jects, or material fields – separated by various spatiotemporal distance relations. But
this leaves much open. In particular, it leaves open the question of just what sort
of entity material objects are, and what it is in virtue of which they bear various
distance relations. Perhaps the only fundamental, concrete objects there are are the
material ones. And perhaps the way to explain spatiotemporality – the fact that
material objects are separated by various spatiotemporal distances – is in terms of
relations that these material things bear directly to one another. This is relational-
ism. Relationalism is typically traced back to Leibniz, and has enjoyed the support
of people like Mach, and, at times, Einstein.
But perhaps relationalists have it wrong. Perhaps the relational ontology omits
an entire category of entity. Perhaps material objects are not the only sort of funda-
mental, concrete objects; perhaps spacetime (or its basic parts) is also a fundamental,
concrete object. This is substantivalism. On this sort of view, spatiotemporality is
in the first place a feature of spacetime, and it is in virtue of their relationship to
spacetime that material objects are spatiotemporal. This view also has an impressive
pedigree, which includes people like Newton, and, at times, Einstein, as well as most
contemporary philosophers.
Given substantivalism, there is a further question regarding the nature of the re-
lationship between material objects and parts of spacetime. Is this relationship like
the relationship between a muffin-tin and its muffins – the former being distinct from
the later, but with the two united by a relation of occupancy. Or is it more like
the relationship between an eddy in a body of water – the former being something
vii
like a property of the latter. Substantivalists who favor the muffins-in-muffin-tins
analogy are dualists. According to dualists, material objects and spacetime are fun-
damentally different sorts of thing, the two are united by an occupation relation that
binds them together and underwrites their collaboration in composing physical real-
ity. Substantivalists who favor the eddies-in-water analogy are supersubstantivalists.
Supersubstantivalists think that spacetime (or its basic parts) is the only fundamen-
tal, concrete object, and that material objects are reducible to regions of spacetime
and their properties.
Each of the following chapters is more or less self-contained. But cumulatively they
lead to the conclusion that supersubstantivalism is the best metaphysical theory of
spacetime. In the first chapter I consider some of the history of the dispute between
substantivalists and relationalists. I offer my own, preferred response on behalf of
the substantivalist to the challenges posed by Leibniz in his famous correspondence
with Clarke. Then in the second chapter I offer a response to the most famous
contemporary challenge to substantivalism: the hole argument. I agree with many
others that substantivalism escapes unscathed from the argument. But I disagree
about the overall impact of the argument. Most have interpreted it as placing pressure
on substantivalists who also accept haecceitism. I appeal to a novel conception of the
relationship between the mathematical models of a physical theory and the worlds
at which that theory is true to show that this interpretation is wrong: there is no
pressure at all on substantivalists who also accept haecceitism.
The first two chapters comprise my defense of substantivalism. In the following two
chapters, I argue that supersubstantivalism is the best version of substantivalism. In
the third chapter I argue against dualism by showing that the conjunction of dualism
and plausible principles of modal plenitude entail a range of troubling consequences.
In the fourth and final chapter I explain that supersubstantivalism is not a single view,
but a family of views. I then show that different members of the family have different
viii
strengths and weaknesses. I conclude by arguing for a version of supersubstantivalism
– compresence supersubstantivalism – that is compatible with the possibility of co-
location.
...
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CHAPTER 1
SPATIOTEMPORAL STRUCTURES AND LEIBNIZ
AGAINST SUBSTANTIVALISM
Modern substantivalism is typically traced back to the conceptions of space and
time Newton appealed to in developing his physics. In this chapter I will discuss these
conceptions, and examine two of Leibniz’ famous arguments against them: the so-
called static shift and kinematic shift arguments. We will find that these arguments
prompt different replies from the substantivalist. The kinematic shift will show a
substantivalist that he must give up Newton’s Absolute space and time and accept a
different sort of spatial and temporal structure instead. The static shift, on the other
hand, requires a substantivalist to clarify his modal commitments.1
1.1 Absolute Space and Time and Leibniz’ Attack
The Ancient Greeks believed that different sorts of material obeyed different sorts
of natural laws. Thus, it was thought to be of the nature of Earth and Water to move
in a straight line towards the center of the universe, of the nature of Fire and Air to
move in a straight line away from it, and of the nature of aether to uniformly rotate
about it. Different things have different sorts of natural motion.
Part of what was revolutionary about the physics Newton offered as an alternative
to that of the ancient Greeks was that its central claims did not discriminate between
1Note that it is usually more convenient to speak of material objects as though they occupy,
rather than are identical, various regions of spacetime. In the second part of the dissertation, I will
defend an identity account over an occupancy account. In the interim, however, I’ll help myself to
the language of the occupancy account.
1
the various sorts of matter. Matter – all matter – obeys certain laws of motion. One
of the best known of these – and the only one that need detain us – is Newton’s First
Law.
First Law: Every body perseveres in its state of either rest or of uniform
motion in a straight line, except insofar as it is compelled to change its state
by impressed forces.2
The philosophical question is this: How must physical reality be composed so as
to make the First Law possible? What sorts of structures does it presuppose? In
particular, how are we to cash-out the notions of rest and uniform motion in a straight
line?
Newton believed that in order to underwrite the First Law (and also subsequent
Laws of motion), reality must include both Absolute space and Absolute time. Leibniz
thought that these structures were metaphysically objectionable, and so rejected the
physics on which they were based (although he failed to ever provide a satisfactory
alternative). In this section we will examine the structures of Absolute space and
time and consider Leibniz’s argument against them. In the following section, we will
consider replies.
1.1.1 Symmetry and Covariance Groups
Distinguish a geometric symmetry from a mechanical symmetry. To do this, first
note that an isometry is a distance-preserving map between geometric structures.
Now let us say that an isometry from a geometric structure G to itself is a geometric
symmetry, and that the set of all geometric symmetries of G is the symmetry group of
G. Roughly, the symmetry group associated with a geometric structure of a certain
type – for example, a two dimensional sphere – is constituted by the range of actions
2This is Maudlin’s (2012, p. 4) translation.
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that may be performed on that structure without changing the properties that make
it count as a thing of that type – that is, all the stuff you can do to a sphere without
making it something other than a sphere. A mechanical symmetry, on the other
hand, has to do with the forms equations governing a physical system may take. For
example, an equation governing a physical system involving coordinates displays a
mechanical symmetry when there are alternative choices of coordinates which preserve
the form of the equation. When such alternatives exist, the equation is said to be
covariant with respect to this class of alternatives, and the covariance group of the
equation is the set of all alternatives that leave the form of the equation unchanged.
A useful way to look at the dispute between Newton and Leibniz – and cer-
tainly a good way to characterize the general dispute between substantivalists and
relationalists – is as one that concerns the relationship between the class of geomet-
ric symmetries and the class of mechanical symmetries associated with a particular
physical theory. For example, a typical anti-substantivalist line of attack proceeds
by charging the substantivalist with accepting an interpretation of a physical theory
wherein the group of geometric symmetries associated with that theory form a proper
subgroup of the group of mechanical symmetries associated with that theory. This
is thought to be problematic because it is only mechanical phenomena and not the
geometric backdrop of a theory, that can be associated with observable quantities.
So, if there is more geometric structure than required to ground the mechanics, we
seem to have an ontology that is needlessly bloated. And, the thought continues,
since a lean ontology is ceteris paribus better than a bloated one, we ought to reject
the substantivalist ontology. Now to the details.
1.1.2 Absolute Space and Time
In his Scholium to the Definitions in Principia, Newton claims that “Absolute,
true, and mathematical time, of itself, and from its own nature, flows equally without
3
relation to anything external [and] . . . Absolute space, in its own nature, without rela-
tion to anything external, remains always similar and immovable.” These claims are
representative of a picture that is standardly interpreted3 as Newton’s endorsement
of the view that Absolute space has the structure of an instantaneous, 3-dimensional,
infinite Euclidean space, and that Absolute space persists through Absolute time.
The following discussion will be an explication of these concepts.
1.1.2.1 Absolute Space
An n-dimensional Euclidean space – En for short – is a special sort of set of points.
It is a set of points that possesses topological, affine, and metrical structure.
We begin with topology. Consider a circle drawn on a piece of paper. Now consider
two sets: the set of points that lie strictly within the interior of the circle, and the set
of points that are within or on the circle. The first is an example of an open set, the
second is an example of a closed set. The open set does not include any boundary
points, the closed set does. Given the notion of an open set, we may characterize
topological spaces in the following terms.
Definition 1.1.1. When X is a non-empty set, a set τ of open subsets of X is a
topology on X if and only if:
1. {∅} ∈ τ , and {X} ∈ τ .
2. τ is closed under arbitrary unions.
3. τ is closed under finite intersections.
When these conditions are satisfied, subsets of X whose complements are in τ are the
closed sets, and the pair (X, τ) is a topological space.
3C.f., Earman (1989), and Pooley (2012)
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Defining a topology on X allows us to ground certain important distinctions. Chief
among these is the distinction between continuous and discontinuous paths through
a topological space. To illustrate, imagine a lump of clay. Suppose I were to stretch
the lump into something resembling a snake, and then join the ends together to form
a ring. When I do this I change the open set structure of the points that compose the
lump of clay: whereas prior to the joining there were boundaries at both the tail and
the head, and so certain closed sets at the tail and the head, after the joining, these
boundaries, and so the corresponding closed sets, were removed, leaving open sets in
their place. Likewise, if we imagine that I first reform the clay into a lump, and then
tear a hole in the middle, we can see that I change the open set structure of the clay,
and so its topology, by tearing: where certain open sets populated the area around
the tear, there are now certain closed set – sets with boundaries – in that area.4
We can extend the notion of open and closed set structure to the notion of conti-
nuity by thinking of the boundaries included in closed sets as “barriers” that paths
cannot cross. In the case of the snake and the ring, it is clear to see that in the process
of changing the open set structure by joining I also change the set of continuous paths.
Consider a point a near the head of the snake, and a point b near the tail. Prior to
the joining, the only way to get from a to b is to traverse the length of the snake.
After the joining, there is a path between a and b that exploits the newly-joined head
and tail. Similarly, we can see that in the case of the lump with the hole, certain
continuous paths within the lump are rendered discontinuous after creating the hole.
A further important feature of topological spaces regards criteria for equivalence.
Topological spaces are topologically equivalent when there is a mapping between
them – called a homeomorphism – that preserves open and closed set structure. A
4This example assumes a connection between the metric and topological structures of spaces.
Namely, that the topology of the space is the topology induced by the metric. See fn. 5 of this
chapter.
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homeomorphism is a mapping φ between topological spaces (X, τX) and (Y, τY ) where
φ assigns every open subset of (X, τX) to an open subset of (Y, τY ) and every closed
subset of (X, τX) to a closed subset of (Y, τY ), in such a way that every subset of
(Y, τY ) is mapped to by exactly one subset of (X, τX). What is interesting about
these criteria for equivalence is that they count things which seem intuitively to be
very different – like spheres and cubes – as topologically equivalent.
Next we need to characterize the notion of affine structure over our set X. Here
a rough, intuitive gloss will do. Affine structure over a set X grounds the distinction
between straight and bent lines through X. Notice that such a distinction does not
fall out of the definition of a topological space in terms of open sets – if a sphere and
a cube are topologically equivalent (they are), then topology must not recognize a
distinction between the straight lines of the cube and the bent lines of the sphere.
But we all know that it is central to Euclid’s geometry that there be a notion of
straightness – the first two postulates make explicit reference to straight lines. So
if this notion is not supplied by the topology, we’ll need to either posit the affine
structure of a space as sui generis structure or we’ll have to show that it falls out of
some other structures associated with our space.
The third geometric structure we require is that given by a metric on En. We
approach this idea via the following definition.
Definition 1.1.2. Let X be a non-empty set and let d be a function d: X ×X → R.
If d is such that for all (u, v) ∈ X:
1. d(u, v) ≥ 0, with d(u, v) = 0 iff u = v Positive definiteness
2. d(u, v) = d(v, u) Symmetry
3. d(u, v) + d(v, w) ≥ d(u,w) Triangle Inequality
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then d is a metric on the set X, and the pair (X, d) is a metric space.5
Now, intuitively, a metric on a set is like physical distance between places as
measured by a ruler. But a bit of care is required in unfolding the potential physical
significance of a metric. To begin, note that each element of the codomain of d is
simply some n ∈ R, where n has no units attached to it: n could represent miles,
meters, minutes, or moles. The metric is silent about units. What it allows us to do,
however, is calculate relative magnitudes. If d(u, v) = 2 and d(s, t) = 8 then we know
that d(s, t) is four times d(u, v). The metric is also silent about scale in the following
sense. If d(u, v) = 2 and d′(u, v) = 10, then d and d′ disagree with respect to (u, v)
by a scale factor of 5. If d and d′ differ by a scale factor of 5 for all elements in their
domain, then d and d′ represent the same metrical structure. The consequence of this
is that differences in scale factor of a metric function have no real significance for the
spaces they describe.
So far we have been discussing various geometric properties of En. These geomet-
ric properties have fairly straightforward physical significance: topological structure
grounds the distinction between continuous and discontinuous motion in physical
space; affine structure grounds the distinction between inertial and accelerated mo-
tion in a physical space; metrical structure grounds distance relations in physical
space. But there is a great deal missing here from the perspective of physics. To
actually do physics, it is convenient to be able to calculate quantities, to add and
subtract things, multiply and divide things, differentiate and integrate things, etc.
To do this, one typically relies on a systematic link between numbers – more specifi-
5A quick note about metric spaces. Given a metric d on a space X, we may define a topology on
X in terms of d by thinking of the open set structure as induced by d. For example, we may specify
a topology over X by appeal to open balls, where an open ball centered on y ∈ X is the set of
all points x ∈ X such that, for some specified n ∈ R, d(x, y) < n. This is perhaps a more intuitive
avenue for characterizing the notion of open set structure, but it obscures somewhat the fact that
the set of metric spaces forms a proper subset of the set of topological spaces.
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cally an algebraic structure – and geometric structure. We can get this by introducing
coordinates.
Although there are many ways to coordinatize a space, a particularly convenient
way is to appeal to the real numbers. We do this by putting the elements of En into
one-to-one correspondence with elements of Rn, and we require that this correspon-
dence satisfy several constraints. First, we want the topology of the physical space
and the topology of the coordinate space to be related in such a way that continuous
paths through physical space correspond to continuous changes in coordinates. Sec-
ond, we want our coordinate space to reflect the affine structure of physical space.
We can get this by requiring that the coordinates of straight lines in physical space
satisfy linear equations. Finally, we want the metric structure of our coordinate space
to reflect the metric structure of our physical space. One way to do this is by using
the familiar Euclidean metric function. Where x, y, and z are variables that range
over Cartesian coordinates of points p and q under a given coordinatization in a space
with dimension 3, the distance between points p and q is given as follows:
d(p, q) =
√
(x(p)− x(q))2 + (y(p)− y(q))2 + (z(p)− z(q))2. (1.1)
So, to sum up: Newton’s Absolute space is a set of points endowed with the topo-
logical, affine, and metrical structure of E3. Moreover, the standard coordinatization
of E3 involves using R3 in a way that satisfies the constraints discussed above. Now
what about time?
1.1.2.2 Absolute Time
Absolute time, like Absolute space, is a set of points. We call these points ‘in-
stants’, and we call paths through this set ‘intervals’. Also like space, the set of
instants may be endowed with various geometric structures. In particular, the set
of instants has a topology, which grounds facts about continuous and discontinuous
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intervals, and it is equipped with a metric, which determines the relative magnitudes
of intervals. Finally, there is an important relationship between Absolute space and
time: Absolute space persists through Absolute time. That is, somehow or other
Absolute space exists at multiple distinct instants of Absolute time. Let’s begin by
clarifying how this might happen.
Let us say that an object perdures if and only if it persists by possessing distinct
parts at distinct times. A perduring object, then, is spread out temporally in much
the way that objects are spread out spatially; just as I have feet and hands for spatial
parts, I have infant, teenage, and retiree temporal parts. Let us juxtapose perdurance
with endurance. We’ll say that an object endures if and only if it persists by being
multiply located in time, and “wholly present” at every time at which it is located. To
clarify this a bit more, consider the difference between perdurantist and endurantist
analyses of change.
According to a perdurantist, objects can gain and lose parts and undergo change
with respect their intrinsic properties by having temporal parts that differ with respect
to which parts they possess and which intrinsic properties they instantiate. So the
change I undergo, for example, from being a 3 foot tall toddler to a 6 foot tall adult is
to be explained by me – the temporally extended continuant – having some temporal
parts that are 3 feet tall and other temporal parts that are 6 feet tall. According
to the endurantist, on the other hand, change in parts and with respect to intrinsic
properties is to be explained by taking parthood and certain properties to be relations
born between objects and times. So, for example, the endurantist analysis of the
change I undergo from being a 3 foot tall toddler to a 6 foot tall adult will involve
recasting my height properties as relations I bear to times: I bear the three-feet-at
relation to some times, and I bear that six-feet-at relation to some other times.
(Perdurantism is sometimes called a “crazy metaphysics” since, for example, it
entails that when I hold a piece of chalk in my clenched hand from 12:05 to 12:06,
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there is something that I have in my hand at 12:06 that wasn’t there at 12:05 despite
my hand remaining clenched – to wit, some temporal part of the chalk. There is
a similarly intuition-based complaint about endurantism: it too is crazy since, for
example, it entails that an apple’s being red involves something other than just the
apple and the color red – to wit, the time relative to which the apple is red. These
sorts of complaints should be given no weight at all. For surely the “intuitive” position
to take about persistence entails, for example, that my change from a short toddler to
a tall adult is one according to which it is me that has various height properties (not
temporal parts of me), and the height properties I have are had by me intimately
(they are not relations between me and anything else). Insofar as this is the folk
intuition, both perdurance and endurance are strange views. But this doesn’t bear
against either of these views, rather it shows that the folk view is incoherent!)
Back to Newton. In order to ground his claims about Absolute motion, Newton
requires that the points of space persist through time. Newton’s view that Absolute
space “remains always similar and immovable” suggests that he himself thought of
points as enduring.6 Be that as it may, Newton’s conception of Absolute space and
time is compatible with either modern view about the nature of persistence. But the
difference is worth mentioning. If one views Newton’s picture through the lens of
the endurance view, then the arena in which the mechanics of the universe unfold is
an infinite, three dimensional euclidean space that is multiply located in time. This
means that the very same points of Absolute space exist across distinct instants of
Absolute time. This numerical identity between points at distinct times gives the
endurantist a tidy way to characterize Absolute motion. First, characterize Absolute
rest in terms of the identities of points:
6C.f., Maudlin (2012).
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an object O experiences Absolute rest between times t and t′ iff the set of
points S of Absolute space that O occupies at t is identical to the set of points
of Absolute space that O occupies at t′, and there is no time t′′ between t and
t′ such that O fails to occupy S at t′′.
Then define Absolute motion in terms of Absolute rest:
an object O experiences Absolute motion between times t and t′ iff O does
not experience Absolute rest between t and t′.
Under the assumption of the perdurance view, points at distinct times are not nu-
merically identical. This means that a perduring object cannot satisfy the endurantist
characterization of Absolute rest, and that means that the perdurantist requires some
other means of characterizing Absolute motion. So, to begin, if one views Newton’s
picture through the lens of the perdurance view, then the arena in which the mechan-
ics of the universe unfold is a set of copies of an infinite, three dimensional euclidean
space – one copy at each instant of time. So while the endurance view is one of a single
space “sweeping through” time, the perdurance view is of successive spaces “stacked
up” time-wise. Another way to put the point is that while the endurance view is
compatible with thinking of Absolute space and time as rather distinct things, the
perdurantist is committed to viewing Absolute space and time as a product space: a
four-dimensional spacetime that is the product of Absolute space and Absolute time.
There is a consequence here for the perdurantist. In order to ground Absolute motion
in the absence of numerical identity between points at distinct times, the perdurantist
needs to claim that there are certain brute facts concerning which non-simultaneous
points are the “same” points. Once these facts are fixed, the perdurantist can proceed
to offer a definition of Absolute motion analogous to that offered by the endurantist,
save for the substitution of the perdurantist’s notion of sameness of points for the
endurantist’s identity between points.
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Note: while the endurantist account of Absolute motion can ultimately be cashed
out in terms of the identity of points, the perdurantist account requires certain brute
facts about the sameness of non-simultaneous points. This, because it is a sort of
theoretical economy, looks like an advantage for the endurance view. On the other
hand, endurantists require a fundamental distinction between spatial and temporal
points in order to cash out their account of Absolute motion. Perdurantists require
no such distinct; they treat all points simply as spacetime points. This, because it is
a sort of theoretical economy, looks like an advantage for the perdurance view. We
seem to have a tie between endurantism and perdurantism in the context of Absolute
space and time.
1.1.2.3 Symmetries of Absolute Space and Time
Because Absolute space has the geometry of E3, it inherits both the translational
and rotational symmetries that E3 possesses. The translational symmetry of E3 en-
sures that the geometric properties of objects do not depend on which regions of E3
they are embedded in, and the rotational symmetry of E3 ensures that the geometric
properties of objects do not depend on their orientation in E3. A space that pos-
sesses translational symmetry is homogenous, one that possesses rotational symmetry
is isotropic. So, because Absolute space is homogenous, the intrinsic properties and
relations of material objects are not affected by their placement in regions of Ab-
solute space: as far as the intrinsic properties and relations of material objects are
concerned, one region of Absolute space is just like any other. Because Absolute
space is isotropic, the intrinsic properties and relations of material objects are also
unaffected by direction – as far as the intrinsic properties and relations of material
objects are concerned, orientation in one direction of Absolute space is just like ori-
entation in any other. Absolute time also possesses translational symmetry, and it
is this symmetry that ensures that the intrinsic properties and relations of material
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objects do not depend upon their location in Absolute time. As we will see, these
geometric symmetries will be exploited by Newton’s opponents.
1.1.2.4 Mechanical Symmetries In Newtonian Physics
It will be easiest to approach the idea of mechanical symmetry by introducing the
notion of a frame of reference. To do this, we take a short detour. Recall Galileo’s
famous thought experiment concerning the relativity of inertial motion. We are to
suppose that we are in a windowless cabin below deck on a ship. In the cabin with us
are some things like balls and butterflies. Now we consider two scenarios. The first
scenario involves the boat docked near shore, the second involves the boat moving with
constant velocity – that is, with change in neither speed nor direction. Apparently,
nothing we could do below deck would reveal to us our state of motion. For, if the
boat is moving with uniform velocity, then the butterflies fly about freely – they are
not forced back to the rear of the cabin – but this is just as it would be if you were
docked near shore. If the boat is moving with uniform velocity, then if you hold
one of the balls and drop it to the floor, it falls straight down rather than in front
or behind you, but this is just as it would be if you were docked near shore. What
does this show? It shows us that inertial states of motion enjoy a sort of equivalence.
In particular it shows us that, like the outcomes of the experiments in the above
scenarios, the laws of nature themselves should not vary between states of inertial
motion. Indeed, Newton’s Second Law, F = ma, is invariant in just this sense.
Suppose that you are on the deck of a ship and that I stand on the shore and
watch you sail away with constant velocity. Now suppose that I want to lay down a
Cartesian coordinate system with me as the origin, and that you want to lay down
one with you as the origin, but we otherwise agree on the orientation of axes and
the passage of time. This is a roundabout way of saying that while we agree about
global things like directions and the passage of time, I think of myself as a stationary
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point watching as you move away, while you think of yourself as a stationary point
watching as I move away. Let us suppose that this perceived motion occurs along
what we’ve agreed is the x-axis of our Cartesian coordinate systems.
Now consider the coordinate system (x, y, z, t) that I lay down with me as the
origin. (x, y, z, t) is a frame of reference, it is my frame of reference, the one according
to which I and my immediate surroundings are at rest. Next consider the coordinate
system (x′, y′, z′, t′) that you lay down with you as the origin. (x′, y′, z′, t′) is also a
frame of reference, its is your frame of reference, the one according to which you and
your immediate surroundings are at rest.
Now it turns out that there is a special relationship between our frames of refer-
ence. This relationship, where v is a velocity vector in the x direction, is given by
(Gal).
x′ = x− vt , y′ = y , z′ = z , t′ = t (Gal)
When the frame whose inertial coordinate system is (x′, y′, z′, t′) (this is your frame)
is related to the original frame whose coordinates are (x, y, z, t) (this is my frame) by
(Gal), the primed frame is said to be related to the unprimed frame by a Galilean
transformation.
Now, it turns out that Newtonian mechanics is invariant under the group com-
posed by the Galilean transformations. That is, calculations employing Newton’s
laws do not differ between coordinate systems related by (Gal). But notice that Ab-
solute space does not posses a geometric symmetry that corresponds to (Gal). That
is, while it follows from the homogeneity and isotropy of Absolute space and time
that the state of motion of an object may be described by a coordinate system whose
point of origin is anywhere and anywhen, and whose axes are oriented in whichever
way one chooses, it does not follow from these symmetries that the state of motion of
a particle can be described equally well by two different coordinate systems related by
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(Gal). If it could be, then there would be no facts about Absolute motion. What this
means is that the symmetries of Absolute space and time form a proper subgroup of
the symmetries of Newtonian mechanics which include not just the symmetries that
arise from the homogeneity and isotropy of Absolute space and time, but also the
symmetry group that arises from Galilean transformations. In short, there is more
geometric structure to the Newtonian regime than is licensed by or strictly required by
its mechanics. As we’ll see in the following section, this idea was famously exploited
by Leibniz.
1.2 Leibniz’ Shift Arguments
Now we’ll consider Leibniz’ famous attacks on the Newtonian regime. We begin
by noting that there are two principles that form the background of Leibniz’ attacks.
The first is a theological principle called the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR),
which we may take to amount to the following:
PSR: for every act A, if God performs A, then there is a sufficient reason for
God’s having performed A, rather than some alternative act B.
The second principle is the Principle of The Identity of Indiscernibles (PII). To prop-
erly formulate this principle, we first need to consider a distinction between qualitative
and non-qualitative properties.
1.2.1 Qualitative and Non-Qualitative Properties
It is more or less standard to characterize non-qualitative properties7 as properties
that concern particular individuals, and to characterize qualitative properties as those
that do not.8 The property being Obama, for example, is a non-qualitative property
7For simplicity I’ll confine my talk to qualitative and non-qualitative properties, although similar
points apply to relations as well.
8C.f., Hawthorne (2006), Skow (2005, 2008).
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since it concerns a particular individual, whereas being president is a qualitative prop-
erty since it doesn’t concern any particular individual. Another way to characterize
the distinction between qualitative and non-qualitative properties is in terms of the
distinction between the natural properties and relations and all the others. We can
say that qualitative properties are those that are built from the natural properties
and relations, and the non-qualitative ones are not.9 More examples of qualitative
properties include properties like being green, being round, being negatively charged,
and so on. Examples of non-qualitative properties include properties like being in the
same room as Ben and living just outside of Tucson.
Given this notion of qualitative properties, we may formulate the PII as follows.
PII: for any objects a and b, if, for any qualitative property P , a has P if and
only if b has P , then a is identical to b.
Leibniz’ assault on Absolute space proceeds along two routes. The first involves
showing that Absolute space entails certain possibilities that jointly run afoul of the
PII, the second involves the charge that Absolute space in conjunction with the PSR
makes a Buridan’s Ass of God.
1.2.2 The Static Shift
Suppose that the material universe has a specific location in some region of Abso-
lute space. Call this region ‘R.’ Now consider the possibility of the material universe
having been placed in some other region R∗ of Absolute space. Call the possibil-
ity of the material universe having been located in R ‘possibility #1’, and call the
possibility of the material universe having been located in R∗, ‘possibility #2’. Now
assume that possibilities #1 and #2 are related by either a rigid rotation or a rigid
translation.
9See Bricker (1996) for a very clear explanation.
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1.2.2.1 The PII Argument
According to friends of Absolute space, possibilities #1 and #2 are distinct be-
cause, by hypothesis, they involve different distributions of matter across regions of
Absolute space. However, possibilities #1 and #2 do not differ qualitatively, they
differ only in which regions of Absolute space are occupied by matter. Because there
is no qualitative difference between possibilities #1 and #2, it follows from PII that
possibilities #1 and #2 are identical. So, it follows from the assumption of Abso-
lute space and the PII that possibilities #1 and #2 are both identical and distinct:
reductio!
1.2.2.2 The PSR Argument
A second line of attack employs the PSR. First, because the only differences
between possibilities #1 and #2 are non-qualitative differences related to the distri-
butions of matter over regions of Absolute space, God could have no reason to choose
one possibility over another as the one to make actual. But, by PSR every act is such
that if God performed it, then He had a sufficient reason for so doing. Thus, the fact
of the actual world’s existence shows that God had a sufficient reason for creating the
actual world as it is. So the existence of the actual world undermines Absolute space,
since if space were Absolute, God would have been frozen by indecision between in-
distinguishable possibilities at the time of creation, and the world would never have
been created.
1.2.3 The Kinematic Shift
Suppose that the material universe has some state of Absolute motion through
Absolute space and time. Call this state ‘S.’ Now consider the possibility that it have
some other state of motion, ‘S∗.’ Now suppose that the velocity change in this case is
uniformly distributed across the entire material universe so that the relative velocities
and relative distances amongst the various material parts of the universe remain the
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same. Call the possibility that the material universe be in state S, ‘possibility #1,’
and call the possibility that the material universe be in state S∗, ‘possibility #2.’
1.2.3.1 Leibniz’ Argument
Leibniz’ argument proceeds, as in the case of the static shift, by pointing out that
by PII possibilities #1 and #2 collapse, and by PSR the fact that the universe exists
at all is evidence that God was not forced to choose between indiscernible possibilities.
In either case, there is no Absolute space.
1.3 Responding to the Shifts
I do not think that many contemporary philosophers are committed to the PSR.
So I’ll assume that the arguments against Absolute space that appeal to the PSR
as a premise can be rejected. (Although, perhaps it’s worth noting this much: if we
suppose that there are infinitely many possible velocities for the material universe for
God to choose from, it doesn’t necessarily follow from the PSR that God would be
unable to pick one. What about a velocity of 0? 0 seems to be, at least in a way,
unique among possible velocities.) But this still leaves the arguments that appeal to
the PII. In the following sections these will be our focus.
1.3.1 Neo-Newtonian Spacetime and the Kinematic Shift
The real force of the kinematic shift argument comes from the methodological
principle according to which, when it comes to unobservable physical quantities – like
absolute motion – its not that we could never be justified in making do with them,
it’s rather that “[c]eteris paribus, one would prefer a theory without them” (Maudlin,
1993, p. 193). So how can we do without them? One way, presumably, is to be
a relationalist. Another way is to concede that, although the kinematic shift shows
absolute velocity to be a suspect quantity, this does not undermine substantivalism.
Instead, it shows that certain of the structures posited as part of the substantival-
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ist picture need to be rejected. Namely, those structures that underwrite absolute
motion.
Recall that Newton’s picture – packaged with absolute motion – involves a three-
dimensional set of spatial points endowed with various intrinsic structures persisting
identically through time. As I mentioned, we could alternatively view the arena of
Newtonian physics the way that a perdurantist does – as a single, four-dimensional
set of points endowed with brute facts about cross-temporal spatial distance relations.
In either case, the trouble-causing piece of structure is the one that grounds claims
about spatial intervals between non-simultaneous points of space. To put this point
more simply: the problem comes from having a notion of being at the same place at
different times. Now, for the spatial endurantist, a notion of being at the same place
at different times is built directly into their metaphysics – it falls directly out of the
claim that identically the same points exist at different times. So getting rid of this
piece of structure means letting go of spatial endurantism.
Once we’ve taken spatial endurantism off the table, the solution becomes appar-
ent. We accept spatial perdurantism, but reject the existence of brute facts about
spatial distances between non-simultaneous points. On this picture, space and time
are a four-dimensional set of points within which there are well-defined temporal inter-
vals between all points, and also well-defined spatial intervals between simultaneous
points, but where there are no well-defined spatial intervals between non-simultaneous
points. The resulting spacetime is called Neo-Newtonian spacetime (or, alternately,
Galilean spacetime). The move from Newtonian Absolute space and time to Neo-
Newtonian spacetime brings the geometric symmetries of spacetime into alignment
with the mechanical symmetries of Newtonian physics and is perfectly compatible
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with substantivalism since it still involves treating spatiotemporal points as funda-
mental constituents of reality. This is an easy fix.10
Before moving on I want to make note of a shift in terminology. Throughout the
remainder of the chapter I’ll drop the terms ‘Absolute space’ and ‘Absolute time’ and
instead use ‘substantival spacetime’ with the understanding in place that substantival
spacetime has Neo-Newtonian structure. I think the kinematic shift argument does
undermine Absolute space and time, but, as I’ve just shown, this doesn’t undermine
substantivalism since one can be a substantivalist about Neo-Newtonian spacetime.
So in what follows we’ll consider what sort of impact the static shift has on the
plausibility of substantival spacetime.
1.3.2 The Static Shift and The Modal Commitments of Substantivalism
In this section I’ll cover some relevant background material concerning modality
and the question of haecceitism. I’ll then consider the sorts of things a substantivalist
might say in response to the Static Shift argument.
1.3.2.1 Possible Worlds, Haecceitism, and Antihaecceitism
Consider the following two propositions:
1. Josh is 6 feet and 2 inches tall.
2. 2 + 2 = 4.
Both (1) and (2) are true, but there is something different about the way they are
true. It seems like (1) could have very easily been false; things could have gone just
slightly different and I would be an inch or two shorter or taller. But it seems like (2)
would be true no matter how things had gone. This suggests that propositions don’t
just come in two flavors: true and false; their truth or falsity also comes in different
10C.f., Earman 1970, Friedman 1983, Sklar 1974.
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modes. Some true propositions are necessarily true – like (2) – and others are only
contingently true – like (1). Others are necessarily false – like ‘2+2=7’ – and others
are only contingently false – like ‘Josh has blue eyes’. The study of these sorts of
modes of truth or falsity is called the study of modality.
Some philosophers think that modally qualified claims are nonsense,11 others think
that modality is primitive,12 but most philosophers prefer reductionism about modal-
ity: modally qualified expressions may be analyzed in non-modal terms.13 Most
reductionists about modality have found it helpful to begin their analysis of modality
by introducing possible worlds. Thus we have the familiar biconditionals.
A proposition p is necessary iff p is true according to every possible world.
A proposition p is possible iff p is true according to some possible world.
A proposition p is not necessary iff p is false according to some possible world.
A proposition p is not possible iff p is false according to every possible world.
So, according to a possible worlds analysis of modality, (1) is contingent iff there are
some worlds according to which it is true, and others according to which it is false.
Similarly, (2) will be necessary iff it is true according to every world.
But of course these biconditionals don’t help much in explaining modality; they
merely shift the question from “what makes statements like (1) and (2) true or false?”
to “what is a possible world?” and “what does it mean for something to be true
according to a possible world?” It turns out that there are many theories about the
11Quine (1951) may be among these.
12C.f. deRosset (2009).
13Strictly speaking, most philosophers working in the metaphysics of modality take themselves
to give only partial reductions of modality. Possible worlds may be used to analyze necessity and
possibility, but typically, somewhere in the account of possible worlds, unreduced modal notions find
their way in.
21
nature of possible worlds – that is, many attempts to answer the question “what is a
possible world?” For our purposes, it will be sufficient to distinguish ersatzism from
realism about possible worlds. There are many versions of ersatzism, but what they all
have in common is that they seek to construe possible worlds as something decidedly
different in kind from our actual world. The ersatzist may take possible worlds to be
sets of sentences, propositions, or pictures, or abstract redistributions of properties
across regions of spacetime. The realist, on the other hand, takes merely possible
worlds to differ from our world only in their local distributions of properties. Possible
worlds, for the realist, do not differ in kind from our world; whatever ontological
category our world belongs to, all the other possible worlds belong to it, too.14
Just as there are several ways to understand what sort of thing a possible world
is, there are several ways to understand what it means for something to be true
“according to” a possible world. Let’s focus our attention on individuals. How might
it be true, according to some possible world, that some individual is different from
the way that it actually is? To begin, consider (3):
3. Josh might have had blue eyes.
I actually have green eyes, but (3) seems plausible. According to the possible worlds
framework we are working within, that means that there is some world according to
which I have blue eyes – in other words, there is something in some other possible
world that represents me here in the actual world as possibly having blue eyes. But
how does that work? Consider some possible accounts.
14I have in mind here the realism of Lewis (1986), but there are other sorts of realism. Bricker
(2006) is an example. He argues that Lewis’ realism is incoherent because it counts all worlds as
equally actual. He offers an amendment to Lewis’ view that he takes to solve this problem. The
fix involves supplementing Lewisian realism with primitive absolute actuality. The result of this
move is a rift in the ontological status of possible worlds: some possible world – namely, ours – have
the primitive property of being absolutely actual, while the others lack it. With minimal changes,
everything I will say about realism can be made compatible with Bricker’s brand of realism.
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To begin, let’s call the sorts of accounts we’re about to consider accounts of
transworld identity. These are accounts that explain the relationship between things
in distinct worlds in virtue of which certain possibilities obtain. Now first suppose
that I manage – literally, without any sort of paraphrasing – to exist in multiple
worlds. That is, in addition to being here in the actual world, I also manage to be
in various other merely possible worlds as well – all of the possible worlds in which
I exist overlap by sharing me as a common part. According to this view, transworld
identity involves genuine identity. On this sort of view (3) is true because something
in a different possible world represents me as having blue eyes, and this something is
me, as I am in that other possible world. But there are problems here. Begin with the
ersatzist. If you are an ersatzist, then you think that the actual world is different in
kind from other merely possible worlds – the actual world is concrete (in some sense
of ‘concrete’) and merely possible worlds are abstract (in some sense of ‘abstract’).
But if I am a part of the actual world, which is concrete, how could I also be part
of a merely possible world that is abstract? That would seem to require that I be
somehow unsure about my ontological status: am I abstract, or am I concrete?
Now consider the realist. If you are a realist, then you think that all worlds
are ontologically on a par – in whatever sense the actual world is concrete, merely
possible worlds are concrete in that sense, too. But now compare the actual green-
eyed me, and the possible blue-eyed me. If we are one and the same – literally,
numerically identical – then my eyes are both blue and green. Or, if that doesn’t
seem so incredible, consider the possibilities of me being completely bald, and me
having knee-length hair. How could one and the same thing be both bald and have
knee-length hair? Indeed, given an overlap account and realism, many objects will
turn out to have many different and incompatible properties.
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These are not decisive objections to the view that representation of counterfactual
possibilities for individuals involves those individuals existing in distinct worlds,15 but
they are reasons to prefer an alternative. The alternative is to deny that objects from
different possible worlds are literally, numerically identical, and instead claim that
they are bound by some sort of relation. On this sort of view what makes a claim like
(3) true will be the holding of some relation between me and some other-worldly, blue-
eyed individual. There are two main variant accounts of such a relation. According
to one, the relation between individuals in distinct possible worlds in virtue of which
they count as “the same” is primitive, according to another, the relation is governed
by qualitative similarity.
David Lewis’ counterpart theory is a paradigm of qualitative similarity accounts.16
According to Lewis view, what makes a claim like (3) true is that there is a counterpart
of me in some other possible world and this counterpart has blue eyes. Likewise, what
makes it the case that I am possibly shorter, taller, balder, fatter, etc., is that I bear
counterpart relations to individuals that are shorter, taller, balder, fatter, etc. But
what determines whether something is my counterpart?
Whether something is one of my counterparts, and thereby represents a possibil-
ity for me, will depend upon qualitative similarities between me and that thing. But
qualitative similarity is a somewhat loose notion, one that seems to be sensitive to
context. The way to factor this in is to take the possibilities for me (and other individ-
uals) to be sensitive to context: different contexts will make salient different respects
of similarity; different respects of similarity will correspond to different counterpart
relations; and different counterpart relations will underwrite different possibilities.
15Indeed, it seems one could accept modal realism and claim that objects have their qualitative
properties only relative to worlds in something like the way that an enduring object has its intrinsic
properties only relative to times. See McDaniel (2004).
16Note that Lewis defends counterpart theory in several different guises. One sort of defense can
be found in his (1968) and (1971), and another sort in his (1986). Here I follow the views he defends
in his (1986) account.
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So in a sense, what is possible for any particular thing is going to depend upon
certain features of context, like what sorts of background assumptions one holds fixed.
For example, if we are discussing physiology, and considering whether or not I might
have been 10 feet tall, or had blue eyes, we are probably holding fixed that I am
human, so all of the relevant counterparts of me are human. But let the context
change. I am playing with toy dinosaurs with my kid and we are talking about what
sort of dinosaur she would be. Here we’ll hold different sorts of features fixed – for
example, certain of her personality traits (like her penchant for stomping around,
yelling, and just causing general mayhem: she’s a T-rex) – and let her being human
vary.
One alternative to counterpart theory is to claim that what makes a distinct
individual in a different possible world count as me is simply a primitive relation – a
non-qualitative counterpart relation – between me and that thing. Let’s call this view
non-qualitative counterpart theory. According to non-qualitative counterpart theory,
my qualitative character plays no role in determining whether I bear such a relation
to any individual in another world – it’s just a brute fact about reality that certain
individuals in distinct worlds are united by a primitive transworld identity relation.
Here is a useful way to flesh out the distinction between this view and the counterpart
theoretic account.
Ask: Could you and I have switched places? I don’t mean switch places like people
do in movies, by transplanting my mental life into your body and your mental life
into mine. I mean, could we have swapped our qualitative roles completely, so that
everything is qualitatively exactly as it actually is, but I am you and you are me?
Call this a qualitative swap. Now, let’s suppose that at least some qualitative swaps
are genuine possibilities. Now ask: how many worlds would it take to represent these
two possibilities – that is, how many worlds would it take to represent the actual
state of affairs as well as the one where we switch qualitative roles?
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If you are a non-qualitative counterpart theorist, then you will say that it takes
two worlds to represent these two possibilities: this world represents the actual states
of affairs (by being identical to it), and then it takes another possible world w that
is a qualitative duplicate of this one, but where I bear a non-qualitative counterpart
relation to the individual in w that occupies the qualitative role you occupy in this
world, and you bear a non-qualitative counterpart relation to the individual in w that
occupies the qualitative role I occupy in this world. What is needed is one world for
each possibility.
Things are different for a counterpart theorist. According to the counterpart the-
oretic account, in order to underwrite the possibility that you and I swap qualitative
roles what is needed is a counterpart relation that links me to an individual that occu-
pies your qualitative role and you to an individual that occupies my qualitative role.
But we need not look far for candidates: I am an individual that occupies my quali-
tative role, and you are an individual that occupies yours, so, given an appropriately
permissive counterpart relation – say, one that makes every person a counterpart of
every other person – you are my counterpart and I am yours. One world can do double
(and triple, and quadruple, and . . . ) duty in representing distinct (but qualitatively
identical) possibilities.
We just saw how the non-qualitative counterpart theorist requires two qualita-
tively identical worlds to underwrite qualitative swap possibilities, while the counter-
part theorist requires only one. It turns out that there is an important corollary to
this; it is the distinction between haecceitism and antihaecceitism. Haecceitism is the
view that there are worlds that fail to differ in qualitative respects and yet differ with
respect to representation de re. Antihaecceitism is the view that representation de re
supervenes on the qualitative character of worlds – it implies that, if there are worlds
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w and v that fail to differ qualitatively,17 then w and v also fail to differ with respect
to what they represent de re.18
1.3.3 The Static Shift
To begin, note that while the move from Absolute space and time to substantival
spacetime (with Neo-Newtonian structure) defuses the problem associated with the
kinematic shift, it does not defuse the problem associated with the static shift. Recall
that the static shift argument uses Absolute space and the PII formulated in terms of
qualitative properties as premises and then derives a contradiction. The same prob-
lem arises if we substitute substantival spacetime for Absolute space and time: we still
end up with possibilities – different ways of locating the material universe within sub-
stantival spacetime – that differ only non-qualitatively. Now, what a substantivalist
ought to say about this will depend on their prior modal commitments.
1.3.3.1 Haecceitism: Bitting The Bullet
Note that the Leibnizian uses substantival spacetime and the PII formulated in
terms of qualitative properties to derive a contradiction. She then takes this to show
that substantival spacetime is suspect. But one could just as well claim that this
shows that the PII formulated in terms of qualitative properties is suspect. Indeed,
this is what a haecceitist ought to do. A haecceitist will agree that there are infinitely
many shift possibilities that differ one from another only non-qualitatively. But she
17Lewis’s (1986) view is supposed to be neutral with respect to whether there are such worlds.
18I want to flag a potential worry. Skow (2008) has recently argued that haecceitism and antihaec-
ceitism are typically characterized in the literature in ways that presuppose a particular conception
of possible worlds. But, so he suggests, haecceitism and antihaecceitism for an ersatzist are not the
same thing as haecceitism and antihaecceitism for a realist. So, when presuppositions concerning
background modal metaphysics remain unstated, we endanger ourselves to talking past one another.
I think he is right. So to avoid this pitfall, I’ll just assume realism about possible worlds, and offer a
characterization of haecceitism suitable to this context. Most of what I say in subsequent chapters
will be easy enough to transpose into the ersatzist regime as long as the transposition also includes
appropriate modifications to the formulation of haecceitism.
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will not think of this as particularly damning – belief in possibilities that differ only
non-qualitatively is just a consequence of her general modal metaphysics.
But not every substantivalist will be comfortable accepting this sort of response to
the static shift argument. Perhaps one is wed to the PII and sees the tension between
it and her substantivalism as problematic. What then? It turns out that counterpart
theory is quite well-suited to dealing with the problem.
1.3.3.2 Counterparts of Parts of Spacetime
Consider a world w with some material occupants. Now suppose we call the
collection of distance relations born between the material occupants of w, R. Next,
observe that there is a certain pattern of occupancy relations born between material
objects and regions of spacetime at w; call this pattern O. Now consider the group
of transformations of O that preserve R – the rigid rotations and rigid translations.
There will be infinitely many of them since space is continuous. Call these ‘the shift
possibilities for w’. A haecceitist will identify each shift possibility with a possible
world. An anti-haecceitist, on the other hand, will claim that a single world can
represent each of the shift possibilities. The question is how the anti-haecceitist pulls
this off.
To begin, suppose you want to move a plate from one region of a tablecloth to
another region one foot to the right. One way to do this is to pick up the plate, and
place it one foot to the right, but another way is to pull the tablecloth one foot to
the left (think of the “pull the tablecloth out from under the dinnerware” trick). The
effect (at least as far as the relations between the plate and tablecloth are concerned)
is the same: either way, the plate ends up at a region of the tablecloth that is one
foot to the right of the region where it was. So, at first blush, it seems like there
will be two ways for an antihaecceitist to account for shift possibilities: the first
way uses counterpart theory to “pick up” objects and “move” them, by appealing
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to counterpart relations between objects; the second way uses counterpart theory
to “move the spacetime” under the objects by appealing to counterpart relations
between regions of spacetime. It turns out that only the second of these strategies
will work. Let’s consider why.
Begin with a case that involves a shift possibility wherein the material contents of
the universe are rigidly translated one foot to the right of where they actually are. Now
suppose we attempt to underwrite this possibility by appeal to counterpart relations
that “pick up” the material contents of the universe and then “place” them one foot
to the right. We can do this by appealing to the extremely permissive counterpart
relation that makes every object a counterpart of every object. We may implement
this counterpart relation so that, for example, it makes the lamp that is one foot to
my right count as my counterpart. This will underwrite certain possibilities, among
them will be the possibility that I be where the lamp actually is – that is, that I be
one foot to the right of where I actually am. If we coordinate counterpart relations
so that everything’s counterpart is the thing that is one foot to the right of where
it actually is, we may be able to effect a global, one-foot-to-the-right shift of the
material contents of the universe.
Essentially, the way this works is by thinking of this counterpart relation as affect-
ing the occupancy relations born between material objects and regions of spacetime.
For example, in the possibility that is actual, I bear the occupancy relation to a par-
ticular region of spacetime, call it R, and that lamp over there bears the occupancy
relation to a particular region of spacetime, call it R∗. So, actually, I occupy R, and,
actually, the lamp occupies R∗. However, in a one-foot-to-the-right shift possibility,
I am where that lamp is. So within that possibility, I rather than the lamp bear the
occupancy relation to R∗. This is so (as I said above) because there is a counterpart
relation that makes that lamp my counterpart, and under that counterpart relation I
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bear the occupancy relation to the region that the lamp actually bears the occupancy
relation to.
But this approach is fraught. For one thing, it will only work for worlds where
matter forms a plenum. Otherwise, there would be some object that is the farthest
to the right, and that object would have no object one foot to its right that could
be its counterpart, and thereby underwrite the possibility that it be one foot to the
right. But there is another sort of problem, too.
What, exactly, is the region that the lamp occupies like? Intuitively, the notion
of occupation that is relevant here is the one according to which the region the lamp
occupies is a region that is exactly the right size for the lamp – none of the lamp
spills out of the region, and the region doesn’t have any more room for anything else.
In short, the region the lamp occupies is (not surprisingly) exactly the shape of the
lamp. But now consider the possibility wherein I bear the occupancy relation to this
region. This would seem to be a possibility that involves me being lamp-shaped!
Otherwise, how would I fit in there?19 But now, remember that the shift possibilities
are supposed to be possibilities where the material contents of the universe remain
qualitatively indiscernible.20But surely my actual shape and the possibility where I
am lamp-shaped are qualitatively discernible!
This makes it look like the “pick the objects up” strategy won’t work. So perhaps
the way to cash out the shift possibilities is to “move” the spacetime, rather than the
objects in it. Intuitively the way to do this is to “move” regions around: we move
a region one foot to my right over to where I am, and thereby make it be the case
19I am, admittedly, intuition mongering a little here. One could maintain that objects and regions
have their shapes independently, and that it follows from a commitment to a principle of recombi-
nation that objects don’t always occupy regions of the same shape. I don’t like this, though, and
I’ll say more about why in chapter 3.
20Indeed, if we “move” me to where the lamp is by making the lamp my counterpart, then the
possibility that I am where the lamp is is also a possibility where I am made of brass, have an
electrical cord that plugs into a wall, etc. That’s not what we want.
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that I am one foot to the right of where I started.21 But it seems that there is a
problem lurking here. If we want to say that I could be a foot to the right of where
I actually am, and we are going to do this by “moving” (via a counterpart relation)
the region one foot to my left over to where I am, we need to either ensure that the
region we “move” over is the same shape as my actual region, or else we need to
convince ourselves that it makes sense to have a me-shaped region be the counterpart
of a non-me-shaped region.
But there is a good way to avoid this worry. It involves appealing to counterpart
relations that hold between spacetime points, not between regions. We can appeal
to a very general sort of counterpart relation that makes every spacetime point a
counterpart of every spacetime point. Let’s walk through this.
First, take me and my region R. R is a collection of points that I bear the
occupancy relation to. Now suppose we want to effect a shift that moves me one foot
to the right of where I actually am. One way to do this is by starting with the points
that compose R. Then, for each point pi in R, we pick out a point qi that is one
foot to the right of pi. Next, we appeal to our very general counterpart relation that
makes every spacetime point a counterpart of every spacetime point, and we pick an
arrangement licensed by this relation that makes each of the qi the counterpart of
the corresponding pi. Then we observe that the fusion of the qi is a new region R
∗,
where R∗ is one foot to the right of R and the same shape and size as R.22 Next, we
make me my own counterpart. Now when we consider the possibility underwritten
by the counterpart relation that makes R∗ the counterpart of R, and me my own
counterpart, we have a possibility where everything is just as it actually is, except I
21Note that we’re not literally moving space around. Since motion is defined relative to space,
moving space would seem to be incoherent. What we’re doing is figuratively moving by implementing
counterpart relations that make one region represent another. I’ll continue to use this language since
it’s convenient.
22This follows from the fact that we are working in a flat, classical spacetime; things aren’t so tidy
in the context of, for example, GR.
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occupy R∗ instead of R. Because R∗ is a foot to the right of R, this is a possibility
where I am one foot to the right of where I actually am. Repeating this procedure
on a global scale will allow us to underwrite the possibility that the entire material
contents of the universe be shifted one foot to the right. Then, making appropriate
modifications – like changing the distance and direction of the points to be utilized
as counterparts – will allow us to get all of the shift possibilities we want.
Let’s quickly summarize. Under the present account, shift possibilities are under-
written by the following counterpart mappings. First, we take points to be mapped
to points that are some specified distance and direction away. Second, we take fusions
of points to be mapped to the fusions of points that those points get mapped to –
so the fusion of points p and q gets mapped to the fusion of p’s counterpart and q’s
counterpart. This just makes the regions tag along with the points – that is, we get
regions to “move” by “moving” the points that compose them. Last, we take every
material object to be mapped to itself.
So, it looks like an antihaecceitist has in counterpart theory a nice way of respond-
ing to Leibniz’ static shift argument. Ontological profligacy is avoided by denying
that there are worlds that differ merely in the ways that shifts differ, but the in-
tuition that static shifts are genuinely possible is satisfied by the holding of certain
counterpart relations among the inhabitants of a single world.23
23There is a general worry once we have all of this in place. Given counterpart theory a single
world can represent all of the shift possibilities, and that means we are not, like the haecceitist,
committed to qualitatively indiscernible worlds – we get to keep the PII as it applies to worlds. But
now we need to ask: are the shift possibilities themselves qualitatively identical? Suppose they are.
Then it seems that the PII should apply to them just as it applies to worlds. But if the PII applies to
possibilities, then the distinction between shift possibilities collapses. But if the distinction between
shift possibilities collapses, then the antihaecceitist has to claim that they are impossible, and this
seems to force a strange and counterintuitive form of essentialism about occupancy relations on the
antihaecceitist.
So suppose the shift possibilities are not qualitatively identical. (This may seem like a strange
proposal, but let’s follow it to see where it leads). What sort of explanation could one offer here?
Here is one. According to Lewis (1986), possibilities (not possible worlds!) are a certain sort of set-
theoretic construction. (See Lewis (1986), pgs. 232-234, and Hazen (1979).) Take, for example, me
and the lamp one foot to my left. We are a pair – the pair 〈me, lamp〉 – of compossible individuals.
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1.4 Conclusion
Stepping back a bit, we can see that the problem raised for a substantivalist by
Leibniz’ static shift argument is both deep and simple: more ontological categories
means a wider range of possibilities, and more possibilities can mean more opportu-
nity for trouble. More specifically, buying-in to an “extra” ontological category of
spacetime makes substantivalism compatible with a range of possibilities that differ
only non-qualitatively. For Leibniz, such possibilities were troublesome because they
lead to violations of the PII and the PSR. From the modern perspective, the problem
is that such possibilities constitute an explosion of mere haecceitistic differences, and
this makes the question of haecceitism a pressing one for a substantivalist. As we’ve
seen, though, counterpart theory provides a substantivalist who denies haecceitism a
nice way of responding.
Lewis would say that switching the order of the pair is one way that this pair of individuals could
differ. So there are at least two possibilities (in fact, there will be many more than two) for me
and the lamp; the one that is actual – 〈me, lamp〉 – and the possibility wherein we switch places
– 〈lamp, me〉. So perhaps one avenue of response for the antihaecceitist to the present dilemma
is to say that the PII can’t apply to possibilities – and thereby collapse them – because the PII
only applies to things that have qualitative properties and not to set-theoretic representations of
things that have qualitative properties. But then this seems suspiciously ad hoc. Thanks to Chris
Meacham for discussion about this problem.
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CHAPTER 2
CLIMBING OUT OF THE HOLE
2.1 Introduction
Over the last quarter of a century, nearly every philosophical engagement with the
dispute between substantivalists and relationalists has involved a discussion of the
so-called hole argument.1 The hole argument has its roots in Einstein’s work on the
field equations for general relativity (GR), but was introduced into the philosophical
mainstream by Stachel (1980), and then used to argue against substantivalism by
Earman and Norton (1987). The argument is supposed to impugn substantivalism in
the context of GR by showing that it leads to an objectionable form of indeterminism.
There is now a consensus regarding the moral of the hole argument. The moral
is that the argument does not succeed in its ambition to undermine substantivalism
in the context of GR, but it does exert pressure on substantivalists who also accept
haecceitism – roughly, the view that there are qualitatively indiscernible worlds that
differ non-qualitatively.2 There are two general strategies for addressing this pres-
sure.3 The first strategy is to embrace antihaecceitism – roughly, the view that there
are no qualitatively indiscernible worlds.4 The second strategy notes that the notion
of determinism exploited by the hole argument is sensitive to haecceitistic differences
1Cf. Pooley (2013, §7) and Norton (2011).
2More rigorous characterizations of haecceitism and antihaecceitism appear in §3.4.
3Cf. Dasgupta (2011, p. 115).
4E.g., Butterfield (1988, 1989), Brighouse (1994), Mundy (1992), Hoefer (1996), Pooley (2006,
2012), and Rynasiewicz (1994). For in-depth discussion of the variety of antihaecceitist responses
and the differences among them, see Rickles (2008), Pooley (2002), and Dasgupta (2011).
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between worlds, and replaces this notion of determinism with one that is insensitive
to haecceitistic differences between worlds.5
In this chapter I will argue that proponents of both strategies have conceded
too much. It is not the case, as advocates of the first strategy would have it, that
the hole argument warrants a rejection of haecceitism. And it is not the case, as
advocates of the second strategy would have it, that the hole argument warrants a
retooling of the thesis of determinism. Rather, the hole argument has nothing at all
to do with haecceitism. Haecceitism has mistakenly been given a starring role in this
drama because proponents of both strategies have failed to make explicit the range
of background assumptions needed to level the hole argument. In particular, they
have failed to pay sufficient attention to the relationship between the formulation of
a physical theory, the theory’s models, and the worlds at which the theory is true.
My discussion will be organized as follows. I begin in §2.2 by outlining the con-
ceptual framework I will use throughout the chapter. Here the emphasis will be on
carefully distinguishing features of mathematical models that are used to represent
worlds, and the physical correlates of those representations. Conflating the represen-
tation and the thing represented in this context is both common and dangerous.6 In
§2.3 I consider two conceptions of the relationship between GR’s models and GR’s
worlds. In §2.4 I show how the default conception of this relationship plays a key role
in generating the hole argument, and in §2.5 I show how the alternative conception
allows us to dodge the hole argument.
5E.g., Arntzenius (2012), Melia (1999) and Skow (2005).
6Maudlin (1988) makes this observation, too.
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2.2 Preliminaries
It will be important for our purposes to be explicit about the relationship between
the mathematical apparatus of GR and the physical reality that that apparatus is
used to represent. In this section I draw some distinctions that will help to make this
relationship clear.
2.2.1 Worlds, Models, and Points
Begin by distinguishing worlds from models. I understand ‘world’ in roughly the
way that Lewis (1986) does: there are many worlds, all alike in kind; one of them is
ours; the rest are, from our perspective, merely possible. Many of these worlds are
composed of a physical spacetime. The basic unit of physical spacetime is the physical
point. I assume that classical mereology applies to these basic units, and I take the
physical spacetime of a world w to be the fusion of spatiotemporally interrelated
physical points at w. I will say that a region of physical spacetime is any fusion of
physical points, and that a region A is a subregion of a region B iff A is a part of B.
Models are abstract mathematical objects. The sorts of models that will concern
us here are general relativistic models. In general relativity, the basic ingredients of
reality are described by appeal to a metric tensor field g and a stress-energy tensor
field T , both of which are defined over a special sort of set of mathematical points
called a differentiable manifold, M.7
When a particular smattering of values of the metric and stress-energy tensor fields
across a differentiable manifold satisfies Einstein’s Field Equations, that smattering of
field values across that differentiable manifold is said to be a model of GR. Typically,
models of GR are represented as the ordered triples 〈M, g, T 〉. For my purposes it
will be useful to be able to unpack the manifold M of GR models into the ordered
pair (X,S), where X is a base set of points, and S is the structure – i.e., topological,
7See Appendix A for details on manifolds.
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affine, and differentiable – defined over X. So I will refer to manifolds as ‘(X,S),’
and I will refer to GR models as ‘〈(X,S), g, T 〉.’
I have appealed to a distinction between mathematical and physical points: phys-
ical points are what worlds are made of, mathematical points are what models are
made of; physical points are (in some intuitive sense) concrete, mathematical points
are (in some intuitive sense) abstract. An important distinction that follows on the
heels of this one regards special collections of mathematical and physical points. I
have in mind here a distinction between mathematical cauchy surfaces of GR models,
and physical maximal achronal subregions of worlds. Both of these notions correspond
in some intuitive sense to the notion of an instant of time, or an instantaneous space.
To be exact, a cauchy surface of an n dimensional differentiable manifold (X,S) is an
n−1 dimensional surface that intersects every extensible, time-like curve in (X,S) at
exactly one point. A cauchy surface of a model 〈(X,S), g, T 〉 is just a cauchy surface
of (X,S) along with the values of g and T defined at the points that compose it. I
will define ‘maximal achronal subregion of a world’ as follows. First, I’ll say that a
subregion S of a world w is achronal iff all points in S are spacelike separated from
one another. Then I’ll say that an achronal subregion S of a worlds w is maximal iff
every point in w that is not in S is either light-like or time-like related to points in
S.8
2.2.2 Properties and Relations
I will accept an account of properties and relations that is very nearly that of
Lewis (1986). So let us begin by recalling Lewis’ views concerning the taxonomy of
properties and relations. He begins by recognizing a distinction between the natural
(or sparse) and the abundant properties. The abundant properties, Lewis says, are “as
8So-called “island universes” will cause a wrinkle for this characterization of ‘maximal achronal
subregion’, but we can ignore this complication. See Bricker (2011) for more on island universes.
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gruesomely gerrymandered, as miscellaneously disjunctive, as you please. They pay
no heed to the qualitative joints, but carve things up every which way. Sharing of them
has nothing to do with similarity. (1986, 59)” The natural properties, Lewis continues
“are another story. Sharing of them makes for qualitative similarity, they carve at the
joints, they are intrinsic, they are highly specific, the sets of their instances are ipso
facto not entirely miscellaneous, there are only just enough of them to characterize
things completely and without redundancy. (1986, 60).” The natural properties, it
is clear to see, are the ones that will be of interest to physics.
Next, Lewis claims that there are an elite few among the natural properties that
are perfectly natural. Perfect naturalness is a primitive on Lewis’ view, which he uses
to define several important concepts. First, he defines duplication in terms of perfect
naturalness as follows: “two things are duplicates iff (1) they have exactly the same
perfectly natural properties, and (2) their parts can be put into correspondence in
such a way that corresponding parts have exactly the same perfectly natural proper-
ties, and stand in the same perfectly natural relations. (1986, p. 61). Next, Lewis
defines intrinsic in terms of duplication: “an intrinsic property is one that can never
differ between two duplicates. (1986, p. 62)” Lewis (1986, p. 61) thinks that there
are intrinsic properties that are not perfectly natural, but that all perfectly natural
properties are intrinsic.
Next, distinguish individualistic properties from non-individualistic properties. I
will say that an individualistic property is a property that concerns a particular in-
dividual, whereas a non-individualistic property is one that does not. The property
being Obama, for example, is an individualistic property since it concerns a particular
individual, whereas being president is a non-individualistic property since it doesn’t
concern any particular individual. Likewise, the property being point p is an indi-
vidualistic property since it concerns a particular point, whereas being a point is a
non-individualistic property since it doesn’t concern any particular point.
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There are many sorts of non-individualistic properties. Qualitative properties are
one sort. Given the distinction between the natural properties and relations and all
the others, we can characterize qualitative properties as those that are built from the
natural properties and relations. Examples of qualitative properties include properties
like being green, being round, being negatively charged, and so on. Another sort of
non-individualistic property is the sort associated with purely geometric entities like
tensors. A tensor is a multilinear map from elements of vector spaces to the real
numbers. As such, a tensor cannot be a qualitative property or relation since it is not
built out of natural properties or relations, but it is nevertheless non-individualistic
since it does not concern any particular individual.
Although tensors, because they are mathematical objects defined over mathemat-
ical points, are not themselves qualitative properties or relations, they are often used
to represent certain qualitative properties and relations. In GR, for example, the
metric tensor g and the stress-energy tensor T are used to represents distances and
the distribution of mass and energy, respectively. For my purposes it will be impor-
tant not to confuse tensors with the things they represent. But let’s consider for a
moment what, exactly, they do represent.
2.2.3 Tensors and What They Represent
To begin, note that for every mathematical point p of the manifold (X, S), there
is a value of g and a value of T defined at p. So there is a sense in which values
of g and T defined over mathematical points of (X, S) look like they ought to be
taken to represent monadic, intrinsic properties of points of physical spacetime (or of
point sized bits of matter that occupy points of spacetime). But recall that tensors,
like g and T , are maps from elements of a vector space associated with points of (X,
S) to real numbers. So there is another sense in which values of g and T defined
over mathematical points of (X, S) look like they ought to be taken to represent
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relations: they each relate a pair of vectors to a real number. But things get a bit
more complicated than that. Associated with each point p of a manifold (X, S) is a
vector space called the ‘tangent space of p’. The tangent spaces associated with the
points of a (X, S) can be conjoined in such a way that they form their own manifold –
called the ‘tangent bundle of (X, S)’. The dimension of the tangent bundle associated
with an n-dimensional manifold is 2n. Thus when we think of g and T as relations
that relate vectors in the tangent bundle of a manifold, we are thinking of them as
relating things that are, in a sense, not even part of the manifold we hoped to be
describing, but are, rather, parts of a higher dimensional manifold that is used to
represent features of the manifold we set out to describe.
In any event, because the tensors g and T each have values that are defined at a
single mathematical point of (X, S), they seem in a way like they ought to represent
monadic properties of physical points. But at the same time they also definitely
involve things other than the points they are defined at. A particular value v of the
metric field at a point p, for example, is not only about p, it’s also about other things,
like some vectors in the tangent space associated with p. The most straightforward
thing to do in light of this is to treat g and T as extrinsic properties of points.
But this now creates a cascade of problems. First, according to Lewis, all perfectly
natural properties are intrinsic. So, if the sorts of properties that g and T represent
are extrinsic, then they cannot be perfectly natural. But surely we ought to treat g
and T as representing properties that are perfectly natural: if we don’t treat them
as perfectly natural, then, because there aren’t any more plausible candidates, there
will be no perfectly natural properties in a GR world. That is certainly unacceptable.
There is another, related problem with treating g and T as representing extrinsic
properties of points. This one has to do with Lewis’ conception of modal plenitude. To
begin, note that in order to underwrite his modal realism, Lewis requires a principle
of plenitude; a principle that allows us to reason from some possibility to others. The
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underlying intuition Lewis appeals to on behalf of plenitude is Hume’s: no necessary
connections between distinct existences. This gives Lewis what he calls the principle
of recombination, according to which any distinct things can coexist or fail to coexist
with one another.9 Now, if the metric and stress-energy tensors that appear in GR
models are taken to represent properties that are extrinsic, then we will be unable
to apply the principle of recombination to GR worlds. Here is why. Suppose some
GR model represents a particular point p as instantiating a physical correlate of a
particular value of the stress-energy tensor field. Call the physical correlate of this
value v. So this model represents p as having v. Now, any duplicate of p will have
v too, since v is a perfectly natural property. But v is extrinsic, which means that
it implies the existence of something other than just p. In this case it will be some
pair of vectors in a tangent space. For simplicity, just call the pair q. So now any
world that has a duplicate of p will also have q. This means that while p and q are
distinct things, p can never get away from q: they are necessarily conjoined. This is
a sin against the Humean intuition.
So, we have several options open to us now. First, we could concede that the
principle of recombination does not apply to GR worlds. But this would be a serious
blow to the Lewisian framework: why does the principle apply only to some worlds,
and not to all of them? Finding a principled explanation seems unlikely. Alternatively,
we could reject the tensor analytic formulation of GR and hope that one of the other
formulations is more amenable to the principle of recombination. This is also a bad
option, though. The tensor analytic formulation of GR is the mainstream formulation
of our best theory of the large scale structure of the universe. If the cost of adopting
the Lewisian framework were giving it up, one might reasonably regard the framework
with skepticism.
9Note that coexistence will be spelled out in terms of duplicates. I, for example, possibly coexist
with a dragon in virtue of having some duplicate that inhabits a world with dragons.
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Luckily, there is a much better alternative. Bricker (1993) points out that while
tensors represent properties that are extrinsic to individual points, the same properties
are also intrinsic to infinitesimal neighborhoods of points. This insight does several
related and important things. First, it allows us to treat tensors as representing
properties that are perfectly natural. Why? Because we seem to have two plausible
interpretations of the sorts of properties that tensors represent: extrinsic properties
of individual points, or intrinsic properties of infinitesimal neighborhoods of points.
Since the Lewisian may adopt the interpretation that is amenable to her framework,
she is free to say that tensors represent properties that are intrinsic to infinitesimal
neighborhoods of points. Second, the insight allows us to agree with Lewis that all
perfectly natural properties are intrinsic. Third, it it makes GR compatible with
recombination. How? By treating infinitesimal neighborhoods of points, rather than
individual points, as the appropriate units of recombination.10
In summary, so long as we accept Bricker’s revision, we may continue to buy into
the Lewisian framework. So we’ll be taking tensors to represent intrinsic proper-
ties of infinitesimal neighborhoods of points. This will allows us to treat tensors as
representing perfectly natural properties.
2.2.4 Individualistic and Non-Individualistic Differences
Next, when modelsM andM′ are exactly alike with respect to non-individualistic
properties, but differ in which individualistic properties they posses, or in how the
individualistic and non-individualistic properties are co-instantiated, I will say thatM
andM′ differ merely individualistically. When worlds w and w′ are exactly alike with
respect to non-individualistic properties, but differ in which individualistic properties
they posses, or in how the individualistic and non-individualistic properties are co-
10Note that this account does require the acceptance of non-standard analysis. See Bricker (1993)
for more.
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instantiated, then I will say that w and w′ differ merely haecceitistically. Finally, I
will take haecceitism to be the thesis that some worlds differ merely haecceitistically,
and antihaecceitism to be the thesis that no worlds differ merely haecceitistically.
Note that Lewis (1986) and I give different and incompatible characterizations of
the distinction between ‘haecceitism’ and ‘antihaecceitism’. In fact, on my usage of
the term ‘haecceitism’, Lewis counts as a haecceitist. Let me explain why. First,
Lewis is “agnostic about whether there are indiscernible worlds (1986, p. 87)”, and
it is compatible with this agnosticism that there be a pair of worlds w and v that
are qualitative duplicates. Next, Lewis denies transworld identities, so inhabitants
of w and v will be distinct. It follows from the distinctness of individuals in w
and v and from Lewis’ views about property individuation11 that w and v differ
individualistically. Here is why. Corresponding to each individual in w is the unit set
of that individual, and, according to Lewis, corresponding to each set is the property
of being that particular set. So for each individual in w, there is the property of being
that particular individual. Likewise for v. But this now means that w and v differ
with respect to individualistic properties. Further, because w and v are qualitative
duplicates, they differ only with respect to individualistic properties – that is, they
differ merely haecceitistically. Since I have characterized haecceitism as the view
that there are worlds that differ merely haecceitistically, I must count Lewis as a
haecceitist.12
2.2.5 Notation
I have been careful to draw some distinctions that we’ll need throughout the
remainder of the discussion. Let us now introduce some terminology to help make
11See especially (1986, p. 225).
12I am not the only one that thinks an intuitively compelling formulation of haecceitism counts
Lewis as a haecceitist. Skow (2008) makes this observation, too.
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these distinctions easy to keep track of. First, I use ‘g’ and ‘T ’ to refer to the metric
and stress-energy tensor fields defined over mathematical points of manifolds, and I
use ‘g’ and ‘T’ to refer to the properties of worlds that g and T are used to represent.
I use ‘S’ to refer to various structures defined over the base set of mathematical points
of GR models, and I use ‘S’ to refer to the physical correlate of S.13
2.2.6 Diffeomorphism
A diffeomorphism is a kind of mapping between differentiable manifolds that can
be used to drag various geometric entities defined over points of one over to points
of the other. GR is diffeomorphism invariant. GR’s being diffeomorphism invariant
means that if a particular smattering of field values across a manifold satisfies Ein-
stein’s Field Equations (EFE) for GR, then any smattering that is related to that
one by a diffeomorphism will satisfy the EFE, too. In other words, if you begin
with a model of GR, 〈(X,S), g, T 〉, and you apply a diffeomorphism d to it, you are
guaranteed to get another model of GR, 〈d(X,S), d(g), d(T )〉 as a result. This allows
us to think of diffeomorphism as an equivalence relation that partitions the class of
GR models. We can call these equivalence classes under diffeomorphism D-classes for
short.
Diffeomorphisms can sometimes also be automorphisms: maps that take a man-
ifold back to itself. When a diffeomorphism is also an automorphism, and we use it
to drag geometric objects around, the effect is a redistribution of geometric objects
among the very same base set of points. It is generally assumed – and I will go
along with this assumption – that the sorts of diffeomorphisms that are relevant to
13It is an interesting and important question just which structures of S have physical correlates.
These are questions I will set aside since whatever answers one prefers can be plugged into the
framework I offer here. See, for example, Arntzenius and Dorr (2012, ch. 8) for more.
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D-class formation are also automorphisms.14 From now on when I use the term ‘dif-
feomorphism’ I’ll mean ‘automorphic diffeomorphism’. Now observe that a non-trivial
diffeomorphism on a model M works by “picking up” the geometric entities defined
over points of a manifold (X,S) and moving them to different points of (X,S). We
are then to think of the first arrangement of geometric entities over points of (X,S)
as constituting M, and the second, moved around arrangement of geometric entities
over points of (X,S) as constituting d(M). The individualistic properties of mod-
els are properties like being point p, being point q, etc., and the non-individualistic
properties are values of the metric and stress-energy tensor fields. Both of these
sorts of properties are operated on by diffeomorphisms. So, intuitively, a diffeomor-
phism takes a model with a particular pattern of co-instantiation of individualistic
and non-individualistic properties and makes a new model by shuffling that pattern
of co-instantiation around.
Now note that this conception of the effect of a diffeomorphism on a model re-
quires certain assumptions. First, we must assume that the individualistic properties
of points are not determined by their non-individualistic properties. For if individ-
ualistic properties were determined by non-individualistic properties,15 then diffeo-
morphic models would fail to differ since they involve the very same arrangement of
non-individualistic properties. Second, we must recognize trans-model identities be-
tween points. That is, we must assume that there are facts about whether the same
individualistic properties are instantiated in different models. Without this assump-
tion, there would be no basis upon which to claim that we can generate a new model
simply by moving the geometric entities around over a set of points. The upshot
here is that models belonging to a common D-class, in virtue of being related by
14Cf. Butterfield (1988, 1989), Carroll (2004, especially Appendix B), Earman and Norton (1987,
520), Hawking and Ellis (1973, 56), and Norton (1993, 824).
15This is to treat the geometric entity fields as “individuating fields.” Cf. Dasgupta (2011) and
Brighouse (1994).
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automorphic diffeomorphisms, differ merely individualistically. In particular, models
belonging to a common D-class will be exactly alike with respect to which individu-
alistic and non-individualistic properties there are; they will differ only with respect
to the pattern in which these properties are co-instantiated. This is an especially
important point because (as we will see in more detail in §4) one of the premises of
the hole argument involves the claim that substantivalists must regard mere individ-
ualistic differences among models of a common D-class as being correlated with mere
haecceitistic differences among classes of worlds.
2.3 What do GR Models do?
Modern physical theories centrally involve collections of dynamical equations that
somehow or other manage to convey something about worlds (and, most relevantly,
about our own world). GR, for example, is centered around Einstein’s Field Equa-
tions, and these equations are supposed to say something about the relationship
between mass and energy on the one hand, and spacetime curvature on the other.
But how exactly does GR “say” anything about worlds?
One approach to this question is to ask how we are supposed to interpret the
sentences that express the EFE. There seem to be two different ways of doing this.
One way is to interpret the sentences in terms of GR’s 〈(X,S), g, T 〉 models,16 and the
other way is to interpret them in terms of worlds. Think of the EFE as unfolding into
infinitely long conjunctions of statements about the field values of individual points.
If we pursue the interpretation in terms of models, then these statements will involve
attributions of values of g and T to mathematical points of a manifold, whereas if
16Actually, while the standard formulation of GR is in terms of tensors on manifolds, it is also
possible to formulate it in terms of Einstein algebras, or twistors. These alternative formulations
will yield different sorts of models. So which mathematical objects are the models of GR needs to be
relativized to a formulation. See Bain (2003, 2006) about this general point and about the twistor
formalism, and Geroch (1972) and Earman (1989) about Einstein algebras.
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we pursue the interpretation in terms of worlds, they will involve attributions of the
properties g and T to physical points of worlds.
Now, it might initially seem that a physical theory can say something about worlds
only if we interpret it in terms of worlds. It might seem that if we interpret the theory
in terms of models, then it’s just pure mathematics – it doesn’t say anything about
worlds, and doesn’t really deserve to be called a physical theory. But that would be
too hasty. Perhaps the dynamical equations of a theory like GR pick out a collection
of models, and these models then bear certain relations to worlds, and it is in virtue
of the theory’s models being related to worlds that the theory says something about
worlds.
Let’s regiment this discussion. First, let’s call the set of worlds at which a physical
theory is true the content of that theory. Now let us distinguish the heuristic con-
ception of models, from the robust conception of models. According to the heuristic
conception of models, the content of GR is determined by interpreting the dynamical
equations of GR in terms of worlds. On this view, one may still help themselves to an
interpretation of these equations in terms of models for heuristic purposes – perhaps
to help us visualize what sorts of transformations are permitted by the theory. But
an interpretation in terms of models is not how the theory determines its content.
According to the robust conception, on the other hand, there is only one right way
to interpret GR. This interpretation is the one in terms of models. Models then bear
certain relations to worlds, and it is in virtue of being so related to GR’s models that
these worlds come to form the content of GR. On this view, models are like bridges
that connect the dynamical equations of theory to the worlds at which it is true.
I will not offer a full defense of the robust conception here. What I will do instead
is show what sorts of consequences would follow from accepting it in the context of
the hole argument. To do this, I’ll begin by examining the hole argument and some of
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the more popular responses to it. Then I’ll develop the robust conception in enough
detail to unfold its consequences for the hole argument.
2.4 The Hole Argument
Recall that GR is diffeomorphism invariant. This means that any diffeomorphism
on a model of GR will yield a new model of GR. So consider a modelM and a “hole”
diffeomorphism h that is an identity mapping everywhere except for an arbitrarily
small region occupying a cauchy surface of M. Call this region H. Within H, h
effects a shuffling of individualistic and non-individualistic properties. Now, givenM
and the diffeomorphism h, we are guaranteed a new model h(M) that differs fromM
only within H, and here it differs from M merely individualistically – that is, both
models have the same individualistic and non-individualistic properties, but differ in
how these properties are coinstantiated. Given this, M and h(M) will violate the
following notion of determinism.
Model Determinism (MD): GR satisfies MD iff: for all GR models, M and
M′, and for all cauchy surfaces Σ inM and Σ′ inM′: if Σ and Σ′ involve the same
pattern of co-instantiation of individualistic and non-individualistic properties
then, M and M′ involve the same pattern of co-instantiation of individualistic
and non-individualistic properties.
Now, it might initially strike one that violating something like MD is not obviously
damning. After all, MD is about GR’s models, not worlds, and presumably when it
comes to violations of determinism, it’s worlds we care about, not models. This is
where the heuristic conception leads us into trouble.
On the heuristic conception, while models do not perform any vital role in securing
a theory’s content, they are nevertheless important heuristic tools. In the context of
the hole argument, for example, models are appealed to as aids in visualizing the
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spread of worlds compatible with GR. But the problem here is that we make this
appeal to models without being sufficiently explicit about which features of worlds
they represent. So it’s as though models are asked to perform an important role
without being told exactly what that role is. Let’s consider this in more detail.17
Begin with a D-class D of models. Once we attempt to use D to help us visualize
a collection of worlds, we immediately face a difficult question: what features of D
really represent physical quantities and entities? On the heuristic conception, one
confronts this question by employing the following strategy: take all (or, anyways,
most) features of D to have physical correlates. Then look and see what sorts of
consequences follow from taking various of these features to have physical correlates.
If undesirable consequences follow from accepting a correlation between some math-
ematical feature of members of D and some physical feature of some world, then
consider rejecting that correlation. Then let the philosophical haggling commence
over questions about which correlations are mandatory and which negotiable given a
commitment to substantivalism.
So within the context of the heuristic conception, the default strategy is to use
D as a means of visualizing worlds in a way that maximizes respects of similarity
between D and some collection of worlds. This, for example, involves taking each el-
ementM of D to have some world w as a physical correlate, where w has a particular
physical structure S iffM has a corresponding mathematical structure S, and where
physical points of w have properties g and T iff corresponding points of M have
corresponding values of g and T , and where w has a particular pattern of coinstanti-
ation of individualistic and non-individualistic properties iff M has a corresponding
17The most explicit general discussion of the role of models in the heuristic conception can be
found in Skow (2005, §2.1) and Liu (1996), but see also Pooley (2002, 2011) and Dasgupta (2011,
126). Also note that Butterfield (1989) has an especially clear discussion of the way advocates of the
heuristic conception reason from the formulation of determinism in terms of models to the physically
important formulation in terms of worlds.
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pattern of coinstantiation of individualistic and non-individualistic properties. This
last type of correspondence – the correspondence between patterns of coinstantiation
of individualistic and non-individualistic properties – is the key point of entry for the
issue of haecceitism. It is this type of correspondence that causes mere individualistic
differences among members of a common D-class to be reproduced as mere haecceitis-
tic differences among worlds. And, importantly, it is the heuristic conception that
seems to legitimize this reproduction. It does so by tacitly appealing to a strategy of
maximizing respects of similarity between models and worlds.
Given this background assumption about the way to use models to visualize
worlds, a particular general principle of correspondence between models and worlds
looks quite plausible.
Haec: for all elementsM of Mod(GR) and for all worlds w, ifM represents w,
then
(1) Every: every element M′ belonging to the same D-class as M represents
some world, and
(2) Distinct: there is no elementM′ of Mod(GR) such thatM′ 6=M andM′
represents w.18
The essence of Haec is quite simple: there is a one-to-one correspondence be-
tween models and worlds; where there is a distinction recognized by models, there is
a corresponding distinction recognized by worlds. So if models can differ merely indi-
vidualistically, then, correspondingly, worlds can differ merely haecceitistically. Now
the problem is that, given Haec, it follows from there being GR modelsM and h(M)
that there are GR worlds w and h(w) that differ in a way that is exactly analogous
18Pooley (2002, p. 93) and Rickles’ (2008, p. 90) use the term Haec for an equivalent princi-
ple. Note that Haec is also roughly equivalent to Earman and Norton’s (1987) “denial of Leibniz
equivalence”, and Rynasciewicz’ (1994, p. 409) “model literalism.”
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to the way that M and h(M) differ. That is, where M and h(M) differ merely indi-
vidualistically, w and h(w) differ merely haecceitistically. But just as M and h(M)
jointly violate MD, w and h(w) will violate an analogous notion of determinism in
terms of worlds: WD.
World Determinism (WD): GR satisfies WD iff: for all GR worlds, w and w′,
and for all maximal achronal subregions S in w and S ′ in w′: if S and S ′ involve
the same pattern of co-instantiation of individualistic and non-individualistic
properties then, w and w′ involve the same pattern of co-instantiation of indi-
vidualistic and non-individualistic properties.
Violations of WD cannot be dismissed as a mathematical quirk in the way that
violations of MD can, since WD is quite clearly a physical variety of indeterminism.
This now gives us everything we need to present an organized rendition of the hole
argument against substantivalism.
2.4.1 The Hole Argument Against Substantivalism
The Hole Argument Against Substantivalism
(P1) If substantivalism is true, then Haec is true.
(P2) If Haec is true, then GR violates WD.
(C1) So, if substantivalism is true, then GR violates WD.
(P3) Any metaphysical thesis from which it follows
that GR violates WD is false.
(C2) So, substantivalism is false.
The most popular response to this argument is the antihaecceitist response. The
antihaecceitist denies (P1). Denying (P1) involves showing that substantivalism is
compatible with the denial of Haec. There are two ways to deny Haec: one way
involves rejecting the first conjunct of Haec – Distinct – and the other way involves
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rejecting the second conjunct – Every. Butterfield (1988, 1989) is an example of
someone who denies Every. He does this by rejecting the view that trans-world
identities are genuine identities, and accepting instead Lewis’ counterpart theory as
an account of de re modality. According to this view, individuals, like physical points,
do not exist in more than one world. Counterfactual claims about individuals, then,
are made true by otherworldly counterparts of those individuals, rather than by those
individuals themselves being located in distinct worlds.
Accepting this sort of metaphysical package allows Butterfield to claim that if
we take a model M to represent some world w, then we have exhausted the rep-
resentational resources of M’s entire D-class. Consider a model M that involves a
mathematical point m. Note that any model d(M) in the same D-class as M will
involve m, too. Now suppose we takeM to represent some world w. This will involve
using m to represent some physical point p in w. But if we try to use d(M) to repre-
sent a distinct world d(w), then, because d(M) involves m and m has been assumed
to represent p, we seem to be committed to recognizing p as a part of d(w). But this
move trades in exactly the sort of “genuine” trans-world identities that counterpart
theorists deny are legitimate: if p exists in w, then it cannot literally also exist in
d(w). In effect, Butterfield’s strategy is to deny that there can be worlds that differ
in the sorts of ways (that is, haecceitistically) that lead to violations of WD.
Hoefer’s (1996) response to the hole argument is similar in effect to Butter-
field’s, but involves denying Distinct, rather than Every. Hoefer argues that we
ought to take the individualistic properties of physical points to be fixed by the non-
individualistic properties of physical points. If we do this, then there is no way to
“re-shuffle” the pattern in which individualistic and non-individualistic properties of
worlds are coinstantiated – the individualistic properties follow the non-individualistic
ones. Thus there cannot be worlds w and d(w) that differ in the sort of way that
leads to a violation of WD.
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2.4.2 The Argument Against Haecceitistic Substantivalism
Though there are other varieties of antihaecceitism, what all varieties have in
common is the supplementation of substantivalism with a metaphysical package that
prevents logical space from being populated by worlds that differ merely haecceitis-
tically. That is, while the antihaecceitist agrees that haeccetism is relevant, he urges
that a substantivalist may nevertheless inoculate himself against the hole argument
with a modal vaccine: antihaecceitism. This move redirects the force of the hole
argument against the substantivalist who is also a haecceitist. This furnishes us with
the following version of the argument.
The Argument Against Haecceitistic Substantivalism
(P1∗) If haecceitistic substantivalism is true, then Haec is true.
(P2∗) If Haec is true, then GR violates WD.
(C1∗) So, if haecceitistic substantivalism is true, then GR
violates WD.
(P3∗) Any metaphysical thesis from which it follows
that GR violates WD is false.
(C2∗) So, haecceitistic substantivalism is false.
There are several ways for a haecceitistic substantivalist to respond to this ar-
gument. Maudlin (1988), for example, denies (P1∗). He claims that a haecceitistic
substantivalist ought to supplement haecceitistic substantivalism with the doctrine of
essentialism as applied to metrical relations. Consider a world w according to which
physical points p and q bear the metric relation R. Because the metric essentialist
takes all metrical relations to be essential to the points that have them, if p bears R
to q in w, then every possible world in which p and q exist is a possible world where
p bears R to q. Given this commitment to essentialism, the metric essentialist can
take at most one member of a D-class to represent a possible world: if one model
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represents a possibility, then the others, because they differ in the metrical relations
they represent physical points as having, cannot.
The most popular way for a haecceitistic substantivalist to respond to the argu-
ment is to deny (P3∗) and argue that the notion of determinism exploited by the hole
argument is not the sort of determinism that we ought to care about. Arntzenius
(2012), Melia (1999), and Skow (2005) are examples of this sort of strategy. They
argue that the hole argument shows us that the sort of determinism relevant to GR
is a sort that is blind to haecceitistic differences between worlds.
2.4.3 The Argument Against Haecceitistic Determinism
This furnishes us with yet another way of redirecting the hole argument.
The Argument Against Haecceitistic Determinism
(P1∗∗) Haecceitistic substantivalism is true.
(P2∗∗) If Haecceitistic substantivalism is true, then Haec is true.
(P3∗∗) If Haec is true, then GR violates WD.
(P4∗∗) If GR violates WD, then WD is false.
(C∗∗) So, WD is false.
It is incumbent on the haecceitistic substantivalist who understands the force of
the hole argument in this way to offer an alternative formulation of determinism.19
For our purposes, we need not go any further. For I will argue that all of the lines of
argument we have considered go wrong by emphasizing the relevance of Haec. The
standard dialectic revolves around the question of who is committed to Haec and
how, if one is, they are to defuse that commitment. But I’ll argue Haec really isn’t
relevant. It merely looks relevant under the assumption of the heuristic conception.
But what if we reject the heuristic conception?
19See Arntzenius (2012), Melia (1999), and Skow (2005).
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2.5 The Robust Conception
Recall that advocates of the heuristic conception confront the question of which
features of models really represent physical quantities and entities by appeal to a
strategy of maximization: first, you maximize the respects of similarity between a
collection of models and a collection of worlds; next, you see if any of these respects of
similarity cause trouble. If there is trouble, then consider rejecting the troublemaking
correlation. This is a rather oblique way of addressing the question, and it has the
effect of making Haec look relevant, when it really isn’t.
Advocates of the robust conception confront the question of which features of
models represent physical quantities and entities head-on. In the following sections
I sketch one way that friends of the robust conception may proceed. This involves
using a relation that I call determination as a means by which to construct GR’s
content. After characterizing this relation, I consider its effect on the hole argument,
and show why Haec is irrelevant.
2.5.1 Determination
I’ll now introduce a relation that I will call ‘determination’ which we will use to
build GR’s content from its models. The basis for this relation will be a mapping
between the set of mathematical points of models and the fusion of physical points of
worlds. There are a few features that this mapping must have. First, it will have to be
one-to-one and onto, otherwise a GR model may be mapped to a world at which which
spacetime is not a continuum. Second, it will have to involve a means of correlating
the structure S of a GR model with the structure S of a world. Otherwise, for
example, models with certain global topologies may mapped to worlds with radically
different global topologies. Finally, the determination relation must form the basis
of a correspondence between the metric and stress-energy tensor fields g and T of
models, and their physical correlates, the perfectly natural properties g and T.
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Intuitively, what we want to require is that a certain mathematical point in a
model has a particular value of g or T iff the physical correlate of that point has that
same value. But we can’t quite do that since physical points don’t ever have values of
g and T . Rather, they have instances of g and T. So what we need here is to appeal
to some previously established correlation between values of g and T and instances of
g and T. It won’t matter all that much exactly what this correlation is, so long as we
stick to it for the purposes of evaluating the relation under consideration. That said,
there are surely some features that would be nice. For example, it would be nice if,
given values a and b of g, where a is least, and b greatest, corresponding values, a and
b, of g were such that a was greatest and b least. There are many other features that
would also be nice, although what these features are taken to be will depend upon
ones position with respect to issues in the theory of measurement.20 In any even, let’s
call a correlation that has all of these nice features – what ever they are taken to be
– a natural correlation
With this in place we are now ready to introduce our relation. Let us suppose
that w is a world, that Y is the set of physical points that compose w and that g and
T are perfectly natural properties of w that are naturally correlated with g and T .
Let us also define a predicate FUS(a1, . . . , an) which is the fusion of a1, . . . , an. Now
we can say that the model M = 〈(X,S), g, T 〉 determines w iff:
There exists a bijective function f : X → Y such that:
1. For every subset x of X and y =FUS(f(a)|a ∈ X) of Y , x has S iff y has
S.
2. Suppose vg and vT are values of g and T , respectively, and dg and dT are
the corresponding perfectly natural properties. Then, for every x ∈ X and
y ∈ Y :
20See, for example, Krantz et al (1971), and Eddon (2013).
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2.1. vg[x] only if dg[f(x)], and dg[y] only if vg[f
−1(y)], and
2.2. vT [x] only if dT[f(x)], and dT[y] only if vT [f
−1(y)], and
2.3. if vg and vT are coinstantiated by x, then the corresponding dg and dT
are coinstantiated by the image under f of x, and if dg and dT are coin-
stantiated by y, then the corresponding vg and vT are coinstantiated
by the inverse image under f of y.
To sum up: the determination relation holds between M and w iff there is some
way of putting mathematical points of M into correspondence with physical points
of w, so that under that correspondence, corresponding collections of points have
corresponding structures, and corresponding points have corresponding values of g/T
and instances of g/T.
Now recall that on the robust conception of models, GR gets its content through
the medium of its models. I propose that we can spell out GR’s content by invoking
the determination relation. We may say the following.
Content: for all worlds w, w is part of the content of GR iff there is some
model of GR that determines w.
The overall picture that emerges is one according to which GR picks out a collec-
tion of models. These models then enter into the determination relation with various
possible worlds. And it is in virtue of being so related to GR’s models that these
worlds come to form GR’s content. So, now that we have this apparatus at our
disposal, what does it do for us?
2.6 Consequences of The Robust Conception
Under Content, (P1) of the hole argument is false. But so too are (P1∗) and
(P2∗∗). This is because while members of a common D-class agree with one another
about which individualistic and non-individualistic properties are instantiated, they
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differ in how these properties are co-instantiated. But the determination relation
tracks individualistic and non-individualistic properties without tracking how these
properties are co-instantiated. So the determination relation respects the features
that elements of a common D-class have in common, but is blind to the features with
respect to which they differ. Let’s consider the consequences of this.
2.6.1 Determinism
To begin, observe that the direct link between models and worlds advocated by
the robust conception licenses two different ways of viewing determinism. On the one
hand, we can begin by thinking of our models as picking out the worlds that form
the content of our theory. Once these worlds have been picked out, we can forget
how we got them, and go about whatever sort of philosophizing we like. We may,
for example, formulate a thesis of determinism like WD that is purely in terms of
worlds, and that ignores the way that those worlds were picked out. But we can
also formulate a notion of determinism that is sensitive to the way that the worlds
are picked out by the models. Arguably, on the robust conception it is this later
sort of determinism that is most closely associated with the physical theory. Recall
that, according to the robust conception, physical theories are interpreted in terms of
models. The models then function as devices by which the theory gets its content. It
therefore seems plausible to suppose that the notion of determinism that respects this
chain of dependence is the one that is most relevant to GR. Consider the following
proposal.
Robust Determinism (RD): GR satisfies RD iff: for all GR models, M and
M′, for all cauchy surfaces Σ in M and Σ′ in M′, and for all classes of worlds
W determined by M and W ′ determined by M′: (1) if Σ and Σ′ involve the
same individualistic and non-individualistic properties, and the patterns of co-
instantiation of individualistic and non-individualistic properties in Σ and Σ′ are
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related by a smooth transformation, then M and M′ involve the same individ-
ualistic and non-individualistic properties, and the patterns of co-instantiation
of individualistic and non-individualistic properties inM andM′ are related by
a smooth transformation, and (2) W = W ′.
GR satisfies RD. When cauchy surfaces of a pair of GR models are such that their
individualistic and non-individualistic properties are related by a smooth transforma-
tion, then it follow that the models from which these cauchy surfaces are selected are
such that their individualist and non-individualistic properties are globally related by
a smooth transformation. But it also follows that when models satisfy this criterion,
they are guaranteed to determine the same classes of worlds. That is, the features
that allow models to satisfy RD also force those models to determine the same classes
of worlds.
2.6.2 Haecceitism and Antihaecceitism
Given Content, haecceitism is irrelevant to the hole argument. To see why,
consider a model M and the class W of worlds that it determines, and the model
M′ and the class of worlds W ′ that it determines. Now, under the assumption of
haecceitism, W and W ′ will have many members – at least one member for each
distinct way of permuting individualistic and non-individualistic properties. Under
the assumption of antihaecceitism, on the other hand, each of these classes will have
only one member. This is because the antihaecceitist does not think that worlds ever
differ merely in virtue of differences in how the individualistic and non-individualistic
properties are co-instantiated. But the cardinality of the classes of worlds is besides
the point. What matters, so far as satisfying RD is concerned, is just whether M
and M′ can ever differ with respect to the worlds they determine. If M and M′ are
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members of a common D-class, then the answer is “no”. This means that it makes
no difference whatsoever whether one is a haecceitist or an antihaecceitist.21
2.7 Conclusion
The heuristic conception has shaped the dialectic around the hole argument. The
effect of this has been to make haecceitism appear relevant when it is not. This
happens as the result of the following pattern. First, the heuristic conception does
not give models a clear role to play in the relationship between the formulation of a
physical theory and that theory’s content, but it nevertheless employs them in non-
trivial ways. In particular, advocates of the heuristic conception appeal to models
for purposes of visualizing GR’s content. The way this visualization proceeds is by
initially maximizing respect of similarity between models and worlds. This involves
taking all of the distinctions recognized among GR models to be recognized among GR
worlds. Of particular importance is the reproduction of mere individualistic difference
among D-classes of models as mere haecceitistic difference among classes of worlds.
Importing this distinction among models to the domain of worlds makes Haec seem
a plausible principle of correspondence between models and worlds. Haec may then
be used as the main premise in the hole argument against substantivalism.
The philosophical community has now reached a stable consensus: the way to re-
spond to the hole argument against substantivalism is to stage one among a variety of
metaphysical interventions, each of which has the effect of redirecting the force of the
21Note that the haecceitist substantivalist will find herself in situation where she can acknowledge
several notions of determinism. On the one hand, she may observe that there is a notion of deter-
minism – WD – that is sensitive to haecceitistic differences that her preferred metaphysical package
violates. But on the other hand, she may acknowledge that there is another sort of determinism – RD
– that her preferred metaphysical package does to violate. Moreover, the haecceitist substantivalist
may point out that RD is the notion of determinism that is most closely associated with GR. She is
licensed to make this point in virtue of her acceptance of the robust conception which gives models
a clear and central role in connecting a theory to its content. So the haecceitist substantivalist who
accepts the robust conception finds herself in a situation where she can have her cake and eat it,
too.
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hole argument. Either – like Butterfield, Hoefer, Maudlin, and Pooley – we buttress
substantivalism with some modal thesis that blocks the generation of problem-causing
worlds by fiat. Or else – like Arntzenius, Melia, and Skow – we fiddle with the for-
mulation of determinism to make it weak enough not to bother haecceitism. What
all of these responses have in common is that they accept the heuristic conception,
and agree that haecceitism is relevant to the hole argument.
But there is another way. We can undermine the hole argument by rejecting a
more fundamental assumption: the heuristic conception. We may instead accept the
robust conception that takes models to play a central role in connecting theories to
worlds. If we accept the account I give, and take the content of GR to be formed
according to Content, then whether GR is deterministic or not will not depend
upon whether one is a haecceitist or an antihaecceitist. The question of haecceitism
as opposed to antihaecceitism – the central point of contention in the aftermath of
the hole argument – becomes irrelevant.
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CHAPTER 3
DUALISM AND THE PRICE OF HARMONY
3.1 Introduction
Spacetime substantivalism is the view that the basic parts of spacetime are fun-
damental entities. There is a live debate among substantivalists that concerns the
relationship between material objects and parts of spacetime. Supersubstantivalists
maintain that material objects are identical to parts of spacetime; dualists maintain
that material objects are distinct from the parts of spacetime, but that they bear a
fundamental relation of occupation to some of them.
Supersubstantivalists and dualists alike find it plausible to suppose that there is
a principle of harmony that governs the relationship between material objects and
parts of spacetime. This principle says, in effect, that if a material object is appro-
priately related to a part of spacetime, then that object and that part of spacetime
have exactly the same geometric, topological, and mereological structure. For the
supersubstantivalist, this appropriate relation is identity: if a material object is iden-
tical to a part of spacetime, then that object and that part of spacetime have exactly
the same shape. For the dualist, the appropriate relation is occupation: if a material
object occupies a part of spacetime, then that object and that part of spacetime have
exactly the same shape. But whereas for the monist this sort of shape harmony is a
consequence of Leibniz’ Law, for the dualist it seems to be a brute fact. I will argue
that this consideration in conjunction with adequately developed Humean intuitions
about recombination provides a strong argument against dualism.
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In this chapter I will proceed as follows. In §3.2, I introduce some familiar meta-
physical notions that we will need throughout. Then, in §3.3, I describe the dualist’s
fundamental occupation relation and some related notions. In §3.4 I develop the
principle of harmony, and show that there are three ways that a dualist may explain
it. I call these explanations ‘shape principles.’ In §3.5 I introduce a framework that
fleshes-out some broadly Humean intuitions about modal plenitude. Then, in §3.6,
I show how this framework undermines each of the dualist’s shape principles. I take
this to show that the dualist’s occupation relation is a troublemaker. Finally, I con-
clude that if the occupation relation is a troublemaker, then we have a reason to favor
a theory that doesn’t require it: supersubstantivalism
3.2 Preliminaries
l will suppose that the basic parts of spacetime are spacetime points, and that
classical mereology applies to them. This allows us to characterize spacetimes as
fusions of spacetime points, and it allows us to characterize regions of spacetime in
terms of the parthood relation.
Next, I will assume a modal framework that is roughly that of Lewis (1986). I
take worlds to be maximally interrelated sums1; I take de dicto modal claims to be
claims about what worlds there are; and I take de re modal claims to be analyzable
in terms of counterparts. This allows me to understand modally qualified claims as
involving quantification either over worlds or over counterparts.
I take there to be a primitive notion of perfect naturalness that applies to properties
and relations. The perfectly natural properties and relations are special in the sense
that they are “joint carving”: when things share a perfectly natural property, they
are objectively similar, and when pairs of relata share a perfectly natural relation,
1Lewis thinks of the relevant sort of interrelatedness as being spatiotemporal. I don’t agree with
this assumption. To see why, read on.
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the pairs are objectively similar. Given the notion of perfectly natural properties and
relations, we may characterize duplication. Two individuals are duplicates iff there is
a similarity map from parts of one to parts of the other such that corresponding parts
have the same perfectly natural properties and stand in the same perfectly natural
relations.
The concept of duplication can be used to characterize the notion of an intrinsic
property. A property P is intrinsic iff no two duplicates anywhere in logical space
disagree with respect to P , otherwise P is extrinsic. Then we may say that the intrin-
sic character of a thing is an exhaustive catalogue of that thing’s intrinsic properties.
Next we can say that a relation R is internal iff R supervenes on the intrinsic char-
acter of its relata. Similarity is the paradigm: whether A and B are similar depends
only on the intrinsic characters of A and B, it does not depend on their locations, or
their arrangement among other things. We may say that a relation R is external iff
it does not supervene on the intrinsic character of its relata taken individually, but it
does supervene on the intrinsic character of its relata taken together. Spatiotemporal
distance relations are the paradigm: whether A and B are five feet apart does not
supervene upon the intrinsic characters of A and B, but it does supervene on the
intrinsic character of their fusion.2 Finally, any relation that is internal or external is
intrinsic, otherwise it is extrinsic.3
Finally, recall that I characterized worlds as “maximally interrelated sums.” Lewis
thinks of worlds as maximally spatiotemporally interrelated sums. This has the effect
of making spatiotemporality an essential ingredient of reality. But there are com-
pelling grounds for skepticism about this. One reason for skepticism comes from
physics. Quantum mechanics and general relativity are famously successful physical
2Although, note that there may be some reasons for thinking distance relations are not external.
See, for example, Bricker (1993) and Maudlin (2007).
3The characterization I give follows Bricker (1996).
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theories; equally famous is their apparent incompatibility. Physicists’ attempts to
reconcile the two theories have spawned radical new proposals for the fundamental
structure of the world. Among these are proposals according to which there are no
natural distance relations.4 This strongly suggests that we ought to think that there
are worlds at which there are no natural distance relations – indeed, ours might be
one of them.
But note that if there are non-spatiotemporal worlds, then the Lewisian analysis
of ‘world’ needs to be augmented. The analysis that I accept appeals to external
rather than spatiotemporal interrelatedness. We should say that worlds are maximal
externally – rather than spatiotemporally – interrelated sums.5 My assumption that
there are worlds unified by natural, external, non-spatiotemporal relations will be
required for several of the arguments I consider below.
3.3 Occupation
There are a variety of occupation relations that different philosophers have con-
sidered as candidates for the sort of fundamental relation a dualist needs to unite
objects and regions of spacetime.6 These include notions like weak occupation, which,
when it obtains between an object O and a region R, requires only that some part of
O be “in” some subregion of R. Consider, for example, the region within my office. I
weakly occupy this region as soon as I put my arm through the door.7 There are other
notions as well. Like, for example, whole occupation, according to which an object
O occupies a region R just in case there is no part of O “outside” of R. According
4See Butterfield and Isham (2001) for an overview of the various research projects in quantum
gravity, include ones according to which there are no natural distance relations.
5See Bricker (1996) for detailed discussion of this proposal.
6Parsons (2007), Hudson (2006), Saucedo (2011), Gilmore (2008).
7This is Parsons’ (2007) “weak location”.
65
to this notion, I wholly occupy the region within my office when I stand inside of it,
despite their being subregions of it that are “free of” me. Finally, the notion I prefer
is exact occupation.8 Intuitively, an object O exactly occupies a region R just in case
every part of O is “in” some part of R, and every subregion of R has some part of
O “in” it. As Parsons (2007) puts it, the region an object exactly occupies is like its
“shadow in spacetime”.
Notice that I used quotes around words like ‘in’ and ‘outside’ in the preceding
paragraph. I did this because these sorts of notions are ultimately to be characterized
in terms of the particular occupation relation we choose to treat as a primitive. So,
although we can use such words to get a feel for things, we cannot innocently use these
words in characterizing the occupation relation. So what we’ll do now is pick one of
the notions of occupation discussed above, and treat it as a primitive. Then, appealing
to this primitive in conjunction with the resources of mereology, we can define other
sorts of occupation relations in terms of it. I already expressed a preference for exact
occupation, so we’ll take that to be our primitive. This then enables us to define weak
and whole occupation. An object O weakly occupies a region R just in case there is
some region R∗ such that O exactly occupies R∗ and R∗ overlaps R. And an object
O wholly occupies a region R just in case there is some region R∗ such that O exactly
occupies R∗ and R∗ is a subregion of R.
3.4 Harmony
I’ll call the sum of the features of an object or a region that are determined by
its geometry it’s shape.9 So to say that such-and-such and so-and-so are the same
8This is also the preferred primitive occupancy relation of Casati and Varzi (1999), Saucedo
(2011), and Leonard (forthcoming).
9McDaniel (2007) characterizes shape this way, too.
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shape entails that such-and-such and so-and-so have the same topological, affine, and
metrical structure.10 Now we may express the principle of harmony as follows.
Harmony: for every world w, if there is some material object O and some
region of spacetime R that are both parts of w, and O exactly occupies R, then
O and R have the same shape.
The business of this paper is to elaborate on premise (1) of the following argument.
The Argument Against Dualism
1. If harmony is true, then dualism is false.
2. Harmony is true.
3. So, dualism is false.
But I anticipate that some committed dualists may be tempted to reverse my
argument and offer the following one instead.
The Argument Against Harmony
1∗. If harmony is true, then dualism is false.
2∗. Dualism is true.
3∗. So, harmony is false.
10Here is the place to flag a related notion of harmony. There is a much-discussed issue regarding
the relationship between the mereological structure of material objects and the mereological structure
of the regions those objects exactly occupy. This issue regards the question: is it metaphysically
possible for these respective structures to be in misalignment? Is mereological disharmony possible?
Simmons (2004), McDaniel (2007) Saucedo (2011), and Uzquiano (2011) argue that disharmony is
possible; Skow (2007) and Schaffer (2009) argue that it is not possible; and Leonard (forthcoming)
offers a taxonomy of restrictions one might place on the sorts of disharmony that are possible. While
the motivations behind mereological harmony are similar to those behind shape harmony, the two
notions are different enough to be considered separately.
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But it is important to note that premise (2) enjoys far more intuitive support than
premise (2∗). The intuition that round things won’t fit in square places, for example,
is more robust than the intuition that objects are related to regions of spacetime by an
occupancy relation. The relative weight of these intuitions is important. It strongly
militates against using dualism as a premise in an argument against Harmony. So,
while I neither offer a positive argument for Harmony nor assume that an argument
against Harmony is necessarily doomed, I will insist that a simple reversal of my
argument – like The Argument Against Harmony – is illegitimate. This is as strong
a claim as I will need.
3.4.1 The Shapes of Objects and their Regions
Given the dualist’s bifurcation of the material and the spatiotemporal, what might
explain Harmony? Is it simply a miraculous coincidence or brute necessity that ob-
jects happen to find the right regions to exactly occupy? Or is there some relationship
between the shapes of objects and regions that makes Harmony inevitable?
There are three mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive principles concerning
the relationship between the shape properties of objects and the regions they exactly
occupy. They are as follows:
Imposition: for every world w, every material object O that is part of w, and
every region of spacetime R that is part of w: if O exactly occupies R, then O
imposes its shape on R.
Inheritance: for every world w, every material object O that is part of w, and
every region of spacetime R that is part of w: if O exactly occupies R, then O
inherits its shape from R.
Independence: for every world w, every material object O that is part of w,
and every region of spacetime R that is part of w: O and R have their shapes
independently.
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Note that under Inheritance the shape properties of regions are intrinsic, while
the shape properties of material objects are extrinsic, and under Imposition the
shape properties of regions are extrinsic, while the shape properties of material objects
are intrinsic. Because of this, it is clear that both Inheritance and Imposition are
capable of providing genuine explanations of Harmony. Harmony is satisfied in
the case of Inheritance because shapes are had by material objects only in virtue
of their relations to regions, and Harmony is satisfied in the case of Imposition
because shapes are had by regions only in virtue of their relations to material objects.
But under Independence shape properties of both regions and material objects are
intrinsic. So there is no clear sense in which Independence explains Harmony.
What we’ll see presently is that problems with Inheritance and Imposition push
dualists towards Independence. But Independence will force dualists to concede
that Harmony is just a brute necessity.
To see how these arguments get off the ground, we need to consider how meta-
physical theories couple to possibilities. This will first involve us in a consideration
of principles of plenitude.
3.5 Modal Plenitude
A principle of plenitude is a principle according to which logical space is consti-
tuted. It is a principle that ensures that all the possibilities are accounted for; it
ensures that there are no gaps – no holes in logical space where a possibility should
have been, but isn’t. Lewis (1986) discusses and defends one such principle, inspired
by the Humean denial of necessary connections between distinct existents. This is his
principle of recombination. A first approximation of the principle says that “anything
can coexist with anything else [and] anything can fail to coexist with anything else.
(1986, p. 88).” But Lewis’ principle of recombination is problematic in a number of
ways. It is problematic, first, because Lewis never articulates it in sufficient detail,
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and second, because all attempts to develop the principle as a comprehensive account
of plenitude seem to fail.11
Bricker (1991, forthcoming), however, has proposed to extend Lewis’ picture by
taking plenitude to require not one principle, but four. To see how these principles
work, begin by thinking of worlds as generally being divisible into two parts: their
structure, and their contents. In familiar cases, structure is spatiotemporal struc-
ture: a system of distance relations instantiated by parts of substantival spacetime.
(Although note that I assume that some worlds have non-spatiotemporal structure.)
A world’s contents, in familiar cases, are the material objects or material fields that
are parts of that world. Bricker proposes a principle of plenitude for structures, a
principle of plenitude for contents, and a principle of recombination that redistributes
contents across structures. These three principles put meat on the bones of the in-
tuition that “anything can coexist with anything else.” The fourth principle – the
principle of solitude – puts meat on the bones of the intuition that “anything can fail
to coexist with anything else.”12
I will need three of these principles: plenitude of structures, plenitude of recom-
binations, and the principle of solitude.
3.5.1 A Plenitude of Structures
What motivates the principle of plenitude for structures? Here is one sort of
motivation: we don’t know exactly what shape our universe is. For all we know, it
might be finite or infinite; it might be bounded or unbounded; it might be flat, or
either positively or negatively curved; it might be simply connected, or have holes.
These are just some of the possible structural features that are compatible with our
11See, for example, Forrest and Armstrong (1984), Divers and Melia (2002), Effird and Stoneham
(2008), and Bricker (forthcoming).
12Bricker (forthcoming) argues that the principle of solitude is not a fourth, fundamental principle
of plenitude, but a consequence of the principles of plenitude of structures and recombinations.
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best large-scale physics: general relativity (GR). But perhaps our best physics isn’t
right – indeed, it probably isn’t. In that case, the sorts of possibilities I just mentioned
may not even begin to plumb the depths of what’s compatible with what we know
about our world. This suggests that we ought to think logical space includes a wide
range of structures.
To begin, we need the notion of a natural generalization of a class of structures.13
Consider some class of structures S. A natural generalization G of S is a superclass
of S that contains elements that naturally generalize certain features possessed by
members of S. (Here what makes a generalization natural is just that it be accepted
as a natural or intuitive generalization by mathematicians.) Some examples will help
to clarify. Consider 3 dimensional Euclidean space. There are several features of 3
dimensional Euclidean space that may be naturally generalized. First, we may gen-
eralize the dimension, which will give us the class of all finite dimensional Euclidean
spaces. Second, we may generalize the metric, which will give us all of the 3 dimen-
sional Riemmanian spaces. Or we may generalize both at once to get all of the finite
dimensional Riemmanian spaces.14 Given the notion of a natural generalization of a
class of structures, we can state the principle of plenitude of structures as follows:
Plenitude of Structures: if S is a class of possible structures, and G is a
natural generalization of S, then any member of G is a possible structure.
Several brief comments are in order. First, this principle does not supply initial
justification for any particular possibilities.15 Rather, it takes a commitment to a cer-
13Cf. Bricker (1991), and Belot (2011).
14See Belot (2011, chapter 2) for relevant discussion.
15Initial justification for believing certain structures to be possible is a function of those structures’
roles in theorizing about the actual world. If a “structure plays, or has played, an explanatory role
in our theorizing about the actual world (Bricker, 1991, p. 609)”, then we are justified in believing
that it is a possible structure. Once a structure earns this status, it then becomes an appropriate
basis for justifying the possibility of other, related structures.
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tain collection of possibilities as input, and generates another collection of suitably
related possibilities as output. So, for example, Plenitude of Structures does not
commit one to the possibility 3 dimensional Euclidean space. However, given a prior,
independent commitment to the possibility of 3 dimensional Euclidean space, Plen-
itude of Structures commits one to the possibility of all suitably related spaces.
These, as I mentioned, will include all of the finite dimensional Euclidean and Rie-
mannian spaces. Finally, that a structure is possible does not mean that it is a world
structure. Plenitude of Structures only entails that natural generalizations of S
are instantiated by parts of worlds.
3.5.2 A Plenitude of Recombinations
The principle of recombination is meant to provide for a plenitude of arrangements
of contents across structures. Here in this world we have trees and cars, and there
in some other world is some exotic structure. Shouldn’t we think that trees and cars
might have found their way into that exotic structure? If so, that possibility won’t
come from either the principle of plenitude for structures or for contents. It will come
from a principle that recombines contents across structures.
To state the principle, we need to introduce a few terms. First, we need the
notion of an arrangement of a class of world-contents within a structure. We’ll say
that an arrangement of a class C of world-contents within a structure S is a category-
preserving, one-to-one or one-to-many mapping from elements of C to places in S.
We’ll say that an arrangement A is non-overlapping iff A never maps distinct contents
to overlapping places in a structure. Next, we need the notion of a world recombining
a class of world-contents according to an arrangement. We’ll say that a world w with
structure S recombines a class C of world-contents according to an arrangement A iff
(1) A is an arrangement of C in S, and (2) for all elements c ∈ C and places s ∈ S,
72
if A maps c to s, then s is occupied in w by a duplicate of c. Now we are ready to
state the principle.
Principle of Recombination (PR): For any class C of world-contents, and
any non-overlapping arrangement A of C, there exists a world that recombines
C according to A.16
3.5.3 The Principle of Solitude
The principles we have so far considered won’t allow us to cut worlds apart and
thereby make new worlds. They won’t, for example, allow us to reason from a world
with a pair of iron spheres to a world with a single iron sphere. To do that we need
a principle that underwrites the denial of necessary connections between distinct
existents. The principle of solitude is meant to do just that.
Principle of Solitude (PS): for any possible individual a, there is a world w
containing a duplicate of a, and containing no individual that is not a part of
a.
3.6 Problems for Exact Occupation
We now have a a collection of adequately developed principles of modal plenitude
in hand. I have already shown that, given dualism, there are three ways to explain
Harmony. I will now show that, given the principles of plenitude, each of these
explanations leads to trouble.
3.6.1 Against Imposition
The problem with Imposition is that it makes material objects do too much of
the work, and in so doing it incurs all the costs associated with relationalism without
reaping any of its benefits. Let’s be precise about how and why this is the case.
16This section reproduces parts of Bricker (forthcoming).
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According to lore, the substantivalist commitment to the existence of space-
time has provided an elegant and straightforward foundation for classical mechanical
physics. Physicists have traditionally offered explanations of mechanical phenomena
in terms of material bodies situated within a medium of spacetime points, where these
spacetime points instantiate a variety of structures (e.g., topological, metrical, affine,
and differential). By accepting these spacetime points into their ontology, substanti-
valists are able to take the physicists’ explanations at face-value. The relationalist, on
the other hand, regards spacetime points with suspicion; she would prefer to provide
an interpretation of our physics that does not involve reference to them. But it turns
out that providing such interpretations, or rewriting the physics so as to avoid men-
tion of spacetime, is extremely difficult. So what we have here is a sort of a trade-off.
In exchange for an ontological cost, the substantivalist gets an elegant foundation
for physics, and in exchange for explanatory acrobatics, the relationalist gets a lean
ontology. But for a substantivalist to accept Imposition is for her to embrace the
worst of both worlds: she is stuck with the ontological burden, but she also saddles
herself with the explanatory acrobatics.
To see exactly why, first distinguish the material shape of a world from the spa-
tiotemporal shape of a world. The spatiotemporal shape of a world is the sum of the
topological, affine, and metrical properties and relations instantiated at that world.
The material shape of a world is the sum of the topological, affine, and metrical prop-
erties and relations instantiated by the parts of matter at that world. It is intuitive
and uncontroversial that many worlds have both spatiotemporal and material shape.
The question is what sorts of entities instantiate spatiotemporal shape, and what sort
of relationship there is between spatiotemporal shape and material shape.
The typical substantivalist claims that the spatiotemporal shape of a world w
is instantiated by the fusion of spacetime points at w, and the material shape of
w is the shape of the fusion of spacetime points at w that are occupied by matter.
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The relationship between spatiotemporal and material shape is thus straightforward:
the latter is embedded within the former. This conception of spacetime and its
relationship with material objects grounds certain highly intuitive possibilities. For
example, it seems very plausible to suppose that empty space is at least possible.
Even if worlds like ours are entirely pervaded by fields, and this makes them count as
entirely non-empty, surely there are classical particle worlds that have empty regions.
The possibility of empty space is easy for a typical substantivalist to ground: it’s just
a region that is unoccupied by matter. Consider another sort of possibility. Begin
with a world w the spacetime of which is 3 dimensional and Euclidean, and whose
lone material occupant is an iron sphere. If there is a world like w, then it follows
from Plenitude of Structures and Plenitude of Recombinations that there is a world
v the spacetime of which is 4 dimensional and Euclidean, and whose lone occupant
is a duplicate of the iron sphere in w. Again, the substantivalist explanation is an
easy one: spatiotemporal shape is entirely independent of material shape, so a single
material configuration is compatible with many different spatiotemporal shapes.
These sorts of possibilities are problematic for the both the relationalist and the
Imposition substantivalist because both accounts seem to require that spatiotem-
poral shape be identified with material shape. In the case of the relationalist, this
identification seems inevitable because material objects are the only things around to
instantiate shapes – there aren’t any other entities around to do the job. In the case of
the Imposition substantivalist, this identification seems inevitable since unoccupied
regions are shapeless regions. Thus, in both cases, the only shapes around are those
that are possessed by material objects, so the spatiotemporal shape of a world must
be the material shape of that world – there aren’t any other obvious candidates.
Of course, a lack of obvious candidates doesn’t mean a lack of candidates sim-
pliciter. In fact, the strategy most often pursued by relationalists is to claim that the
spatiotemporal shape of a world is fixed, not by matter, but by facts about where
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matter could have been. This involves the invocation of a sui generis form of modality.
Whether this sort of modality can be reduced to non-modal notions depends on the
details of one’s account. However, Belot (2011) argues that a relationalist who wants
to have a one-to-one correspondence between the space of relationalist possibilities
and the space of substantivalist possibilities will have to take this modality to be
primitive.
It is fair to expect that the Imposition substantivalist, qua substantivalist, be
in a position to accommodate the full range of possibilities typically associated with
substantivalism. However, just as the relationalist requires primitive modality in
order to underwrite a one-to-one correspondence between the space of relationalist
possibilities and the space of substantivalist possibilities, so too will the Imposi-
tion substantivalist require primitive modality in order to underwrite a one-to-one
correspondence between typical substantivalist and Imposition substantivalist pos-
sibilities. But whereas the cost of accepting this sort of primitive modality might be
tolerable for a relationalist, since it is offset by the benefit of a lean ontology, it is
absolutely intolerable for a substantivalist, who has no analogous means of righting
the balance of theoretical costs and benefits.
3.6.2 Against Inheritance
Consider the fusion M of actual material objects. It follows from the Principle
of Solitude that there is some world w that contains a duplicate of M and contains
no individual that is not a part of M . That means there is some world w with just
material objects, no spacetime. If Inheritance is true, then material objects in such
worlds have no shapes at all. Pause for a moment to reflect on how truly odd that
would be.
In a world where material objects have no shape, since shape comprehends such
things as topological structure, there is nothing to ground notions of continuity and
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connectedness. It’s not necessary to go too far into technical details to see the conse-
quences of this. It would mean, for example, that given such a world and a duplicate
of me within that world, there is no fact of the matter concerning that duplicate
whether his heart is in his chest or on his elbow, whether the duplicates of neurons
that are adjacent in my brain are adjacent in his, and so forth. Indeed, it’s hard to
see how in such worlds there could be things like people.
In a world where material objects have no shape, not only are they neither square,
nor round, nor . . . , but there is also no fact of the matter about whether they have
one side longer than the other, or whether one object is larger than another. So, for
example, if we consider a spacetime-free world populated by a duplicate of my car
and a duplicate of my garage, there is no fact of the matter about whether, in that
world, my car fits in my garage. The relation of comparative size is dependent upon
the shape properties of the objects being compared, so with no shape, there are no
facts about comparative size. Odd!
Now, I suspect that one might be tempted to reply on behalf of Inheritance that
it is only natural for a substantivalist to think of spacetime as carrying as much of the
explanatory burden as possible. At the very least, it is natural for a substantivalist to
think that spacetime points and regions instantiate all the spatiotemporal properties
and relations, like topological, affine, and metric properties and relations. So given
this, it is only natural to think that in a world with no spacetime, material objects
will lack all those sorts of paradigmatically spatiotemporal properties. Of course
material objects behave strangely in non-spatiotemporal worlds, the reply continues;
non-spatiotemporal worlds are strange parts of logical space!
But I think this reply misses the point. If you have already accepted the Inher-
itance view, then you will likely be inclined to adjust to whatever possibilities it
entails. The point is, consequences that are pre-theoretically very odd have to count
against the view when we are surveying options. And it cannot be denied that the
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sorts of possibilities discussed above are pre-theoretically very odd. It’s not that we
could never be justified in living with possibilities of this sort. It’s just that, other
things being equal, it would be better if our theory didn’t entail them.
3.6.3 Against Independence
Dualism is the default version of substantivalism. This is so primarily because it
seems to accord better with common sense. Monism, so the story goes, seems weird
since it entails, for example, that regions of spacetime fight and love and sing. Regions
of spacetime, so common sense tells us, don’t do anything; they are – as the dualist
says – the silent and immobile containers for things that fight and love and sing.17
But when dualism is thought of as enjoying the advantage of agreeing with com-
mon sense, it cannot be dualism under the guise of the Inheritance or Imposi-
tion view; both of these views are wildly counterintuitive. The version of dualism
that agrees with common sense is dualism under the guise of the Independence
view. This is the version of dualism according to which the universe is like a cosmic
jello mold: just as little grapes and marshmallows fit neatly into little grape and
marshmallow-shaped cavities in the jello, people and houses and so forth fit neatly
into little people-shaped and house-shaped regions of spacetime.
But Independence is just as problematic as Inheritance and Imposition. The
problem is that Independence together with Plenitude of Recombinations entails
that Harmony is false. Confronted with this, the dualist may either restrict Plen-
itude of Recombinations in ways that block the entailment, or else she may employ
some semantic trickery to dodge the entailment.. Each of these options leads to its
own sort of trouble. In the following section we’ll see why, exactly, Independence
together with Plenitude of Recombinations entails that Harmony is false, then we’ll
17Cf. Schaffer (2009, p. 133), Sider (2001, p. 111), Skow (2005, p. 58).
78
examine the troubles the dualist faces when she restricts Plenitude of Recombinations
or engages in semantic trickery.
3.6.3.1 Independence, Harmony and PR are Inconsistent
According to dualism, material objects and regions of spacetime are ontologically
distinct and are bound by a fundamental external relation of exact occupation. It
follows from Plenitude of Recombinations, then, that we may mix and match regions
with objects, since we may mix and match the relata of external relations. To illus-
trate, where R is some external relation, if R[A,B] and R[C,D], then there is some
world where a duplicate of A bears R to a duplicate of D, and some world where a
duplicate of A bears R to a duplicate of C, . . . and so on. Now, when R is the relation
of exact occupation, and the relata are material objects on one hand and regions of
spacetime on the other, then strange possibilities ensue.
Some strange possibilities are these: if a material object O exactly occupies some
region S, then there is some world where a duplicate of O exactly occupies another
duplicate of O, and some world where a duplicate of S exactly occupies a duplicate of
S, and some world where a duplicate of S exactly occupies a duplicate of O. Perhaps
these can be got around by appeal to the logical properties of exact occupation: it is
intransitive, irreflexive, and asymmetric. In essence, the relation respects ontological
categories – it is a relation that necessarily holds between a thing in the category of
material object and a thing in the category of spacetime region.
That sounds reasonable, and that does block some of the outlandish possibilities,
without really seeming to count as much of a restriction on Plenitude of Recombina-
tions. However, this still leaves plenty of room for trouble so long as we are assuming
Independence. According to Independence the shapes material objects and re-
gions of spacetime are logically independent – neither depends in any way on the
other. So now consider a world wherein a rectangular object exactly occupies a rect-
79
angular region of spacetime, and a circular object exactly occupies a circular region of
spacetime. It follows from this possibility that there is some world where the objects
trade regions. That is, it follows that there is a world where a rectangular object
exactly occupies a circular region and a circular object exactly occupies a rectangular
region. This is an obvious violation of Harmony.
3.6.3.2 Restricting PR
Once one has formulated general principles of plenitude like those outlined in §3.5,
it is worrisome to introduce amendments that constrain the range of possibilities they
generate. The worry is that many sorts of constraints would be ad hoc, and that the
theory that requires them is likely to be false. That said, it is natural to think that
the principles of plenitude have certain constraints already built in. As I mentioned
in the previous section, for example, once one has parceled out reality into a cluster
of distinct ontological categories, it is reasonable to expect principles of plenitude
to respect those categories. So, to take another example, given certain views about
the relationship between particulars and properties, it is natural to think that it is
impossible for a property to instantiate a particular – elements of the category of
particulars instantiate elements of the category of properties, never the other way
around.
So could an Independence substantivalist plausibly argue that shape properties
are deep enough features of reality that principles of plenitude always respect them
in ways that maintain Harmony? This is highly implausible. But even if we grant
this, the Independence substantivalist looks bad in comparison to the supersub-
stantivalist. For the supersubstantivalist, Harmony is grounded in occurrent facts
within each world: every material object in every world is identical to some region
of spacetime at that world. But for the Independence substantivalist it is simply
a brute fact about logical space that it won’t permit violations of Harmony. So
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to the extent that explanations are preferable to brute facts, supersubstantivalism is
preferable to Independence substantivalism.
3.6.3.3 Preserving Harmony?
Is there a way to make Independence, Harmony, and PR consistent? Perhaps
an Independence substantivalist can find inspiration for a reconciliation in a debate
about the relationship between properties and their causal powers. On one side of
this debate are necessitarians who think that the causal powers properties confer are
essential,18 and on the other side are contingentists19 who think that they are not. A
typical necessitarian approach may be characterized as follows.20
[Suppose] that properties are individuated by their nomological roles. The
essence of a property, on this view, is its place in the Ramsified lawbook.
To derive the Ramsified lawbook, conjoin the law statements, uniformly
replace each property name by a variable, and prefix the result with a
unique-existential quantifier ∃! for each variable. To find the place of a
given property, delete its associated quantifier. The resulting open sen-
tence describes the essence of this property. To be that property is to
satisfy that sentence. On this view, like charges could not attract because
to be charge is to satisfy the place of
According to the sort of view of properties described here, it is of the essence of
the property charge that it satisfy Coulombs’ law. What if a dualist were to think of
the relation of exact occupation along these lines? Could one plausibly argue that it
is of the essence of the relation exactly occupies that it satisfy Harmony?
18Cf. Shoemaker (1980), Ellis (1999).
19Cf. Lewis (2009), and Schaffer (2005).
20There are other necessitarian approaches. See Schaffer (2005) for discussion of a few of them.
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This sort of response is really just an attempt to apply a superficial semantic
remedy to a deep metaphysical problem. It is not successful. Consider two different
angles on the issue. First, recall the distinction between abundant properties and rela-
tions and natural properties and relations. The natural properties and relations carve
reality at the joints, they ground cases of similarity, and are always intrinsic. The
abundant properties and relations are not like this; they are totally undiscriminating.
For every possible predicate, no matter how bizarre, there is an abundant property or
relation. Given this, we are guaranteed to refer to some property or relation any time
we formulate a predicate, but we are not guaranteed to refer to a natural property
or relation any time we formulate a predicate. So, while abundance guarantees that
there is some relation whose essence involves the satisfaction of Harmony – which
we may agree to refer to with the predicate ‘exactly occupies’ – there is no guarantee
that this relation is a natural relation. Indeed, ‘exactly occupies’, when restricted in
this way, says something less than we ordinarily take it to say. For, arguably, what
we ordinarily take it to say involves a perfectly natural relation, a relation that is
not the one we have defined, because that defined relation, unlike perfectly natural
relations, does not satisfy PR.
Here is the second angle on the same issue. Suppose that we do accept the strategy
under consideration and take it to be of the essence of exactly occupies that it satisfy
Harmony. Now, I’ve argued that Independence substantivalists should not restrict
PR because, if they do, their view looks ad hoc. But not restricting PR means that
the relata of external relations can be mixed and matched any which way. But now,
according to the Independence substantivalist, there is a natural external relation –
never mind for a moment what we’re calling it – that binds material objects to regions
of spacetime. It follows from PR that this relation sometimes obeys Harmony and
sometimes it doesn’t. The solution under consideration, then, boils down to this: we
agree to call this relation ‘exact occupation’ in worlds where it satisfies Harmony,
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and we agree to call it something else in worlds where it violates Harmony. But this
is the most superficial of solutions. The problematic worlds are still there no matter
how we agree to use our words to pick out relations. Simply agreeing not to use
the predicate ‘exactly occupies’ to refer to the relation that binds material objects to
regions of spacetime at the problematic worlds does not make these worlds any more
palatable.
Trying to reconcile Independence, Harmony, and PR by appeal to necessitari-
anism is a semantic trick. It is simply a distraction from the fact that the important
metaphysical problems remain unsolved and as troubling as ever.
3.7 Conclusion
I have argued that dualism is problematic because it requires a fundamental ex-
ternal relation – exact occupation – that is a troublemaker. Exact occupation is a
troublemaker because it conflicts with Harmony, and Harmony is independently
plausible. The conflict between exact occupation and Harmony is brought into fo-
cus by appeal to some broadly Humean principles of plenitude. There are, of course,
many opportunities for a committed dualist to block my arguments. She may reject
Harmony, she may reject or restrict various of the principles of plenitude, or she
may happily accept some of the counterintuitive results I discuss in §6.1 and §6.2.
But all of these options have costs. These costs ought to motivate substantivalists
who are undecided between dualism and supersubstantivalism to decide in favor of
supersubstantivalism.
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CHAPTER 4
PROSPECTS FOR SUPERSUBSTANTIVALISM
4.1 Introduction
Our world is made either mostly or completely of material things – material ob-
jects, or material fields – separated by various spatiotemporal distance relations. But
this leaves much open. In particular, it leaves open the question of just what sort
of entity material objects are, and what it is in virtue of which they bear various
distance relations. Perhaps the only fundamental, concrete objects there are are the
material ones. And perhaps the way to explain spatiotemporality – the fact that
material objects are separated by various spatiotemporal distances – is in terms of
relations that these material things bear directly to one another. This is relational-
ism. Relationalism is typically traced back to Leibniz, and has enjoyed the support
of people like Mach, and, at times, Einstein.
But perhaps relationalists have it wrong. Perhaps the relational ontology omits
an entire category of entity. Perhaps material objects are not the only sort of funda-
mental, concrete objects; perhaps spacetime (or its basic parts) is also a fundamental,
concrete object. On this sort of view, spatiotemporality is in the first place a feature
of spacetime, and it is in virtue of their relationship to spacetime that material objects
are spatiotemporal. This view also has an impressive pedigree, which includes people
like Newton, and, at times, Einstein, as well as most contemporary philosophers.
Given substantivalism, there is a further question regarding the nature of the re-
lationship between material objects and parts of spacetime. Is this relationship like
the relationship between a muffin-tin and its muffins – the former being distinct from
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the later, but with the two united by a relation of occupation. Or is it more like
the relationship between an eddy in a body of water – the former being something
like a property of the latter. Substantivalists who favor the muffins-in-muffin-tins
analogy are dualists. According to dualists, material objects and spacetime are fun-
damentally different sorts of thing, the two are united by an occupation relation that
binds them together and underwrites their collaboration in composing physical real-
ity. Substantivalists who favor the eddies-in-water analogy are supersubstantivalists.
Supersubstantivalists think that spacetime (or its basic parts) is the only fundamen-
tal, concrete object, and that material objects are reducible to regions of spacetime
and their properties.
Supersubstantivalism has enjoyed recent interest, and can arguably also claim
an impressive pedigree. For example, there are grounds for understanding Plato1,
Alexander2, Descartes3, Newton4, Clifford5, and Spinoza6 all to be supersubstantival-
ists in some way or other. The contemporary interest in the view, however, seems to
be the result of two things. First, supersubstantivalism seems to be more parsimo-
nious than dualism, since it does not require a fundamental occupancy relation, and
does not require two distinct categories of fundamental, concrete objects. Second,
modern field theories seem to treat fields as properties of spacetime, and a literal
reading of these theories yields supersubstantivalism. Against these considerations
dualists typically press two sorts of argument. The first is based on the idea that
co-location may be possible, and it is not obvious how a supersubstantivalist can
1Cf. Graves (1972).
2Cf. Thomas (2013).
3Cf. Skow (2005, p. 55), and Schaffer (2009, p. 133)
4Cf. Thomas (2013), and Skow (2005).
5Cf. Graves (1972).
6Cf. Bennett (1984).
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accommodate co-location. The second sort of argument is based on the idea that
supersubstantivalism is counterintuitive.
This chapter will proceed as follows. In §4.2 I introduce some concepts that
we will need as we proceed. In §4.3 I consider a variety of ways to formulate su-
persubstantivalism and consider some of the advantages and disadvantages of each
formulation. Then, in §4.4, I consider the alleged advantages of supersubstantivalism
over dualism. I show that field theory turns out not to supply a big advantage to the
supersubstantivalist since a dualist can offer a nice reformulation of her view with
which it is compatible. I then show that it is not clear that supersubstantivalism is
more parsimonious than dualism. In §4.5, I consider some of the alleged problems for
supersubstantivalism. I concluded that supersubstantivalists have a variety of inter-
esting and compelling responses to arguments from common sense. I also argue that,
while there is indeed real pressure to accommodate the possibility of co-location, this
is an accommodation that a supersubstantivalist can make.
The main conclusion I reach is somewhat deflationary. The standard list of pros
and cons appealed to in the debate between dualists and supersubstantivalists does
not strongly decide between the two views. Rather, it brings into focus a particular
version of dualism – bundle-theoretic dualism – and a particular version of super-
substantivalism – compresence supersubstantivalism. Moreover, on inspection, the
distinction between bundle-theoretic dualism and compresence supersubstantivalism
seems to be merely semantic, rather than robustly metaphysical.
4.2 Preliminaries
4.2.1 Spacetime
In general, I will suppose that the basic parts of spacetime are spacetime points.
The main question will be whether there are, distinct from, and in addition to space-
time points, any material objects. Sometimes I will talk like there are. When I do, I
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will often assume that the basic parts of material objects are material points. This
allows me to apply classical mereology to both. This, in turn, allows us to charac-
terize spacetimes as fusions of spacetime points, and material objects as fusions of
material points. It also allows us to characterize regions of spacetime in terms of the
parthood relation. If we suppose spacetime is a fusion of spacetime points Ω, then: r
is a region of spacetime =def. r is a part of Ω.
I will have occasion to challenge many of these assumptions. For example, in
§7.1, I will consider the prospects of treating the fundamental constituents of reality
as neutral entities – point-like things that are neither material, nor spatiotemporal.
I will also sometimes talk about fields, where these are taken to be the material
constituents of reality. The question here will be whether we ought to think of fields
as occupying spacetime in the way that material points – if there are any – do, or
whether we ought to think of them as properties of spacetime. In every case, the
context will make it clear which background assumptions I am appealing to.
4.2.2 Natural Properties and Relations
I take there to be a primitive notion of perfect naturalness that applies to properties
and relations. The perfectly natural properties and relations are special in the sense
that they are “joint carving”: when things share a perfectly natural property, they
are objectively similar, and when pairs of relata share a perfectly natural relation,
the pairs are objectively similar. Given the notion of perfectly natural properties and
relations, we may characterize duplication. Two individuals are duplicates iff there is
a similarity map from parts of one to parts of the other such that corresponding parts
have the same perfectly natural properties and stand in the same perfectly natural
relations.
The concept of duplication can be used to characterize the notion of an intrinsic
property. A property P is intrinsic iff no two duplicates anywhere in logical space
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disagree with respect to P , otherwise P is extrinsic. Then we may say that the intrin-
sic character of a thing is an exhaustive catalogue of that thing’s intrinsic properties.
Next we can say that a relation R is internal iff R supervenes on the intrinsic char-
acter of its relata. Similarity is the paradigm: whether A and B are similar depends
only on the intrinsic characters of A and B, it does not depend on their locations, or
their arrangement among other things. We may say that a relation R is external iff
it does not supervene on the intrinsic character of its relata taken individually, but it
does supervene on the intrinsic character of its relata taken together. Spatiotemporal
distance relations are the paradigm: whether A and B are five feet apart does not
supervene upon the intrinsic characters of A and B, but it does supervene on the
intrinsic character of their fusion.7 Finally, any relation that is internal or external is
intrinsic, otherwise it is extrinsic.8
4.2.3 Modality
Next, I will assume a modal framework that is roughly that of Lewis (1986). Like
Lewis, I take worlds to be maximally interrelated sums. However, unlike Lewis, I
take the relevant sort of interrelatedness to be underwritten by a network of external
relations.9 I take de dicto modal claims to be claims about what worlds there are; and
7Although, note that there may be some reasons for thinking distance relations are not external.
See, for example, Bricker (1993) and Maudlin (2007).
8The characterization I give follows Bricker (1996).
9Note that Lewis thinks of worlds as maximally spatiotemporally interrelated sums. This has
the effect of making spatiotemporality an essential ingredient of reality. But there are compelling
grounds for skepticism about this. One reason for skepticism comes from physics. Quantum mechan-
ics and general relativity are famously successful physical theories; equally famous is their apparent
incompatibility. Physicists’ attempts to reconcile the two theories have spawned radical new pro-
posals for the fundamental structure of the world. Among these are proposals according to which
there are no natural distance relations. (See Butterfield and Isham (2001) for an overview of the
various research projects in quantum gravity, including ones according to which there are no natural
distance relations.) This strongly suggests that we ought to think that there are worlds at which
there are no natural distance relations – indeed, ours might be one of them. See Bricker (1996) for
discussion.
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I take de re modal claims to be analyzable in terms of counterparts. This allows me
to understand modally qualified claims as involving quantification either over worlds
or over counterparts.
4.2.4 The Occupation Relation
I have already mentioned that dualists require an occupation relation that binds
material objects to regions of spacetime. There are a variety of these relations on the
market, and there does not seem to be a consensus concerning which is the best one.
The idea, however, is that all of these relations are related and inter-definable. So, for
example, if we settle on one of these occupation relations and treat it as a primitive of
our theory of occupancy, we can then define the other occupancy relations in terms of
it. This is analogous to the situation in classical mereology: although it is standard
to take parthood to be a primitive and then define the other mereological notions in
terms of it, one could just as well start with overlap and use it to define parthood
and the other notions.
My own preference, if I were a dualist, would be to accept exact occupation as
a primitive in my theory of occupancy. Because this is a primitive, I can’t offer
you an analysis, but I can say a bit about the relation. When a material object O
exactly occupies a spacetime region R, then O and R are the same size, shape, and
dimension. An elephant will not generally be able to exactly occupy a region that is
the shape and size of a mouse; a cube will not generally be able to exactly occupy
a toroidal region.10 Now, as I write, I will have in mind exact occupation as the
dualists occupancy primitive, but I will just write ‘occupation’ to avoid unnecessary
complication, and because not much in this chapter turns on the specifics of the
dualist’s occupancy relation.
10Why just “generally”? Because some dualists will accept all sorts of mayhem from their occu-
pancy relation. See chapter 3 for more about this.
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One last point. A supersubstantivalist can understand talk of occupancy relations.
He can understand, for example, the question “Is Tolstoy identical to the region
he occupies?” Here it is just that for the supersubstantivalist, occupancy isn’t a
fundamental relation, as it is for a dualist. The supersubstantivalist will analyze
occupation in terms of the reduction thesis he applies to material objects.
4.3 Supersubstantivalisms
Substantivalism is the view that spacetime is a fundamental, concrete object11
that does not depend for its existence on anything else.12 Dualistic substantivalism
is substantivalism in conjunction with the thesis that material entities – material
objects, or material fields – belong to a distinct category of fundamental, concrete
object, and that material objects are related to regions of spacetime by a fundamental
relation of occupancy. Supersubstantivalism is substantivalism in conjunction with the
thesis that material entities are reducible to spacetime and its properties. A variety
of ways of cashing out ‘reducible’ gives rise to a variety of supersubstantivalisms.
There is a top-level distinction among varieties of supersubstantivalism that we
may approach by considering the question: What sorts of fundamental properties and
relations does spacetime instantiate? According to the modest supersubstantivalist,
spacetime instantiates not only the fundamental topological and geometric properties
and relations typically associated with spacetime, but also fundamental properties
that are paradigmatically material, like mass and charge. According to the radical
supersubstantivalist, the only fundamental properties and relations instantiated by
11What if you are a mereological nihilist? The mereological nihilist maintains that there are no
composite objects, so, because spacetime is the composite of certain basic parts (points, regions,
etc.), there is no spacetime. Does it follow that mereological nihilism and substantivalism are
incompatible? Of course not. The mereological nihilist merely needs to substitute ‘basic units of
spacetime’ for ‘spacetime’ in the above characterization.
12C.f., Lehmkuhl (2015), Pooley (2012), Schaffer (2009).
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spacetime are topological and geometric properties. On this view, properties like
mass and charge are not fundamental. Rather, they are reducible to the geometric
and topological properties of spacetime.13
So substantivalism comes in two variants: dualism and supersubstantivalism. Su-
persubstantivalism itself comes in two variants: modest and radical. A typical dualist
will claim that there are material properties and there are spatiotemporal properties,
and spacetime instantiates the spatiotemporal properties, while matter instantiates
the material properties. The modest supersubstantivalist agrees with the dualist that
there is a distinction between these sorts of properties, but claims that spacetime is
capable of being the bearer of not just the spatiotemporal properties, but also the
material ones. The radical supersubstantivalist thinks that, fundamentally, there is
no distinction between material and spatiotemporal properties. According to him,
there are really just a collection of geometric properties instantiated by spacetime,
and everything is reducible to these. So the modest supersubstantivalist thinks that
the dualist is mistaken about how many types of fundamental entity are required to
instantiate the fundamental properties, while the radical supersubstantivalist thinks
the dualist is wrong about how many types of fundamental entity are required to
instantiate the fundamental properties, and that both the dualist and the modest
supersubstantivalist are mistaken about what properties there are.
Most philosophical engagement with supersubstantivalism has involved modest
supersubstantivalism. Lewis (1986), Sider (2001), Skow (2005), and Schaffer (2009)
all defend versions of modest supersubstantivalism14 But some philosophers of physics
have suggested that all the focus on modest supersubstantivalism is unfortunate.
Sklar, for example, is dismissive of the view, he suggests that “[t]he identification
13The terms ‘radical supersubstantivalism’ and ‘modest supersubstantivalism’ are due to Skow
(2005).
14Their defenses seem to vary in vigor with Lewis occupying the less vigorous side of the spectrum
and Schaffer the more vigorous side. See the following sections for more on this.
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of all of the material world with the structured world of spacetime [should not be]
interpreted as the linguistic trick of simply replacing objects by the region of spacetime
they occupy and some novel “objectifying feature” – say replacing ‘There is a desk
in the (X,T) region’ by ‘The (X,T) region desks.’ (1974)” This sort of linguistic
trick is supposedly something the modest supersubstantivalist is guilty of. Lehmkuhl
(2015) has a similarly dim view of moderate supersubstantivalism. He suggests that
the philosophical community would be better served by shifting the focus to radical
supersubstantivalism, since only radical supersubstantivalism has the potential to
interact fruitfully with live issues in physics. Presumably, he thinks that philosophical
issues are important only to the extent that they interact fruitfully with empirical
science.
4.3.1 Modest Supersubstantivalisms
Modest supersubstantivalism is the view that spacetime is a fundamental, concrete
object that does not depend for its existence on anything else, that material entities
are reducible to spacetime, and that paradigmatically material properties like charge
and mass can be instantiated by spacetime. This still leaves open how to cash out
‘reducible’. There are several ways that modest supersubstantivalists have proceeded
here. Perhaps the most popular way has been by taking the reduction of the material
to involve the identification of the material objects with regions of spacetime. Another
strategy is to take material objects to be composed by parts of spacetime. Each
of these varieties of supersubstantivalism have further variants. I’ll consider some
of these below. Later in the chapter (§7.3.2), I’ll offer a novel version of modest
supersubstantivalism that I think is preferable to those discussed here.
4.3.1.1 Identity Supersubstantivalism
Identity supersubstantivalism is the view that we ought to take the reduction of
material objects to regions of spacetime to involve the identification of material ob-
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jects with regions of spacetime. Now, it may seem odd to treat the identification
of A with B as a reduction of A to B, since reduction is typically taken to be an
asymmetric relation, while identity is symmetric. But in the present context it’s not
so odd, since most people who accept the view that material objects are identical
to regions of spacetime, tend to treat spacetime as taking over the job of material
objects, rather than the other way around. Schaffer, for example, gives the following
picturesque description: “[On the dualist view] [w]hen God makes the world, she
must create the receptacle, and fill it with material. Then she can pin the funda-
mental properties onto the material substrata that fill the receptacle. . . [According
to the supersubstantivalist alternative] [w]hen God makes the world, she need only
create spacetime. Then she can pin the fundamental properties directly to spacetime.
(2009, p. 133)” It’s clear from Schaffer’s remarks that at least his version of identity
supersubstantivalism has a built-in asymmetry: it’s spacetime that gets the material
properties, not matter that gets the spatiotemporal properties.15
Now, the identity view may be qualified in any number of ways; it does not, per
se, say anything about which regions of spacetime are to be identified with material
objects. One might, for example, claim that only regions that are chosen by God
qualify as material objects, or only regions that involve biological processes, or only
regions that instantiate consciousness, etc. However, as Schaffer notes, there are
several qualifications that are especially natural ones. They are as follows:
Massy Identity Supersubstantivalism: every region with non-zero mass-
energy is identical to a material object.
Connected Identity Supersubstantivalism: every connected region is iden-
tical to a material object.
15See also Schaffer’s (2009) remarks on p. 146. He claims that his version of Unrestricted Identity
Supersubstantivalism entails “a one-one mapping between material objects and spacetime regions,
which is a perfect opportunity for reduction. (My emphasis)”
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Unrestricted Identity Supersubstantivalism: every region is identical to
some material object.
Schaffer himself defends unrestricted identity supersubstantivalism.16 He is moti-
vated to accept this view because it maximizes a sort of mirroring between material
objects and spacetime. Consider the following principles:
Monopolization: necessarily, if a material object O exactly occupies a region
R, then there is no material object distinct from O that exactly occupies R.
Materialization: necessarily, every material object exactly occupies some re-
gion of spacetime.
Exhaustion: necessarily, if a material object O exactly occupies a region R,
then there is no region distinct from R that O exactly occupies.
As Schaffer puts it: “Materialization and exhaustion together show that every
material object occupies one and only one spacetime region, and monopolization and
[the thesis of unrestricted identity supersubstantivalism] together show that every
spacetime region is occupied by one and only one material object. That yields a
one-one mapping between material objects and spacetime regions, which is a perfect
opportunity for reduction. (2009, p. 146)”
But there are some problems here that we need to flag. First, the problem with
monopolization and materialization is that they are false (just a trifling problem!).
Begin with monopolization. Monopolization rules out the possibility of co-locating
material objects. But, even leaving aside familiar issues having to do with statues and
16Note that Schaffer uses the term ‘monistic substantivalism’ and ‘dualistic substantivalism’ rather
then ‘supersubstantivalism’. I confess that I much prefer Schaffer’s terminology, but he seems to be
just about the only one to use it; ‘supersubstantivalism’ seems have established itself as the standard
nomenclature.
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lumps, there are strong motivations for regarding cases of co-location as genuinely
possible. I defer further discussion of these motivations to §4.5.2.
Now consider materialization. Our two best physical theories – quantum mechan-
ics and general relativity – are famously incompatible, and it is not clear what a
reconciliation will look like. Among the live options for a reconciliation are accounts
according to which there are no fundamental distance relations. On this sort of view,
material objects exist, and they occupy parts of the fundamental structure of the
world, but because the structure is not spatiotemporal, they do not occupy parts of
spacetime. Because this is a live option among physicists – something that may, for
all we know, be true of our world – we ought surely countenance its possibility. But
this means materialization is false.17
Next, consider the phenomenon of empty regions. Prima facie, it seems that a
supersubstantivalist who accepts an identity view would analyze emptiness as follows:
a region of spacetime R is empty iff there is no material object that is identical to R.
But there can be no such region according to unrestricted identity supersubstantival-
ism (although there can be according to the other identity views). The problem here
is that it is supposed to be a decisive advantage of substantivalism over relationalism
that it be in a position to explain the possibility of empty regions – a possibility that
is surely one we ought to accommodate. But it seems that Schaffer’s unrestricted
supersubstantivalism is forced to concede this advantage.
Schaffer is aware of this problem, and he does attempt to mitigate against the
conclusion I draw by claiming that “empty regions are impossible in one sense but
possible in another. Empty regions are impossible – at least within field theory – in
the sense in which an empty region is one that lacks field values. . . . Empty regions
are possible in the sense in which an empty region is one with null values for certain
17C.f., Lehmkuhl (2015).
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fields. (2009, p. 145.)” But, presumably, field theories, if true, are contingently true.
So, for example, there are field-free, Newtonian particle worlds. But at worlds like
this we cannot appeal to an analysis of ‘empty region’ in terms of null field values, so
it seems we’d be stuck back with the analysis of ‘empty region’ I gave in the preceding
paragraph. But again, according to unrestricted identity supersubstantivalism, this
sort of emptiness is impossible. That means that matter at all field-free Newtonian
worlds forms a plenum. But that’s incredible!
This actually is part of a more general issue that sometimes surfaces in debates
between dualists and supersubstantivalists. The question of dualism as opposed to
supersubstantivalism is often cast as a question that faces someone who has already
decided in favor of substantivalism. The problem is that in the haggling between these
two views, one may concede something to the other that ends up shifting the balance
back towards relationalism. Schaffer’s unrestricted identity supersubstantivalism is
an example of this phenomenon: the move to unrestricted identity substantivalism
requires that we take empty regions to be impossible (at least, impossible within the
sphere of Newtonian worlds). And this seems to undermine one of the advantages of
substantivalism over relationalism.
4.3.1.2 Constitution Supersubstantivalism
According to another version of modest supersubstantivalism, material objects
are constituted by spacetime regions, though they are not identical to them. Thomas
(2013) argues that this was actually a position that Newton held early in his career.
One advantage the constitution view has over the identity view is that it makes
room for a material object to differ from its associated regions of spacetime with
respect to non-categorical properties. Compare with the case of the statue and the
lump of clay from which it was made. Suppose the clay came into being at some time
t, and that it was subsequently fashioned into a statue of David at t1. At t1 it is
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tempting to identify the statue and the lump of clay: if you were to pick up the statue,
it would be difficult for you to look at it and claim that you held more than one thing
in your hands. But other considerations press in the opposite direction. The statue
and the lump differ with respect to temporal properties: the lump exists at both
t and t1, while the statue exists at t1 but not t; they differ with respect to modal
properties: the lump, but not the statue, has the property being possibly spherical;
they differ in kind: the statue is a statue, while the lump is not a statue; they differ
with respect to persistence conditions: the lump, but not the statue, could persist
through a squashing.18 These sorts of considerations have lead many philosophers to
deny that constitution is identity.
As I said, applying a constitution view to supersubstantivalism allows a super-
substantivalist to claim that material objects and their associated regions differ with
respect to non-categorical properties. The big advantage of this is that it gives the
supersubstantivalist a way to avoid one of the main arguments against supersubstan-
tivalism: the argument from de re modal difference. I will discuss this argument and
the constitution supersubstantivalist’s reply to it in §8.2. Perhaps an obvious disad-
vantage to constitution supersubstantivalism is that whereas the idea that a statue
is composed of a lump of clay is intuitively accessible, the idea that a tree, person, or
electron is composed by spacetime is intuitively opaque.
4.3.2 Radical Supersubstantivalism
Radical supersubstantivalism is the view that spacetime is a fundamental, concrete
object, and that material properties are reducible to spatiotemporal properties.19
18See Gibbard (1975), and Wasserman (2013).
19See Lehmkuhl’s (2009) dissertation for excellent and detailed discussion of radical supersubstan-
tivalism.
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There are many ways that this reduction might proceed, but the underlying intuition
on its behalf is nicely summarized by Clifford (1876):
I hold in fact
1. That small portions of space are in fact of a nature analogous to
little hills on a surface which is on the average flat; namely, that the
ordinary laws of geometry are not valid in them.
2. That this property of being curved or distorted is continually being
passed on from one portion of space to another after the manner of
a wave.
3. That this variation of the curvature of space is what really happens
in that phenomenon which we call the motion of matter, whether
ponderable or etherial.
4. That in the physical world nothing else takes place than this varia-
tion, subject (possibly) to the law of continuity.
This general thought was the inspiration for Wheeler and Misner’s geometrody-
namics. Geometrodynamics is a reconstrual of GR as a theory of 3-spaces evolving
in time. Material properties, according to this view, are reduced to various of the
geometric properties of space (not spacetime). In particular, different sorts of mate-
rial properties are taken to correspond to different structural features of space. Thus
we have Wheeler echoing Clifford when he asks whether “curved empty geometry [is]
a kind of magic building material out of which everything in the physical world is
made: (1) slow curvature in one region of space describes a gravitational field; (2) a
rippled geometry with a different type of curvature somewhere else describes an elec-
tromagnetic field; (3) a knotted-up region of high curvature describes a concentration
of charge and mass-energy that moves like a particle? (Wheeler (1962), p. 361)”
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Geometrodynamics was agreed to have been a failure on the grounds that it lacks
a well-posed initial value problem, and fails to predict fermions.20 Nevertheless, the
radical supersubstantivalist program has carried on in physics under various banners.
For example, classical Kaluza-Klein theory unifies the gravitational and electromag-
netic fields in the context of a five-dimensional manifold. Modern versions of the
Kaluza-Klein theory have successfully reduced further material properties to the ge-
ometric properties of a five-dimensional manifold, and so appear to be promising
habitats for radical supersubstantivalism.21 There are also ongoing projects in loop
quantum gravity that seem to offer respite for radical supersubstantivalism. Accord-
ing to loop quantum gravity approaches, space (which is distinct from time, and
evolves through it) is discrete, and the properties of the fundamental particles of the
Standard Model are reduced to states of these fundamental, discrete units of space.
But it is important to observe that while the radical supersubstantivalist program
may perhaps be substantially developed in the context of some future physics, all
current attempts are incomplete, and all past attempts have stalled. It thus remains
an unfulfilled ambition. So the right attitude to take, I think, is to remain hopeful of
the prospects for radical supersubstantivalism, but to continue to examine in greater
depth the case for or against modest supersubstantivalism.
4.4 Advantages of Supersubstantivalism
There are two considerations that are often touted as important advantages of
supersubstantivalism over dualism. The first comes from physics: most relatively
modern physical theories are field theories, and field theories seem to treat physical
fields as properties of spacetime, rather than as things that occupy spacetime. The
20See Stachel (1974) about the the fermion problem, and Schafner and Cohen (1974) for the
problem with the initial value problem. C.f. Lehmkuhl (2009).
21See, for example Wesson (2007).
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second consideration is that supersubstantivalism is more parsimonious than dualism:
where the dualist requires two types of fundamental entity – spacetime and material
objects – the monist requires only one – spacetime; and where the dualist requires the
instantiation relation to pin properties to material objects, and then an occupation
relation to situate material objects in regions of spacetime, the monist requires only
instantiation – the properties stick directly to the spacetime. In this part of this
chapter, I will consider these two sorts of considerations and see how well they stand
up to scrutiny.
4.4.1 Field Theories
There are lots of different sorts of fields, and there are lots of different sorts of
field theories, but the complexities need not detain us. The important point is that
material fields are one sort of field. The stress-energy field in GR is a good example of
one of these. So let’s focus on the difference between dualist and supersubstantivalist
accounts of this sort of field. For the rest of this section I’ll just use ‘field’ to refer to
the sorts of material fields at issue here.
So, do field theories really decide in favor of supersubstantivalism? I think that
they do not. But they do introduce an interesting twist: they turn what appeared to
be a substantive metaphysical debate between dualists and supersubstantivalists into
a semantic issue. Here is why.
First, field theories really do not offer much that the supersubstantivalist can lord
over the dualist. While it is true that it is tempting to treat fields as properties of
spacetime, there is no reason we can’t think of fields as occupying spacetime, rather
than being instantiated by it. Nothing about the physics could possibly bear on
whether to prefer one over the other relation. So, let’s suppose that fields occupy
points of spacetime. How, exactly, would that work? Well, it turns out that it will
depend on what sort of account of properties you accept. The basic idea will involve
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treating field values as material point objects that occupy points of spacetime. But
the problem will be to account for the “materiality” of these point objects in a way
that doesn’t smack of redundancy.
To see the problem, begin by supposing that the dualist accepts a substance-
attribute theory of material point objects. According to a substance-attribute theory,
material objects are analyzed in terms of an element of particularity – a thin particular
– that instantiates some property or collection of properties. The thin particular
with its full complement of properties is a thick particular. So perhaps material point
objects are to be analyzed as thick particulars that are composed by point-sized
material thin particulars together with a property corresponding to a value of a field.
For example, consider a particular value of the stress-energy field, call it v. Sup-
pose we think of v as a property. The dualist might analyze the attribution of v to
a point of spacetime in terms of v’s instantiation by a material thin particular. The
combination of this thin particular together with the property v that it instantiates
is a thick particular. Material point objects are these sorts of thick particulars, and
these sorts of thick particulars are what bear the occupancy relation to points of
spacetime. It’s like a layer cake: first you take the field-value qua property, and you
have this instantiated by a material thin particular, then you take the resulting thick
particular and you have this occupy a point of spacetime – the instantiation and
occupation relations are like frosting, and property (field value), the material thin
particular, and the spacetime point are like the layers of cake.
The problem with this is that it seems awfully bloated. This makes it tempting
to find ways to get rid of layers of cake and frosting. The most obvious way would
be to say that the only element of materiality that is needed is supplied by space-
time: just take the field value v to be a property, but have it bear the instantiation
relation directly to the point of spacetime rather than introduce all these intervening
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layers of thin particulars and occupancy relations. This of course is to go over to
supersubstantivalism. But this isn’t the only way to go.
A dualist who is a bundle theorist could offer an account that is very similar to
that of the supersubstantivalist. A bundle theorist thinks of material objects as mere
bundles of properties (either universals or tropes), rather than as thin particulars
together with collections of properties. So a dualist who is a bundle theorist may
think of the field value v itself as a material point object, and can then take this
material point object to bear the occupancy relation to a point of spacetime. This
gets rid of a lot of the bloat that a substance-attribute theorist seems committed to:
there is no need for thin particulars, and there is no need for the instantiation relation
to bind v to a thin particular.
There are two ways to read all of this: a weaker way, and a stronger way. Ac-
cording to the weaker way, we have found that field theories put some pressure on a
dualist to be a bundle theorist rather than a substance-attribute theorist, and that if
this move is made, the bundle theoretic dualist and the supersubstantivalist seem to
come out pretty neck-and-neck. The supersubstantivalist thinks that field values are
properties that are instantiated by spacetime points, and bundle theoretic dualists
think that field values are material point objects (that happen to also just be proper-
ties since bundle theorists take material objects to just be bundle of properties) that
bear an occupancy relation to spacetime points. There may still be a bit of a tilt
in favor of supersubstantivalism here since supersubstantivalists don’t need an occu-
pancy relation. They get by with instantiation alone, which, presumably is a freebie
on the grounds that it, as a part of first-order logic, is part of everyone’s ideology.
But there is also a stronger, more interesting way to read all of this. The difference
between bundle theoretic dualism and supersubstantivalism seems to come down to
whether we ought to call the relation that binds fields to spacetime ‘occupation’
or ‘instantiation’, and whether to call the fields themselves ‘material properties’ or
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‘material objects.’ But this seems to me like a mere semantic issue. If that’s right,
then maybe the two most plausible version of substantivalism in the context of field
theories are, fundamentally, one.
4.4.2 Parsimony
Supersubstantivalism is supposed to be more parsimonious that dualism.22 Con-
sider Sider:
“There is considerable pressure to [identify material with regions of space-
time], for otherwise we seem to gratuitously add a category of entities to
our ontology. All the properties apparently had by an occupant of space-
time can be understood as being instantiated by the region of spacetime
itself. The identification of spatiotemporal objects with the regions is just
crying out to be made. (2001, p. 109-110)”
Schaffer adopts a similar attitude:
“Where the [supersubstantivalist] of any stripe has one sort of substance
. . . the dualistic substantivalist needs two sorts of substances (plus the
containment relation to link them). What is the necessity for the dualistic
doubling of substance types? [. . . ] It is as if the dualist has not just pins
(properties) and pincushions (material objects), but also a sewing table
(the spacetime manifold) on which the pincushions sit. But once one has
the sewing table, the pincushions seem superfluous. Why not push the
pins directly into the table? (2009, p. 137-138)”
Note that the supersubstantivalist’s alleged conservatism is really twofold: he has
a leaner ontology, since he gets by with one type of fundamental, concrete object;
22C.f., Lewis (1986, p. 76), who “oppose[s] the dualist conception as uneconomical”, and Quine
who is critical of “a redundant ontology containing both physical objects and place-times” (1981, p.
17).
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he also has a leaner ideology since he does not require a fundamental occupancy
relation. I think there are two things to think about in relation to this observation.
The first is whether parsimony really counts for much, the second is whether there
is some serious theoretical cost associated with this sort of parsimony. Parsimony is
one among the theoretical virtues. If you maintain that it is important to respect the
theoretical virtues, and gloat about how parsimonious your theory is, you had better
be prepared to respond if the lump pops up in some other part of the rug.
Is supersubstantivalism really more parsimonious than dualism? I think it is clear
from what we saw in §4.4.1 that this really depends on what version of dualism you are
considering. Clearly, supersubstantivalism is more ontologically parsimonious than
substance-attribute dualism, although it seems to be about on a par with bundle the-
oretic dualism. But what about the alleged advantage of ideological parsimony that
supersubstantivalists are supposed to enjoy over dualists? Is this a real or imagined
advantage?
Well, the idea is supposed to be that whereas the dualist ideology involves both
instantiation and occupation – material objects are related to properties by a relation
of instantiation, and to regions of spacetime by a relation of occupation – the super-
substantivalist ideology gets by with instantiation alone. But the bundle-theoretic
dualist doesn’t mention instantiation in their analysis of the relationship between
material objects and regions of spacetime. They say that material objects just are
bundles of properties, and that these bundles occupy spacetime. But here is a worry:
what about the properties and relations that spacetime is supposed to instantiate,
like metric and topological properties and relations? Presumably the dualist requires
an instantiation relation for those properties and relations. But does she? What if
the dualist just gets rid of instantiation altogether? There are two ways to go about
this sort of thing.
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One way involves treating regions of spacetime as bundles of properties, and then
claiming that the spatiotemporal bundles get together with the material bundles via
an occupancy relation. There’s no need for instantiation here. But (and I’ll say a
little more about this later), this might make a substantivalist feel like she is sliding
uncomfortably close to relationalism. According to the sort of view we’re considering,
while its true that there are such things as spacetime regions, it is also true that
reality is made out of nothing but properties and relations, since material objects and
spacetime regions are nothing but bundles of properties standing in various sorts of
relations.
Another way to pull off this sort of trick is to maintain that spacetime is a genuine
substance (not just bundles of properties and relations) but that all of its properties
and relations are mediated by an occupancy relation. That is, it’s not just material
objects that occupy spacetime, but regular properties and relations occupy spacetime,
too. So, to be clear, the idea here is this: (1) spacetime is a substance; (2) there is
no such fundamental relation as instantiation; (3) so the properties and relations of
spacetime are not instantiated by spacetime, but occupy it; (4) material objects are
also related to spacetime by an occupancy relation.23 There is yet another way to
pull off this trick. We could revert to a substance-attribute theory, and say that
the relationship between thin particulars and their properties is occupation rather
than instantiation. On this sort of view, properties and relations occupy material
objects, and material objects occupy regions of spacetime. Again, no need to mention
instantiation. Although, I’ve already said why I don’t like this third view: it is
bloated.24
23Here I would not deny that there are properties in the abundant sense, and that an instantiation
relation holds between them and particulars. Rather, I would deny that the relation that sparse,
immanent properties have to spacetime is anything other than occupation.
24Cowling (2014) develops the idea of replacing instantiation with occupation.
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So, there seem to be ways for a dualist to match not just the ontological parsi-
mony enjoyed by the supersubstantivalist, but also the ideological economy. I think
the two best ways are the bundle-theoretic account that does away with instantiation
and treats spacetime regions as bundles, and the account that takes material objects
to be bundles of properties, and treats the properties and relations of substantival
spacetime as being related to spacetime by an occupancy, rather than an instanti-
ation, relation. If pressed, I’d opt for the former, despite, as I noted earlier, being
suspiciously relational.
4.5 Problems for Supersubstantivalism
There are two sorts of problems for supersubstantivalism that have received some
attention in the literature. The first has to do the fact that the view seems counter-
intuitive, and the second has to do with the possibility of co-location. In this part of
the paper I will discuss both of these problems in detail. What we will find is that
these “problems” are actually salutary to the supersubstantivalist: they force him to
clarify his position.
4.5.1 Counterintuitiveness
Supersubstantivalism is supposed to be counterintuitive. Schaffer, for exam-
ple, notes that “[d]ualistic substantivalism is by far the more natural and popular
view. . . [supersubstantivalism], by contrast, is a revisionary and unpopular view.(2009,
p. 133)” Lehmkuhl observes that “[supersubstantivalism] may seem logically possible
but slightly non-common-sensical.(2015)”25 Hawthorne makes this point in signifi-
cantly more detail:
25C.f. Skow (2005), and Sider (2001, p. 111).
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“One objection one might make against [supersubstantivalism] would be
to point out that its identity claims – say that a certain poached egg
is identical to a region of space-time – seem to directly violate common
sense. More subtly, one might offer an objection based on modal consid-
erations that runs as follows. It is natural to think of space-time regions
as having their spatiotemporal profile essentially, but of their occupants
as having their spatiotemporal profile only accidentally. For example, it
seems obvious that the space-time region I occupy could not have been
shorter in temporal extent, but that I could. If so, and if we accept the
principle concerning identity known as Leibniz’ law (that if x has some
characteristic that y lacks, then x is not identical to y), then I am not
identical to the space-time region that I occupy.
A third argument can be made on similar grounds employing non-modal
properties. Many of the [predicates] that seem true of me sound very
odd when combined with noun phrases that explicitly pick out space-time
regions that I occupy. For example:
The space-time region that I occupy walked to the fish and chip shop
last night.
Here the problem is not so much that the claim conflicts with a previous
explicit commitment about the nature of space-time regions (say, that
space-time regions do not walk to fish and chip shops); rather, it’s that
predicates like ‘walk’ sound very odd in combination with noun phrases
that are explicitly about spacetime regions, whereas they don’t sound
odd at all in combination with noun phrases concerning their occupants.
(2008, p. 265)”
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I don’t really think there are three arguments here. I think there are two. One of
these is an argument to the effect that common sense does not regard the occupants
of spacetime as identical to the regions they occupy: on the one hand, common
sense straightforwardly rejects identity claims involving spacetime regions and their
occupants, and on the other, it recoils from sentences that involve predicating certain
properties of spacetime regions. In both cases the key premise would be the same: if
common sense rejects or recoils from X, then there is some reason to think that X is
false.
The second argument involves modal differences between spacetime regions and
their occupants. This argument is related to the first – in so far as these modal
differences are generated by our common sense intuitions about regions and their
occupants – but it is also quite importantly different from it, since it requires a
different sort of response. So, what we’ll do now is formulate the two arguments in a
concise way, and then consider how a supersubstantivalist ought to respond. One of
the interesting things to note is that there will be different sorts of responses available
to different sorts of supersubstantivalists.
4.5.2 The Argument From Common Sense
We will begin with the argument from common sense. This argument encapsulates
Hawthorne’s first and third complaints from the passage above.
The Argument From Common Sense
P1. Supersubstantivalism entails that the author of War and Peace is a spacetime
region.
P2. Common sense tell us that the author of War and Peace is not a spacetime
region.
P3. If common sense tells us that P, then P.
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C1. So, the author of War and Peace is not a spacetime region.
C2. So, supersubstantivalism is false.
I admit that I am initially tempted to dismiss this as an unimportant argument
on the grounds that we are under no pressure to accept (P3). But I think this
temptation must be resisted. Part of what motivates supersubstantivalism is a respect
for the theoretical virtues. Typically these are taken to involve such properties as
explanitoriness, parsimony, and intuitiveness. Because this framework is implicated
in motivating supersubstantivalism, we can’t very well dismiss it when it fails to suit
us. So we ought to have something fairly substantial to say in reply to the charge that
supersubstantivalism is counterintuitive. As it turns out, I think there is quite a lot
to say. Indeed, some other philosophers have attempted to offer replies on behalf of
supersubstantivalism to the argument from counterintuitiveness. However, it seems
that no one has recognized (1) how much there is to say, and (2) that what sort of
thing is the right thing to say depends on whether one wishes to defend radical or
modest supersubstantivalism.
4.5.2.1 Modest Supersubstantivalism and Neutral Monism
Let us formulate neutral monism like this. Neutral monism is the view that,
fundamentally, reality is composed of one sort of neutral entity, but that there may
be other non-fundamental, non-neutral entities. This view is typically understood in
the context of the philosophy of mind as one concerning the relationship between the
mental and the physical. Neutral monists, like Spinoza, James, Mach, and Russell
have seen neutral monism as a tertium quid in the debate between materialists and
idealists. The idea, in outline, is that both mental and physical phenomena are
non-fundamental, but are reducible to some basic entities that are neither mental,
nor physical, but neutral. These neutral entities all belong to a single fundamental
ontological category.
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Not many people are neutral monists. But that is because it is difficult to properly
deploy in the context of the distinction between the mental and the physical. Might
it be easier to deploy in the context of the distinction between spacetime and matter?
What if we regard the fundamental constituents of reality as points, but think of
them as neither fundamentally material, nor as fundamentally spatiotemporal, but
rather as neutral. These neutral points are nevertheless spatiotemporal in a non-
fundamental sense. They are rightly regarded as spatiotemporal points when we think
of them as things that instantiate a certain subset of their properties and relations –
i.e., the spatiotemporal properties and relations, like metric, topological, affine, etc.
And they are rightly regarded as material points when we think of them as things
that instantiate another subset of their properties and relations – i.e., the material
properties and relations, like mass, charge, and so on.
What this strategy allows us to do is claim, for example, that it is not literally
true that the author of War and Peace is a region of spacetime, since, literally, the
author of War and Peace is an amalgamation of properties that we do not ordinarily
attribute to spacetime. This means that the supersubstantivalist is not committed
to the truth of the sorts of counterintuitive claims he is typically accused of being
committed to. This undermines the claim that supersubstantivalism is counterintu-
itive. Note however, that this sort of strategy is most appropriate to the modest
supersubstantivalist, since it seems to require that there be a legitimate distinction
between material and spatiotemporal properties and relations – a distinction that the
radical supersubstantivalist denies.
4.5.2.2 Radical Supersubstantivalism and the A Posteriori
But there is another avenue of response available to the radical supersubstantival-
ist. To begin, consider Lehmkuhl’s (2015) characterization of the distinction between
modest and radical supersubstantivalism:
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“[M]odest super-substantivalism is not a scientific research programme. It
is not a stance that could motivate research in physics, or serve as guid-
ing principle for such research. Modest super-substantivalism is a purely
metaphysical standpoint that can be taken quite independently from the
physical theory we find to be true, and it is motivated by purely philosoph-
ical advantages. . . That is not bad in itself. But it cannot be denied that
a philosophical standpoint like radical super-substantivalism that can be
fruitful for physics, motivate it and in turn be questioned by it, is a very
desirable thing. . . This is what radically super-substantivalist positions of-
fer: they are programmes that pose a real challenge to physics, offering
fruitful heuristics for scientific research, and can in turn be challenged by
it.”
Modest supersubstantivalism, if true, is true a priori; arguments for it are either
true or false no matter how the world is. The truth of radical supersubstantivalism,
however, is an a posterior matter. Either radical supersubstantivalism is true, or it is
false, but to tell, we’d have to go look at what the world is actually like. We’d have
to go look to see if properties like mass and charge are in fact reducible to the sorts
of properties and relations that spacetime actually instantiates. This is an important
difference, and it bears on the charge that supersubstantivalism is counterintuitive.
Consider Skow’s following observation:
“[One] might oppose supersubstantivalism because it sounds odd to say
that I bought my coffee from a region of spacetime. But, in general, the
demise of ordinary language philosophy has taught us to be suspicious of
arguments that start with it would sound odd to say....’ And in particular,
history should make us suspicious: there was a time when it sounded odd
to say that I bought my coffee from a swarm of elementary particles.
(2005, p. 58-59)”
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The thought here seems to be that the oddness of phrases like ‘I bought my coffee
from a region of spacetime’ derives from our ignorance of the actual state of affairs.
Just as ‘I bought my coffee from a swarm of elementary particles’ sounded odd before
we came to find that things like people are actually swarms of elementary particles,
‘I bought my coffee from a region of spacetime’ will sound odd to the ear that is
ignorant of the fact that things like people are actually regions of spacetime. But just
as coming to find that things like people are actually swarms of elementary particles
should mitigate against the oddness of the phrase ‘I bought my coffee from a swarm
of elementary particles’, so too should coming to find that people are actually regions
of spacetime mitigate against the oddness of the phrase ‘I bought my coffee from a
region of spacetime’.
However, it is important to observe what the actual force of this line of reasoning
is. All this talk of ‘coming to find that such-and-such’ shows us that this line of
reasoning is only appropriate to an a posteriori thesis; it is not appropriate to an a
priori one. So while Skow’s point is inappropriately deployed on behalf of modest
supersubstantivalism, it is just the ticket for the radical supersubstantivalist.
4.5.3 The Argument From De Re Modal Difference
Now we’ll consider an argument against supersubstantivalism based on the intu-
ition that there are some spatiotemporal properties that are contingent to material
objects but essential to the regions they occupy.
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The Argument From De Re Modal Difference
P1. If there is some property P , such that Tolstoy and the region that Tolstoy
occupies differ with respect to P , then supersubstantivalism is false.
P2. The region that Tolstoy occupies has, while Tolstoy lacks, the property being
necessarily 82 years in temporal extent.
C. So, supersubstantivalism is false.
Once again, the correct response to the argument depends on what sort of super-
substantivalism one accepts. The relevant distinction here is between two versions of
modest supersubstantivalism: the constitution view or the identity view.
4.5.3.1 The Constitution View
The constitution view takes material objects – like Tolstoy – to be constituted by
regions of spacetime. The constitution relation, unlike identity, is supposed to allow
for a thing and the stuff it is constituted by to share all of their categorical properties
– like their shape, size, mass, charge, and mereology structure – and yet differ with
respect to their non-categorical properties – like their temporal, or modal properties.
It seems to follow that a constitution supersubstantivalist is in a position to reject
(P1): a region of spacetime and the material object that it constitutes may differ
with respect to the modal property being necessarily 82 years in temporal extent.
But the problem I have with constitution supersubstantivalism is the same prob-
lem that I have with constitution views more generally. It is one thing to stipulate
that there is a relation that allows its relata to share categorical properties while
differing with respect to non-categorical ones, and it is another thing to explain what
it is in virtue of which things may share categorical properties while differing with
respect to non-categorical ones. The latter would be satisfying; the former, which is
the strategy of constitution theorist, is simply mysterious.
113
4.5.3.2 The Identity View
There are at least two ways for an identity supersubstantivalist to respond to the
argument from de re modal difference. One way is to be a counterpart theorist, the
other way is to reject metric essentialism.
Counterpart Theory and Identity Supersubstantivalism Proponents of an
identity view (any of the versions we discussed) could accept counterpart theory as
an account of de re modality.26 Modality de re concerns the relationship between
individuals and certain of their properties. Consider me. I am 6’2”. But my being
6’2” seems contingent. It seems like I could easily have been a little taller or a little
shorter: maybe if I’d eaten more broccoli, I’d have been taller; maybe if I’d eaten
less, I’d have been shorter. I am also human. But perhaps my being human is an
essential property. Perhaps I could not exist without being human. So although I’m
6’2”, I am possibly 6’4”, or 5’11”, or what have you, but I am essentially human.
Counterpart theory is an account of this sort of modality.
According to counterpart theory, I am possibly taller or shorter, not because I
literally exist in some other possibility wherein I am either taller or shorter, but
because I bear a counterpart relation to an individual that is either taller or shorter.
Similarly, if I am essentially human, all of my counterparts are human. Whether
something is one of my counterparts, and thereby represents a possibility for me,
will depend upon qualitative similarities between me and that thing. But qualitative
similarity is a somewhat loose notion, one that seems to be sensitive to context. The
way to factor this in is to take the possibilities for me (and other individuals) to be
sensitive to context: different contexts will make salient different respects of similarity;
different respects of similarity will correspond to different counterpart relations; and
different counterpart relations will underwrite different possibilities.
26C.f., Skow (2005) p. 70-71, and Schaffer (2009) p. 145.
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So in a sense, what is possible for any particular thing is going to depend upon
certain features of context, like what sorts of background assumptions one holds fixed.
For example, if we are discussing physiology, and considering whether or not I might
have been 10 feet tall, or had blue eyes, we are probably holding fixed that I am
human, so all of the relevant counterparts of me are human. But let the context
change. I am playing with toy dinosaurs with my kids and we are talking about what
sorts of dinosaurs they would be. Here we’ll hold different sorts of features fixed –
for example, certain of Ella’s personality traits (like her speed and loud vocalizations:
she’s a velociraptor), and certain of Ben’s (like his penchant for stomping around,
yelling, and just causing general mayhem: he’s a T-rex) – and let their being human
vary.
So now we can apply this to our case. When we think of a spacetime region as
Tolstoy we invoke a context where temporal extent seems to be contingent. This
is simply an artifact of our standard way of thinking of people as being such that
they could possibly have lived a little longer, or died a little sooner. But when we
think of the region as a region of spacetime, we invoke a different context, one where
temporal extent seems to be necessary. This, presumably, is also an artifact of our
standard way of thinking of a region of spacetime as a thing that is individuated by
its extent. So although in both cases we’re talking about the very same entity, one
conceptualization of it suggests one set of possibilities, while another suggests another
set.
Denying Metric Essentialism Metric essentialism is the view that spacetime
points have their metric relations essentially. This is a position that is defended by
Maudlin (1988) in the context of the hole argument against substantivalism. It is not
a popular view among philosophers, and it is rightly eschewed. But, apparently, if
we have the intuition that spacetime regions have their temporal extent essentially,
it is because we are somehow motivated by metric essentialism. I really don’t think
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that we have any strong or clear pre-theoretic intuitions about things like spacetime
regions, at least not any that might bear on the question of whether they do or don’t
have their temporal extent essentially. So it is probably just confusion that leads to
something like (P3) in the first place. But there are further reasons to reject it. Chief
among these it that general relativity and metric essentialism seem at odds. Recall
that according to general relativity, matter covaries with the metric. One consequence
of this is that if you have an unoccupied region, and you plunk a mass down in it, you
thereby change its metric structure. So if you think that metric relations are essential
to spacetime, then (at least in the context of general relativity) you also have to think
that the distribution of masses is essential to spacetime.
4.5.4 Co-Location
Co-location occurs when multiple distinct material objects exactly occupy the
same region of spacetime. This is not like when you and I come to be in the same
office at the same time, or even cram into the same small closet at the same time.
This is more like when you put two different size 12 feet into the same size 12 shoe
at the same time – intuitively, it seems like there just isn’t room for both of them.
Moreover, I am not talking about co-location in the sense that a constitution theorist
might talk about the co-location of statues and lumps of clay. A constitution theorist
might say something like this:
My seated body occupies at a seated-body-shaped region r. Could any-
thing else, you ask, occupy r? Well, look, there are certain identity condi-
tions associated with me, and there are others associated with the stuff of
which I am constituted right now. I, for example, do not cease to be me
upon the gain and loss of parts. I am still the same person before and after
I cut my hair, and before and after I metabolize some food. On the other
hand, the stuff that makes me up right now – that is, a certain quantity
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of molecules – does not survive the gain and loss of parts. If one molecule
is subtracted from a sum of molecules, then that sum becomes a different
sum. So because I and the stuff that constitutes me have different iden-
tity conditions, we are not identical. Because we are not identical, but are
nevertheless such that a temporal part of me exactly occupies the same
region as a temporal part of a certain sum of molecules, exact co-location
is clearly possible. In fact, it’s actual!
But this is importantly different from the sort of co-location I am worried about.
To see this, observe that we’re considering a case where a temporal part of me, call
it ‘tJ’, is co-located with a temporal part of a certain sum of molecules, call it ‘tM’.
Now note that tJ and tM have exactly the same parts. The constitution theorist does
not deny this, she merely denies that this makes them identical. The constitution
theorist will typically attempt to explain spatiotemporal co-location with material co-
location. But the sorts of cases of co-location I am worried about are cases where the
objects that exactly occupy the same region do not have all their parts in common;
they are cases of spatiotemporal co-location without material co-location. From now
on I’ll assume that co-location entails not just that distinct material objects exactly
occupy the same region, but that the objects in question also differ with respect to
some of their parts.
Now why think that this sort of co-location is a genuine possibility? There are
really two sorts of reasons. The first reason is that the causal powers possessed by
material objects are what prevent them from co-locating in the actual world, but there
are good reasons for thinking that causal powers are not essential to the objects that
have them. The second reason is that a reasonable philosophical extrapolation from
contemporary quantum mechanics entails that co-location is not just a metaphysical
possibility, but a physical one – it might even happen all the time right under our
noses!
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Now the problem. Dualists have an easy time of it when they are asked if their
spacetime metaphysics is compatible with co-location. Since material objects and
regions of spacetime are distinct sorts of things which are united by a fundamental
relation of occupation, the dualist can simply claim that a single region can stand
in this relation to multiple, distinct material objects. The supersubstantivalist, on
the other hand, does not have things so easy. If, as the supersubstantivalist seems to
require, material objects are to be analyzed in terms of regions of spacetime, it seems
to follow that co-location is a metaphysical impossibility. A superficial reason for this
is that regions of spacetime cannot occupy entirely distinct regions of spacetime. The
deeper problem here, however, is easy to see when we consider just what co-location
would involve for a supersubstantivalist.
Co-location for a supersubstantivalist cannot involve distinct material objects oc-
cupying the same region of spacetime. This is because the supersubstantivalist does
not think that there is such a relation to be born between material objects and regions
of spacetime (at least not a fundamental relation). Co-location for a supersubstanti-
valist will be analyzed in terms of patterns of property instantiation. Here is what
I mean. Consider a possibility wherein a black and a white billiard ball are set in
motion towards one another. Suppose that at the moment of contact, when the laws
of the actual world would cause them to repel one another, they instead come to rest
in exactly the same place. They perfectly overlap. Now a dualist will be able to ex-
plain the situation by claiming that two billiard balls, one black, and one white, have
come to be located at the exact same region of spacetime. The supersubstantivalist
on the other hand has to say that a region of spacetime has come to be both black
and white (and otherwise billiard ball like). But note that this region is not both
black and white in the way that a tuxedo is – by having some black parts here, and
some white parts there. This region is black all over and white all over. But, so it
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seems, nothing can be both black all over and white all over. So, if co-location is
possible, supersubstantivalist must be false.
So, in the following several sections I’ll develop two lines of argument meant to
support the possibility of co-location. Then I’ll consider how the supersubstantivalist
may reply.
4.5.4.1 The Argument from Causal Powers
Return to the billiard balls. Suppose you have two of them, and you roll them
towards one another on a collision course. What will happen when they collide? They
will bounce off of one another and change course. Why does that happen? Because the
chemical bonds that prevail among the constituting particles of the billiard balls are
pretty tough to sever, and the force of one ball rolling towards the other is insufficient
to break them. If we caused the balls to collide with enough force, we could get
them to break, and even to disintegrate completely, but we could not get them to
pass through one another unaltered in the way that, say, a ghost might pass through
a wall leaving itself and the wall unaltered. Why can’t the billiard balls act like
ghosts? Because the billiard balls instantiate certain properties, and (in the actual
world) these properties realize certain causal powers, and being deflected when struck
is among the effects of these causal powers. But what if those causal powers are
contingent to the properties that realize them? What then?
If the causal powers associated with the relevant properties – in this case, probably
the charge properties of fundamental particles – are contingent, then, arguably, there
are worlds where duplicates of these billiard balls exist, but where these very same
properties do not cause the billiard balls to bounce off of one another, but rather
allow them to pass through one another like ghosts. But if there are worlds where
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this sort of thing happens, then there are worlds where things co-locate, since the
billiard balls, or parts of them, co-locate as they pass through one another.27
Now, this way of arguing for the possibility of co-location hinges on the idea that
properties have internal essences, that their being the property that they are goes
beyond simply a propensity to bring about such-and-such causes. This is quidditism.
Quidditism is a controversial thesis. The main alternative to it is the view that
properties are individuated by, and so essentially connected to, the causal powers
they confer. Call this necessitarianism.28 Shoemaker (1980), for example, opposes
quidditism, and accepts a version of necessitarianism. He claims that “[o]nly if some
[necessitarian] theory of properties is true [. . . ] can it be explained how properties
are capable of engaging our knowledge, and our language, in the way they do.” We’d
be shrouded in ignorance, so far as properties go, if quidditism were true.
But quidditism has its proponents. Among them, David Lewis (2009), who agrees
with Shoemaker’s assessment that quidditism entails a kind of ignorance, but dis-
agrees that this warrants its rejection. Instead, he says, it requires humility con-
cerning our knowledge about the fundamental properties. Schaffer (2005) argues that
quidditists can, after all, know something of the fundamental properties. He considers
a variety of versions of quidditism and necessitarianism and ends up defending a view
that he calls quiddistic contingentism. Quiddistic contingentism says several things.
First, it says that properties are trans-world entities, rather than world-bound ones.
This means that the very same property P – not, mind you, a counterpart of P – ex-
ists in more than one world. Second, properties can recombine with any “lawmakers”,
27I anticipate some nit-picking here. Someone might say: while billiard balls seem pretty dense,
really they are mostly empty space, their constituting particles maintaining their distances from one
another in virtue of the strong and electroweak forces. To this I reply: fine; then substitute the case
where we are considering a single fundamental particle. If that still won’t satisfy, then consider a
non-actual case involving something like a billiard ball that is perfectly continuous – i.e., its material
parts are point-sized and can be mapped one-to-one and onto to the spacetime points of the region
it occupies.
28C.f. Schaffer (2005).
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where lawmakers are understood to be whatever entities one accepts in the analysis
of laws of nature.29
I’m not sure how many people accept quidditistic contingentism. But Schaffer
does. And, considering he seems to be one of the most vocal proponents of super-
substantivalism, and also one who is dismissive of the possibility of co-location qua
challenge to supersubstantivalism, this seems quite enough. So, let us assume that
quidditistic contingentism is true. It seems to follow that co-location is possible, since
the only thing – at least the only things aside from a prior commitment to supersub-
stantivalism – that prevent co-location are the actual causal powers associated with
certain of the properties of matter.
4.5.4.2 The Argument from Quantum Mechanics
Begin by distinguishing state dependent properties from state independent prop-
erties. A state dependent property is a quantity of a physical system that changes
in some manner over time. Examples include things like position and momentum.
State independent properties are properties of a physical system that do not change
over time. Examples include things like mass and charge. So physical systems are
first categorized by their state independent properties, and then their dynamics are
characterized in term of their state dependent properties.
The state dependent properties of a non-relativistic quantum mechanical system
may be represented either by a high-dimensional vector space over the complex num-
bers,30 or by a wave function over configuration space.31 To begin, suppose that A
is a quantum system composed of a single electron, that V is the associated vector
29For Lewis (1973, 1983) the lawmakers will be those regularities that correspond to the set of
true, deductive systems with the most favorable overall balance of strength and simplicity.
30A complex number is a number of the form a + bi, where a&b ∈ R, and i = √−1
31There is an exception to this rule. The spin state of a particle is a state independent property
of that particle, but it is nevertheless characterized by a vector space.
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space, and that C is the associated configuration space. A state of A, then, may ei-
ther be represented by a state vector, |ψ〉, in V or by a wave function Ψ(r, t) over C.
Once again, the vector space V, and the configuration space C are merely alternative
means of encoding the same information. As we’ll see, it is sometimes more natural
to appeal to the wave function formulation, and other times more natural to appeal
to the state vector formulation.
To begin, observe that the state vector or wave function representing the state of
a quantum system provides an exhaustive description of that system in terms of its
state-dependent properties. Among these state-dependent properties is a property
that corresponds to location. This will be our focus.
So how is it that the information regarding the location of a quantum system
is generated? –Well, it turns out that the sort of information quantum mechanics
generates about the locations of particles is probabilistic. That is, given a system
A, we are told, for each region of space r, and for a time t, what the probability of
finding A at r would be, were we to measure A’s location at t.
When doing this sort of calculation, the wave function formulation is most conve-
nient. So what we need is a means of generating a probability measure from the wave
function Ψ(r, t). The problem is that because the configuration space over which the
wave function operates is complex, the value of the wave function will be a complex
number. But a complex number is not the sort of thing that can straightforwardly be
taken to encode a probability value, that is, some number n, such that n ∈ [0,1]. So
what we do is take the absolute square of the wave function summed over the relevant
regions of space. This will give us a positive real in the interval [0,1].
Now suppose we want to know where a quantum system A is, but we haven’t
done any measurements yet. Here is what we know: we know that if we measure A
for exact location, we will find A’s exact location. Here is what we don’t know: we
don’t know, prior to measuring, which region is A’s exact location, and, what’s more
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puzzling, we don’t even know if there is any region that is A’s exact location. All we
know is that, if we do make a measurement, it will turn up an exact location. So,
while nothing prior to measuring A for its exact location will allow us to derive A’s
exact location, what we can do is appeal to a formula that will give us a probability
distribution corresponding to A’s exact location upon measurement.
Now suppose we want to consider the probability of finding A’s exact location,
r, to be in some region R. In that case, to get the probability that the region r,
at which A is exactly located, is a subregion of R, we integrate over the probability
amplitudes of each subregion of R using the formula:
Pr∈R =
∫
R
|Ψ(r, t)|2dr (4.1)
Note that this is essentially just summation of the probabilities associated with points
in R; the complication is induced by the fact that there are continuum many points
in a region, each with probability 0, so countable additivity will not be helpful in
generating a non-zero probability measure. This is why we use integration rather
than summation.
4.5.4.3 Co-Locating Bosons
According to the standard model of particle physics, there are two classes of fun-
damental particles: fermions and bosons. Fermions are mass-carrier particles which
are associated with matter. Bosons are force-carrier particles and mediate all of the
fundamental forces (i.e., electromagnetism, and the strong and weak forces). What
these two classes of particle have in common is that individual instances of each class
are indistinguishable from one another. That is, if you take an aggregate of photons
– which are a type of boson – each will be qualitatively indistinguishable from all
the others. Two photons never differ with respect to any state-independent property.
This is actually a general feature of quanta.
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There is, however, one very important respect in which bosons and fermions differ.
Fermions and bosons differ with respect to the statistics associated with composite
systems of which they are members. Composite fermionic systems always occupy
antisymmetric states, and composite bosonic systems always occupy symmetric states.
Here is what this means. First, note that the state vector of a composite system is
built up out of the state vectors of the components of that system by appealing to
the following rule (given a simple two-particle case):
|ψcomposite〉 =
∫
x,y
A(x = r1, y = r2)|x = r1, y = r2〉 (4.2)
Now consider a law that applies to Fermions:
A(x = r1, y = r2) = −A(x = r2, y = r1) (4.3)
This is ultimately a claim about the relationship between the probabilities associated
with the component vectors in a composite system. To see what this claim amounts
to, consider a composite system with two component fermions, x and y. Suppose
that fermion x is exactly located at region r1, and fermion y is exactly located at
region r2. This state of affairs will be represented by the vector, |x = r1, y = r2〉, and
will have an amplitude A(x = r1, y = r2). What (4.3) says is that if the amplitude
A(x = r1, y = r2) of |x = r1, y = r2〉 is equal to n, then the amplitude of the vector
describing the state of affairs consisting in x being exactly located at r2 and y being
exactly located at r1 must be −n. But note that there is only one case where n = −n,
and that is when n = 0. But now this straightforwardly carries over to probability
values. If the amplitude of a vector |ψ〉 is n, then the probability that |ψ〉 describes
that state of the system it corresponds to is |n|2. So when the amplitude of a vector
|ψ〉 is 0, that entails that the probability that |ψ〉 describes the state of the system it
corresponds to is 0 as well (since |0|2 = 0). The upshot here is that the antisymmetry
requirement given by (4.3) entails that fermions never exactly occupy the same region.
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But now consider the parallel law for bosons:
A(x = r1, y = r2) = A(x = r2, y = r1) (4.4)
The importance of this law is this: if the amplitude of the vector representing the state
of affairs consisting in two bosons, x and y, being arranged with x exactly located at
r1 and y exactly located at r2 is n, then the amplitude of the vector representing the
state of affairs consisting in x and y being arranged with x exactly located at r2 and
y exactly located at r1 is n as well. To make this clear, consider just r1 for a moment.
This law says that if x is exactly located at r1, then y may be exactly located there
as well.
The state vector of a bosonic system is still well-defined in the case where the
bosons are exactly co-located. This means that among the elements in the configura-
tion space of non-relativistic quantum mechanics are elements that involve co-located
bosons.
4.5.4.4 Co-Located Bosons and Modal Plenitude
So, I’ve just taken pains to show that it is compatible with an orthodox, collapse
version of non-relativistic quantum mechanics that bosons co-locate. So what? Quan-
tum mechanics is simply a mathematical algorithm for making predictions about the
outcomes of measurements of physical systems. It does not come packaged either
with a compulsory formalism – there are non-collapse theories, there is relativistic
field theory, etc – or with a compulsory ontology. So we need more than the bare
observation that a particular version of quantum mechanics entails such-and-such
before we are under any pressure to recognize such-and-such as a genuine possibility.
What we need is an account of modal plenitude according to which the coherency
of a physical theory gives us reason to believe that each of the states that are compat-
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ible with it represent genuine possibilities. 32 Rather than defend such a principle in
detail, I’ll just consider what one might say against it. To begin, I am asking that we
begin with a physical theory and consider whether or not it is coherent. If we have
reason to think it is, then, so I say, we have reason to believe in the possibilities that
are compatible with it. Rather than confront the sophisticated case of co-locating
bosons directly, begin by considering the following simple case: in classical mechan-
ics, dynamical interactions are sometimes modeled by point particles. Sometimes
we want to consider what happens when point particles collide, or, from the four-
dimensional perspective, what happens when then their world-lines intersect. The
standard approach to modeling this sort of phenomenon involves treating the point
particles as being co-located at the spacetime region where their world-lines intersect.
Such cases represent straightforward case of co-location.
So, I say: if classical mechanics is coherent, then such cases give us reason to think
that co-location is possible. Moreover, classical mechanics is coherent, so these cases
do give us reason to think that co-location is possible.
But am I putting the cart before the horse here? Perhaps what we ought to do,
at least in some cases, is to start by asking what possibilities are entailed by a theory,
and then use these possibilities as guides to the theory’s coherence. If the theory
entails outlandish possibilities, then it isn’t coherent; if it doesn’t entail outlandish
possibilities, then it is coherent. But co-location – I can imagine someone saying
32As it turns out, Bricker (1991) offers an account of plenitude that entails the sorts of possibilities
I am concerned with here. Consider Bricker’s principle (B).
(B) We have warranted belief that a structure is logically possible if that structure plays, or has
played, an explanatory role in our theorizing about the actual world.
Because orthodox quantum mechanics and Newtonian mechanics with point particles have played
explanatory roles in our theorizing about the actual world, we are warranted in believing the struc-
tures posited by these theories to be logically possible. These theories posit structures that involve
co-locating entities, so we are warranted in believing that co-located entities are logically possible.
Note also that while I use the concept of coherency in my discussion above, this is compatible with
Bricker’s (B): a theory’s having genuine explanatory power entails that it is coherent.
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– isn’t coherent. So classical mechanics isn’t coherent – at least not when we take
these sorts of cases literally, and not as “convenient fictions”, idealizations that make
calculations easier.
This is actually a difficult issue. Here is what I think: there are standards for con-
sistency within mathematics (which may themselves be grounded in logic), and these
standards are more rigorous and less subjective than the standards set by our intu-
itions alone. So when we attempt to undermine, or drastically reconstrue a physical
theory that meets these standards for mathematical consistency, and we do so on the
grounds that this physical theory generates counterintuitive possibilities, we do so at
our peril. It is legitimate to use intuition as a guide to rejecting or accepting certain
views in the absence of other standards, but it is not legitimate to allow intuition to
trump something like mathematical consistency. For these reasons, I think there is
real pressure to accommodate the possibility of co-location.
So, we’ve seen that the orthodox, collapse version of quantum mechanics entails
that co-location is possible. Moreover, I’ve given some reasons to think that, if a
coherent physical theory entails that such-and-such is possible, then we have reason
to think that such-and-such is possible. I assume that the orthodox, collapse version
of quantum mechanics is coherent in the sense I think is relevant. So we have reason
to think co-location is possible.
4.5.5 Supersubstantivalism and Co-Location
So, we seem to have two compelling reasons for thinking that co-location is a
genuine possibility. How should a supersubstantivalist respond? It seems to me there
are two sorts of responses available, but only one of them is good. The first response
– the one I do not like – is to try to deny that co-location is a genuine possibility, the
second is to embrace this possibility and see where it leads. I’ll address the first of
these responses first, and the second one second.
127
4.5.5.1 Tollensing The Argument
Here is an argument:
The Argument from Co-location
(P1.) If co-location is possible, then supersubstantivalism is false.
(P2.) Co-location is possible.
(C.) So, supersubstantivalism is false.
This is an argument that a dualist might give against a supersubstantivalist.33 I
have just argued that (P2) is true. Schaffer (2009) disagrees. He is dismissive of the
Argument From Co-Location on the grounds that (P2) is false. What is the argument
against (P2)? Something like this:
The Argument Against Co-location
(P1∗.) If co-location is possible, then supersubstantivalism is false.
(P2∗.) Supersubstantivalism is true.
(C∗.) So, co-location is not possible.
I do not think responding to the argument from co-location by appeal to the ar-
gument against co-location is a viable strategy. The primary reason for this has to do
with the source of the pressure to accommodate the respective theses: the pressure to
accommodate co-location comes both from physics and metaphysics, while the pres-
sure to be supersubstantivalists (at least of the moderate version under consideration)
is purely metaphysical. If the benefits to total theory of supersubstantivalism were
great, and unable to be met elsewhere, I might be persuaded to accept the argument
33Indeed, this is an argument that Hawthorne (2008) does give.
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against co-location. But this is not the state of things. We have seen that the bundle-
theoretic dualist is pretty close to equal with the supersubstantivalist in the context
of field theory, and so the main advantage of supersubstantivalism is that it is more
parsimonious. But denying a possibility that physics countenances on the grounds of
parsimony alone seems to me a bad move.
4.5.5.2 Supersubstantivalism and The Compresence Relation
What a supersubstantivalist should do is accept something a lot like a bundle
theory. Bundle theories typically require something called a compresence relation.34
Compresence is a primitive, second-order equivalence relation on n-tuples of prop-
erties (either universals or tropes). Now, I’ve earlier suggested that a dualist is
well-advised, in the context of field theory, to be a bundle theorist. So, let us restate
the version of dualism that is suggested by field theory. First, material objects are
to be analyzed in terms of bundles of properties. To get the properties bundled into
discrete objects, we need the compresence relation. Next, we take the occupation
relation to hold between bundles of compresent properties and regions of spacetime.
Now, the supersubstantivalist, to deal with the problem posed by co-location, can
ape the dualist.
First, the supersubstantivalist should appeal to a relation of compresence among
properties in order to underwrite the distinctness of material objects. Consider a
case of two 1g point masses, a and b, with perpendicular trajectories that intersect
at some point p. Because a and b are distinct before and after p, we are under some
real pressure to regard them as distinct at p, even though they are co-located. The
dualist is in a position to make this accommodation. Indeed, the dualist who is also a
bundle theorist can make the accommodation twice over! Here is what I mean. At p
the bundle-theoretic dualist can claim that a and b are distinct on the grounds that p
34This is Russell’s terms. See Armstrong (1989, Chapter 4) for discussion.
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bears the occupation relation to a, and a separate instance of the occupation relation
to b. But she can also claim that, at p, a is distinct from b on the grounds that there
are two instances of the compresence relation – one that holds between a and itself,
and the other that holds between b and itself. The supersubstantivalist who accepts
compresence – let’s call him the compresence supersubstantivalist – can appeal to this
second strategy, and derive the same result.
This compresence supersubstantivalist must reject the identity view: if a is identi-
cal to p and b is identical to p, then it immediately follows that a is identical to b, but
that’s just what we’re trying to avoid. But what positive thesis does he accept? The
basic idea is simple: material objects are to be analyzed as bundles of compresent
properties instantiated by spacetime. This is sort of a hybrid of a substance-attribute
theory and a bundle theory, since we have bundles of compresent properties, but we
also have a substance – spacetime regions – that instantiate them. On this view
material objects are not identical to regions of spacetime, rather, they are identical
to regions of spacetime together with property bundles. So, the property bundles
associated with a and b are distinct on the grounds that one includes the relational
property being compresent with b while the other includes the relational property be-
ing compresent with a. This keep a and b distinct at p despite being co-located at
p.35
4.6 Conclusion
We’ve considered a variety of arguments that bear on the issue of dualism as op-
posed to supersubstantivalism. There are several important themes that we ought
to walk away with. First, radical supersubstantivalism is an intriguing thesis, and it
35Note that these relational properties – being compresent with a, etc. – are not fundamental. But
perhaps only the fundamental properties are included in bundles. If that is so, then what’s to keep
a and b distinct? Deciding in favor of tropes along with primitivism about their individuation will
may solve this problem.
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seems that some optimism for its prospects is warranted. But it remains an unfulfilled
ambition, and we shouldn’t hold supersubstantivalism hostage to the development of
its radical variant. Second, it is far less clear than usually advertised that supersub-
stantivalism is less commonsensical, but more parsimonious, than dualism.
We have seen that the supersubstantivalist has a number of responses to the ar-
guments derived from common sense. We have also seen that field theory makes
substance-attribute dualism seem bloated. This should prompt a dualist to be a
bundle-theoretic dualist. The contingency of causal powers, and some cases from
physics, create pressure to accommodate the possibility of co-location. In order to
make the accommodation, the supersubstantivalist should be a compresence super-
substantivalist. So how do these two views compare? Well, a bundle-theoretic dualist
uses the term ‘material object’ to refer to bundles of compresent material properties,
and he uses the term ‘occupation’ to refer to the fundamental relation that binds
material objects to regions of spacetime. The compresence supersubstantivalist, on
the other hand, uses the term ‘instantiation’ to refer to the relation born between
bundles of compresent material properties and regions of spacetime, and he uses the
term ‘material object’ to refer to regions of spacetime together with the bundles of
compresent properties they instantiate. As I have said, this debate does not strike
me as a substantive metaphysical debate, it is merely a debate about which are more
appropriate terms for various relations and entities.
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APPENDIX A
MANIFOLDS
Let’s consider how to build a manifold. Begin by recalling that a topological space
(X, τ) is a set of points X equipped with a characterization of which sets are open
and closed, given by τ . Now we characterize some basic notions concerning means of
comparing topological spaces. To do this we begin with the notion of a map between
topological spaces. A map φ : M → N is a correlative relationship between the space
M – called the domain of φ – and the space N – called the image of M under φ.
Next, we need the notion of composition of maps. Begin with the map φ : Rm →
Rn. Here we may think of the map from Rm to Rn as one that takes the m-tuple
(x1, x2, . . . xm) to the n-tuple (y1, y2, . . . yn). This allows us to think of φ : Rm → Rn
as a collection of functions. In particular, it allows us to think of φ as a collection
of n functions φi, one for each of the yi, that acts on the m-tuple. So, to get y1, for
example, you allow φ1 to operate on (x1, x2, . . . xm); to get y2, you allow φ2 to operate
on (x1, x2, . . . xm), and so on.
Next we consider each of these functions φi. If the P th derivative of φi exists, then
we say that φi is a CP function – that is, continuous to degree P . To determine the
degree of continuity of the map φ : Rm → Rn you check to see to what degree each of
the functions – the φi – are continuous. If it turns out that each of the φi are at least
P times differentiable, then the map φ : Rm → Rn is said to be P times differentiable,
and if the map is infinitely differentiable, the map is said to be smooth or C∞.
The next notion we require is that of a chart. A chart is a pair (U, φ), where
U is a subset of a topological space (X, τ) and φ is a one-to-one map φ : U → Rn,
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where φ(U) is open in Rn. In English: a chart is a pair, the first member of which
is a specified subset of a topological space, and the second member of which is a
means of correlating that subset with an open subset of a coordinate representation
of Euclidean space. Now consider two charts (Uα, φα) and (Uβ, φβ) on an arbitrary
(not necessarily Euclidean) topological space (X, τ). Suppose that (Uα ∩ Uβ) 6= 0.
Now, φα maps (Uα ∩ Uβ) to an open subset of Rn. Let us call this open subset Φ.
φβ maps (Uα ∩ Uβ) to an open subset of Rn. Let us call this open subset Ψ. Now,
because Uα and Uβ share a common set of points as subsets, we expect that there
be a relationship between Φ and Ψ. At a raw, intuitive level, because Φ and Ψ are
coordinatizations of Uα and Uβ, respectively, and because Uα and Uβ share a common
set of points, Φ and Ψ involve two alternative descriptions of the very same points.
Because they are alternative ways of describing the same things, we expect that they
themselves are related in some way. It turns out that the relationship between Φ and
Ψ is given by a special mapping that is the composition of φα and the inverse of φβ.
This gives us the notion of a transition map, τα,β : φα(Uα ∩ Uβ) → φβ(Uα ∩ Uβ),
which is given by τα,β = (φα ◦ φ−1β ). Such maps are defined for all and only such
charts as involve subsets whose intersections are non-empty.
Now that we have the notions of continuity, of a chart, and of a transition map
between charts, we are ready to characterize the notion of an atlas.
Definition A.0.1. A collection of charts {(Uα, φα)} is a C∞ atlas if and only if:
1.
⋃
Uα = M .
2. For any two charts (Uα, φα) and (Uβ, φβ), such that (Uα ∩ Uβ) 6= 0, there exists
a C∞ transition map (φα ◦ φ−1β ) : φα(Uα ∩ Uβ)→ φβ(Uα ∩ Uβ).
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We will say that an atlas is maximal if it is not possible to add another chart that
is compatible with those already included. Now, finally, we are ready to give the
definition of a manifold.
Definition A.0.2. A C∞ manifoldM is a topological space equipped with a max-
imal atlas.
...
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APPENDIX B
MODEL-DETERMINISM AND WORLD-DETERMINISM
The first step in the hole argument involves showing that GR models violate a type
of model-theoretic determinism. The second step involves saddling substantivalism
with an interpretation of models in terms of worlds that causes this model-theoretic
determinism to be reproduced among collections of worlds. Butterfield, for example,
begins his discussion of the hole argument by claiming that “[t]he basic idea of de-
terminism is this: a spacetime theory is deterministic if any two of its models that
agree on the physical state at one time agree on the physical state at any other time.
(1989, p. 2)” He then goes on to claim that “the basic idea of determinism is that a
single physically possible world is specified by the physical state on a certain region of
spacetime. . . Since [my] definitions are cast in terms of models . . . rather than possible
worlds . . . I need to consider the relation between models and possible worlds. (1989,
p. 11)”1 As we can see, the idea is that we begin with a conception of determinism
in terms of a theory’s models. Then we implement a principle of interpretation that
allows us to transpose that notion to the realm of the theory’s worlds.
Let us begin with the following notion of determinism in terms of models.
Model Determinism (MD): For all GR models,M andM′, and for all cauchy
surfaces Σ found inM and Σ′ found inM′, if Σ agrees with Σ′, thenM agrees
with M′.
Then we may formulate a corresponding notion of determinism in terms of worlds.
1See also Melia (1999, p. 656) Brighouse (1994, p. 118), and Butterfield (1988).
135
World Determinism (WD): For all GR worlds w and w′, and for all maximal
achronal subregions S of w and S ′ of w′, if S agrees with S ′, then w agrees
with w′.
In both cases the task now is to spell out what agreement ought to consist in.
We’ll begin with MD.
I talked a lot about how the distinction between members of a common D-class of
models is grounded in the relationship between individualistic and non-individualistic
properties: while all members of a common D-class are alike in which individualistic
and non-individualistic properties they posses, they differ in how those individualistic
and non-individualistic properties are co-instantiated. Now because both of these
varieties of property are relevant to the identity conditions for models, we might
anticipate that what it means for models to agree is for them to fail to differ with
respect to either of them. In other words, we might expect to cash-out agreement
between models in the following way:
M-Agreement 1: models M and M′ M-agree 1 iff: M and M′ involve
the same pattern of co-instantiation of individualistic and non-individualistic
properties.
Likewise, we might expect to cash-out agreement between cauchy surfaces in the
following way:
C-Agreement 1: cauchy surfaces Σ and Σ′ C-agree 1 iff: Σ and Σ′ involve
the same pattern of co-instantiation of individualistic and non-individualistic
properties.
Next, we parlay these notions into the following notion of determinism:
Model Determinism (MD1): GR satisfies MD1 iff: for all GR models, M
and M′, and for all cauchy surfaces Σ found in M and Σ′ found in M′: if
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Σ and Σ′ involve the same pattern of co-instantiation of individualistic and
non-individualistic properties then, M and M′ involve the same pattern of co-
instantiation of individualistic and non-individualistic properties.
But GR’s models will violate MD1. Here is why. Recall that the effect of a
(non-trivial automorphic) diffeomorphism is a rearrangement of the pattern of co-
instantiation of individualistic and non-individualistic properties across points. So if
you start with a modelM and you apply a diffeomorphism d to it, the model you end
up with d(M) will involve the same individualistic and non-individualistic properties
as M, but will differ with M over the pattern in which the individualistic and non-
individualistic properties are co-instantiated. Now, among the sorts of diffeomorphism
one could consider in this capacity are so-called “hole diffeomorphisms.” A hole
diffeomorphism h is a trivial diffeomorphism over some initial segment of a model, but
then becomes non-trivial within some segment. The segment of the model where h is
non-trivial is called ‘the hole.’ The overall effect of h on a modelM is the generation of
a new model h(M), whereM and h(M) are exactly alike with respect to individualistic
and non-individualistic properties and with respect to how those properties are co-
instantiated, except for within an arbitrarily small region, the hole. Within the hole
M and h(M) differ over the pattern of co-instantiation of individualistic and non-
individualistic properties.
So, now here is why this causes a violation of MD1. Consider two models M and
h(M) related by a hole diffeomorphism. Consider a cauchy surface Σ from M and a
cauchy surface Σ′ from h(M) such that Σ′ is prior to the hole in h(M). Because h is
trivial over all segments outside of the hole, Σ and Σ′ will involve the same pattern
of co-instantiation of individualistic and non-individualistic properties. It does not
follow from this, however, thatM and h(M) will globally involve the same pattern of
co-instantiation of individualistic and non-individualistic properties, since there is a
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region – the hole – whereM and h(M) differ in this respect. So GR’s models violate
MD1.
But so what? Perhaps this by itself isn’t all that worrying, since a violation
of MD1 doesn’t automatically have any physical significance. The models of GR,
after all, are just “heuristic devices”; they’re useful for helping us picture what really
matters: GR’s worlds.2 But the problem is, with LI in place, given diffeomorphic
models M and h(M), we are committed to diffeomorphically related worlds w and
h(w). Diffeomorphically related worlds will violate a notion of determinism that is
important. To see this, let’s first extract the relevant notion of determinism. We’ll
begin with a notion of agreement between worlds.
W-Agreement 1: worlds w and w′ W-agree 1 iff: w and w′ involve the same
pattern of co-instantiation of individualistic and non-individualistic properties.
Next, we need a notion of agreement that corresponds to the notion of agree-
ment between cauchy surfaces. This will be a notion of agreement between maximal
achronal subregions.
S-Agreement 1: maximal achronal subregions S and S ′ S-agree 1 iff: S
and S ′ involve the same pattern of co-instantiation of individualistic and non-
individualistic properties.
Now we can use these notions to formulate a notion of determinism for worlds
that corresponds to the notion we developed earlier in terms of models.
World Determinism 1 (WD1): GR satisfies WD1 iff: for all GR worlds,
w and w′, and for all maximal achronal subregions S in w and S ′ in w′: if
2Norton, for example, points out that a notion of determinism that remains confined solely to
GRs models “is usually dismissed as a purely mathematical gauge freedom associated with active
general covariance. (1993, 825)” See also Butterfield (1989, 10-11).
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S and S ′ involve the same pattern of co-instantiation of individualistic and
non-individualistic properties then, w and w′ involve the same pattern of co-
instantiation of individualistic and non-individualistic properties.
As I have noted in 2.4, haecceitist substantivalism violates WD1 (although, I called
it ‘WD’). Let’s walk through this more carefully. Begin with two modelsM and h(M)
related by a hole diffeomorphism. Now, under the assumption of Haec, givenM and
h(M), we commit ourselves to worlds w and h(w) that differ in an analogous way.
Recall that M and h(M) are exactly alike save for within some arbitrarily small
region. With this regionM and h(M) differ with respect to the pattern in which the
individualistic and non-individualistic properties are co-instantiated – that is, they
differ with respect to which points have which values of g and T . Similarly, w and
h(w) will be exactly alike save for within some arbitrarily small region, H. Within
H, w and h(w) will differ with respect to the pattern in which the individualistic and
non-individualistic properties are co-instantiated – that is, they differ with respect
to which points have which determinates of g and T. Given this, it will be possible
to select some maximal achronal subregion S in w, and another maximal achronal
subregion in S ′ in h(w) prior to H, such that S and S ′ involve the same pattern of co-
instantiation of individualistic and non-individualistic properties. And yet, because
w and h(w) differ within H, it does not follow from the fact that S and S ′ agree in
this way, that w and h(w) do, too.
As I noted in 2.4.3, the haecceitist substantivalist can respond to this issue by
substituting a new notion of determinism. Here is one way to do this. First, it turns
out that there is a notion of determinism in terms of models that GR satisfies. Instead
of appealing to a notion of agreement that requires the patterns of co-instantiation of
individualistic and non-individualistic properties to be identical, we appeal to a notion
that requires them to merely be related smoothly. This will give us the following
notion of agreement.
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M-Agreement 2: models M and M′ M-agree 2 iff: M and M′ involve the
same individualistic and non-individualistic properties, and the patterns of co-
instantiation of individualistic and non-individualistic properties in M and M′
are related by a smooth transformation.
By way of explaining what I mean here by a smooth transformation, let’s consider
the following game. You have a pegboard covered with hooks. There are two rings
hanging on each hook – a blue one and a red one. The rings are tied to their immediate
neighbors with pieces of string. The object of the game is to rearrange rings across
hooks while satisfying three constraints. First, if a particular blue and a particular
red ring are together on a hook, you cannot move them independently – they are a
pair, they have to stay together. Second, every hook has to have one blue and one
red ring after rearranging – no hook can be naked, and no hook can have more than
two rings. Third, you cannot ever break any of the strings holding rings to their
neighbors. Now, I’ll say that a smooth transformation, in the context of the game, is
a transformation of rings across hooks that satisfies the three constraints.
Its likely obvious, but I’ll be explicit anyways: a pegboard with hooks is like a
model, the hooks are like the individualistic properties of manifold points, and the
red and blue rings are like the non-individualistic properties of models – the values
of the metric and stress-energy tensors fields. The first constraint forces the metric
and stress-energy to be coordinated. You cannot pair stress-energy and metric values
willy-nilly and still satisfy the field equations. The second constraint ensures that
every point gets a field value, and no point gets more than one value of a particular
field. The third constraint forces the topology of the non-individualistic properties to
remain the same while allowing the relationship between the individualistic and non-
individualistic properties to change – the strings force neighboring points to remain
neighboring points. So a smooth transformation in the context of a model is a trans-
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formation of non-individualistic properties across individualistic ones that satisfies
the above three constraints.
Next, we can make the corresponding amendment to C-agreement 1, which gives
us the following:
C-Agreement 2: cauchy surfaces Σ and Σ′ C-agree 2 iff: Σ and Σ′ involve
the same individualistic and non-individualistic properties, and the patterns of
co-instantiation of individualistic and non-individualistic properties in Σ and Σ′
are related by a smooth transformation.
This then gives us MD2:
Model Determinism 2 (MD2): GR satisfies MD2 iff: for all GR models,M
andM′, and for all cauchy surfaces Σ found inM and Σ′ found inM′: if Σ and
Σ′ involve the same individualistic and non-individualistic properties, and the
patterns of co-instantiation of individualistic and non-individualistic properties
in Σ and Σ′ are related by a smooth transformation then, M and M′ involve
the same individualistic and non-individualistic properties, and the patterns of
co-instantiation of individualistic and non-individualistic properties in M and
M′ are related by a smooth transformation.
Now, just as we mimicked MD1 for the purposes of generating WD1, we can mimic
MD2 for the purposes of generating a physically significant notion of determinism that
GR’s worlds will satisfy. We begin with a notion of agreement between worlds.
W-Agreement 2: worlds w and w′ W-agree 2 iff: w and w′ involve the
same individualistic and non-individualistic properties, and the patterns of co-
instantiation of individualistic and non-individualistic properties in w and w′
are related by a smooth transformation.
Next, we characterize agreement between maximal achronal subregions.
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S-Agreement 2: maximal achronal subregions S and S ′ S-agree 2 iff: S and
S ′ involve the same individualistic and non-individualistic properties, and the
patterns of co-instantiation of individualistic and non-individualistic properties
in S and S ′ are related by a smooth transformation.
This will give us the following notion of determinism.
World Determinism 2 (WD2): GR satisfies WD2 iff: for all GR worlds, w
and w′, and for all maximal achronal subregions S of w and S ′ of w′: if S and
S ′ involve the same individualistic and non-individualistic properties, and the
pattern of co-instantiation of individualistic and non-individualistic properties
in S and S ′ is related by a smooth transformation then, w and w′ involve the
same individualistic and non-individualistic properties, and the patterns of co-
instantiation of individualistic and non-individualistic properties in w and w′
are related by a smooth transformation.
GR’s worlds will satisfy WD2. But this victory requires the concession on the
part of the haecceitist substantivalist that haecceitistic differences between worlds
are irrelevant. The solution that I offer gives a haecceitist substantivalist a way to
have two notions of determinism: WD1 (again, in 2.4 I called it ‘WD’), which can see
haecceitistic differences, and RD which is blind to haecceitistic differences.
...
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